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PHILOSOPHICAL AUD TERMINOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
The principle of homogeneity
This study crust begin with a recognition of the necessary inadequacy
of its approach to a complex subject. Any attempt to separate out
Bonnefoy's poetic theory from the entire corpus of his work, in
verse and prose, must betray the essence of that theory by the vere¬
process of extraction: for in an important sense Bonnefoy's theory
is not theory at all. It is an integral part of the coherent line
of literary research which Bonnefoy has carried on over thirty years
- that part which is principally, rather than incidentally, informed
by what he calls 'mon besoin maladroit d'une pensee coherente?
(AP, p.131).^^ In the development of Bonnefoy's poetic thought (if
one may thus roughly translate 'pensee poetique', the thought expressed
through poetry, and with poetry's own internal logic, as well as in
prose essays which are born of the same intellectual and emotional
impulse), theory takes second place to poetic practice: the critical
essays are the branches and twigs of a tree whose trunk is the poetry
itself. One must therefore beware of abstracting a neat, all-encompassing
system from the essays, and taking this as the primary tool for in¬
vestigation of the poetry. One must also beware of attaching too much
importance to logical contradictions and inconsistencies within single
essays, and between one essay and another. The spirit of Bonnefoy's
thought is not directed towards the construction of abstract systems,
and what is valid in one context may be quite invalid elsewhere. At
the same time, one should not under-estimate the importance of the
essays: to push a shaky metaphor a little farther, a trunk without
(l) For abbreviations of works by Bonnefoy in the references, see
Bibliography, p. 251.
"branches or twigs is not the whole tree. Bonnefoy undoubtedly has
all the tools of conceptual thought at his disposal. If he chooses
not to use them, or to use them only intermittently or in an apparently
idiosyncratic way, we must respect this decision, and take it seriously
and this will itself have important implications for the content of
what we are studying.
As I will make clear later, a change of orientation occurs in Bonnefoy'
prose writings after the mid-sixties. This study will consider in some
detail only the earlier, more abstract phase of his thought (up to the
publication in 1967 of Un Reve fait a Mantoue), though reference is
also made where appropriate to his later work. Any conclusions I may
be able to draw will therefore necessarily deal with a phase of the
development of his thought, and not with its full development, which
is of course still continuing.
I wish, first of all, to point out what may be called a principle of
homogeneity in Bonnefoy's work, in the sense that its parts, apparently
disparate in form and content, nevertheless have all the same artistic
goal. This principle runs from the four published volumes of poetry
to the essays collected in 1'Improbable, Un Reve fait a Mantoue and
Le Nuage rouge, and includes the more extended body of art criticism
in Borne 1650: 1'horizon du premier baroque, the literary criticism of
Rimbaud par lui-meme and the unclassifiable L'Arriere-pays. We may
exclude from this homogeneity of approach only a few of the shorter
uncollected reviews and magazine articles, and occasional articles,
(2)
such as'Les Romans arthuriens et la legends du Graal* 'or 'Rimbaud
(d)
devant la critique', 'which deal with their subjects in much more
(2) Introduction to La Quete du Graal, trans. Beguin (Paris, 1965).
(3) In Rimbaud (coll. 'Genies et Realites'), (Paris, 1968), pp. 269-87.
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traditional, scholarly terms than is usual in Bormefoj'-'s writing. The
raison d'etre of this principle of homogeneity may he seen in a remark
of Bonnefoy's, towards the end of 'L'Acte et le lieu de la poesie'.
Talking of the 'vrai lieu', he says: 'Nous qui avons decouvert,
maintenant, que le voyage, 1'amour, 1'architecture, toutes ies
tentatives de l'homme, ne sont que des ceremonies pour accueillir la
presence, nous avons a les ranimer jusque sur le seuil meme de ce pays
plus profond' (I , p.127)- To 'le voyage, 1'amour, 1'architecture'
one might be tempted to add 'la peinture, la philosophie, la poesie',
and even 'la critique', in the sense of creative meditation on works
of art, as practised by Bonnefoy. The distinction between this and
traditional academic criticism somewhat resembles the distinction - to
which I shall return - between those philosophical projects which
Bonnefoy would consider valid, though sometimes misguided, and those
which he would see as mere juggling with concepts, and is summed up
in the (anonymous) leaflet advertising L'Ephemere, the review Bonnefoy
edited from 1966 to 1973s 'Et on le voit: aucune critique, au sens
appreciatif ou descriptif ou analytique de ce mot, n'a place dans
L'EPHEMEKE. Pourtant les oeuvres de la poesie et des arts y seront
interroges: mais sous le signe toujours de cette instauration d'absolu
ou 1'exteriorite se resorbe.^ ^ The last clause here (which bears, I
think, the unmistakable stamp of Bonnefoy's own style of thought) may
seem obscure: its meaning will emerge more clearly when we come to
look at Bonnefoy's ideas on poetic language, as will the sense in which
he talks above of 'presence' and 'vrai lieu'.
Por the moment we may simply note that Bonnefoy sees the quest of the
artist, and indeed of humanity itself, as aiming at something beyond
(4) Distributed with L'Enhemere 1 (1966).
the 'tentatives' of human activity, which can thus be seen, for all
their apparent diversity, as having a common goal, and to that extent
as sharing a common character. The same applies to Bonnefoy's writing.
Beyond the diversity of style and content of all his literary production
lies a single artistic impulse.
The homogeneity of Bonnefoy's output can be seen on several levels.
In the first place, many of his essays cover a wide range of topics,
but relate them all to his central preoccupations. 'Les Tombeaux de
Eavenne', for instance, contains elements of autobiography, travel
writing and art criticism: but the whole is coloured by the strong
philosophical concern to be found in almost all Bonnefoy's work, a
concern which, in its turn, is directly relevant to his ideas on poetry.
L'Arriere-pays covers a similar diversity of subjects, while Borne 1630:
1'horizon du premier baroque places Baroque art and architecture firmly
in the context of the seventeenth-century ferment of ideas which pro¬
duced also, for instance, the astronomical discoveries of Kepler and
Galileo. Again, one of Bonnefoy's clearest statements of the philo¬
sophical dilemma of the modern artist, which is relevant to poetry no
less than to the visual arts, comes at the beginning of his essay on
the painter Balthus (I , pp. 39-41).
We may also note in Bonnefoy's essays the ease with which he moves from
the formulation of precise ideas on particular subjects to the statement
of more general principles: and here we have a further dimension of
homogeneity, for these two approaches cannot be considered as operating
on different levels. Theory, as the term is usually conceived, is
derived by a process of abstraction from analysis of, and commentary on,
particular phenomena. Bonnefoy's approach, in his essays, is quite
different. He mixes the most precise with the most general remarks,
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without giving either category any sort of precedence over the other.
It is therefore wrong to talk of his aesthetic theory, divorced from
his criticism of individual works of art. Again and again, he takes
the ostensible subject of an essay as the starting-point for the pre¬
sentation, from an individual angle, of more general ideas similar to
those to be found, looked at from different points of view, in other
essays. But this does not imply that such general ideas can be
formulated in the abstract, outside the particular context in which
they are presented, or that any generalised theoretical superstructure
can be postulated to cover the theoretical dimension of Bonnefoy's
writing, tempting though this is to the thesis-writer. Indeed the
only safe generalisation about Bonnefoy's critical theory is that
there is no such easily-separable superstructure. We might say that
the essays are fragments of an aesthetic which, by its very nature,
has to be presented in a fragmentary way; but in using the word
•fragment* we must not imply any notion of inadequacy. On the contrary,
what is inadequate, according to Bonnefoy, is the abstraction inherent
in an overall aesthetic theory, which makes it less satisfactory than
(indeed, a different order of thing from) what emerges from creative
meditation on particulars.
The oscillation between particular and general concerns is of great
importance in Bonnefoy's work. We will return in a moment to the
relationship between his writing and systematic thought. It may first
be worth pointing out, however, another aspect of the principle of
homogeneity to be found in his work - the homogeneity of prose and
poetry. In considering what we must call, for want of a better word,
Bonnefoy's poetic 'theory', it would be wrong to exclude all con¬
sideration of his poetry. It would in fact be just as misleading to
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make a rigid distinction between 'prose works' and 'poetry' as it
would be to make such a separation between, say, 'travel writing' and
'philosophy' within the prose works themselves. Both L'Improbable and
Un Reve fait a Mantoue contain items which are at least very close to
being poems (respectively, 'Devotion' and 'Sept feux' - 'Devotion' is
in fact reprinted in his collected poems (P, pp. 155-9) as well as in
the revised and expanded edition of L'Improbable (i , pp. 133-5))> and
Bonnefoy included a short poem ('Les Lumieres de Brindisi') in the 1961
edition of La Seconde Simplicite, though this has not been reprinted
along with the four essays from that volume in Un Reve fait a Mantoue
and the 1980 edition of L'Improbable. Conversely, we find in the books
of poetry some poems, such as 'L'Imperfection est la cime' (P, p. 117),
which speak directly to the reader in terms almost resembling those of
prose. While it would not be appropriate at this point to embark on
a discussion of the various ways in which different registers of language
may relate to experience, we may, instead of making a strict distinction
between prose and poetry, claim that all Bonnefoy's writing is poetic,
in the sense that none of it uses only the dead language of conceptual
analysis. In 'La Poesie franpaise et le principe d'identite', Bonnefoy
writes: 'II y a certes dans la langue, qui analyse, cette virtualite
de mutisme, contre quoi se dressent le sentiment, le desir, 1'humour -
^ 2
commencements de la poesie' (i , p. 249)- These 'commencements de la
poesie' run through all Bonnefoy's work. This is not to claim, however,
that they are always present in equal measure. In a note (dated November
1969) to the NRP/Poesie edition of Du mouvement et de l'immobilite de
Douve and Hier regnant desert, which includes two of his essays, he
writes of these:'Mais je ne les reprends aujourd'hui ni pour leur verite,
toujours entravee, ni pour le sens qu'ils pourraient porter dans les
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poimes: au contraire, pom? l'ecart qu'ils marquent, et qui me parait
signifiamt, entre le lieu de 1'image et celui de la formule' (HRF,
p. 222). The 'ecart' of which Bonnefoy speaks here is of course
important, relating as it does to the difference between the enactment
of an insight in poetic imagery and its description in the inevitably
more arid, analytical discourse of prose: but the difference, in spite
of what Bonnefoy implies in this note, is never a rigid distinction.
One feels, rather, that while there may be wide variation in the use
of language between the two 'lieux' to which he refers, they neverthe¬
less belong to a single continuum of expression, and invoke the same
quest at different levels of intensity. Different artistic forms,
including the discursive essay, may in fact simply fulfil the artist's
expressive needs at different times and in different contexts, as
when the rejected early 'recit', L'Ordalie, contributed to the poetry
of Du mouvement et de I'immobilite de Douve. Bonnefoy notes that
'la recherche dont jjLe recitj etait un moment prenait forme, irresistible-
ment, de poemes', (5 ^nd enlarges on this later (1974): 'a peine L'Ordalie
eut-elle ete "dechiree", certains passages achev^rent, par la grace de
mots continuant de chercher leur sens, et leur lieu, de se reclasser
dans 1'autre livre, - Da mouvement et de 1'immobilite de Douve. surtout
dans sa quatrieme partie, L'Orangerie' (0, p. 41)•
We may add here that, just as Bonnefoy's prose never reaches an extreme
of analytic conceptualisation, so his poetic language never comes any¬
where near abandoning a coherent line of discourse. His study of, and
devotion to, Mallarme has never led him — as may have been the case
with some modern French poets - to rarefy even further the purely
(5) L'Euhemere 1 (1966), p. 52.
stylistic features of Un Coup de des .jamais n'abolira le hasard. ¥e
may quote Pierre de Boisdeffre's perceptive remark that Bonnefoy
'resout par le langage 1'equation que d'autres situent au-dell, du
langage, au risque de n'en jamais trouver la solution'.', ^ This notion
has important implications for the consideration of Bonnefoy's poetic
theory and practice, particularly for the notion of 'vrai discours',
and will be further developed later: for the moment, we may simply
note that Bonnefoy's practice occupies a middle band in a spectrum
of linguistic usage which may be imagined as between extremes of
prosaic and poetic discourse. These extremes are, admittedly, logically
inconceivable, but can be conveniently postulated as a theoretical
framework when we are talking of possible varieties of language.
It may be appropriate here to add two remarks which, while referring
primarily to Bonnefoy's prose style, have a direct bearing on his
thought. Indeed, a further dimension of his homogeneity of approach
is that style and content are inseparable throughout his work. I
have mentioned above his rejection of analytic and conceptual language:
and one can see the intrusion of 'le sentiment' and *le desir' in the
intensity of a passage such as this, from 'Les Tombeaux de Ravenne':
'Je ne sais pas le nom de cette pierre terreuse, dont la surface est
en friche. Elle parait tout utilitaire, vieux drap qu'on a roule sur
un corps. Mais le couvercle est Ste, la tombe vide. 0 pure joie, qui
prend soudain le coeur! 0 souvenir, mais dans l'abolition du temps I '
(I2, P. 17).
Here, it is the religiously-felt intensity of the experience Bonnefoy
is describing which raises the rhetorical tone. But elsewhere, a
(6) Pierre de Boisdeffre, 'Un Siecle de poesie franqaise: de Baudelaire
k Yves Bonnefoy', Arts-Loisirs 66 (28 December 1966), p. 29.
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similarly high-flown style may indicate anger, or sorrow - though the
intensity of the emotion involved may almost be disguised by the
smoothness of the tone. One must read the following, for instance,
carefully before seeing how damning Bonnefoy's criticisms of Valery
actually are - and then the style seems to lend them extra dignity
and force:
Quelle decadence, pourtant, de 1'ambition poetique! Bans cette
poesie moderne qui pretend k la succession de la pensee religieuse,
dans cette langue franpaise profonde, presaue eveillee, a laquelle
Baudelaire a rappele quelle place elle avait gardee au Bieu inconnu,
et celui-ci cette passante, ce cygne, cette feuille du lierre
tachee de boue, dans cette decouverte et dans cette instauration
Valery est 1'apostat, le nouveau philosophe des lumieres, celui
qui parle de la clarte de 1'esprit quand de son corps et son
coeur il a consenti d'etre une ombre, (i^, p. 101)
Bonnefoy's writing is in fact always informed by a passionate concern
for its object as such, though the well-polished surface of his prose
may at first sight give an impression of excessive attention to mere
stylistic detail.
A second feature of his style might similarly be liable to misinter¬
pretation by the unwary reader. This is his fondness for inserted
qualifications and parentheses, which may on examination turn out to
be more striking than the original propositions to which they are
attached. Examples abound: I take a few, almost at random, from the
first few pages of 'La Poesie franpaise et le principe d'identite':
Pour tous les linguistes, semble-t-il, ce que le mot cheval
represente, c'est ce qui n'est, disons, ni l'ane ni la licorne.
(I2, p. 245)
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Voici ce qui, je crois, commence la poesie. Que je dise 'le feu'
(oui, je change d'exemple, et cela deja signifie) ... (p. 246)
Et j'imaginerai, ou me rappellerai - on verra peut-etre plus tard
que les deux notions s'equivalent - que j'entre ... (p. 246)
J'appellerai cette unite retablie, ou tout au moins qui affleure,
la presence. (p. 249)
There is hardly a page in Bonnefoy's essays which could not provide
an example of this sort of thing. It can indeed also be found in
his poetry:
Souvent dans le silence d'un ravin
J'entends (ou je desire entendre, je ne sais)
Un corps tomber parmi les branches. (P, p. 106)
If Bonnefoy's asides were mere ornamentation, his style would soon
appear affected: but they are most often essential parts of the content
of what he wants to convey. For instance, the 'semble-t-il' and
'disons' of my first example point the irony of Bonnefoy's deliberate
distortion of certain linguists' analysis of meaning; the change of
example in the second quotation is crucial for his ideas on 'les mots
profonds'; the tentative identification of memory and imagination in
the third is essential to his conception of all human experience being
realised in its fullness through imaginative re-creation, as we see
also in the verse extract; and the most important feature of presence
is that it cannot be taken as firmly established, but can be asserted
only through being said to 'affleurer'. I shall deal with these
notions at greater length in due course: it seems worth pointing out
here, however, the importance of an apparently incidental stylistic
feature in their formulation. It is tempting, indeed, to compare the
function of such apparent ornamentation in Bonnefoy's own prose style
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with the supremely important function he assigns to the 'ornement1
of the tombs in Ravenna, or to the decorative style of Baroque art:
however, an exploration of this would not be immediately relevant at
this point.
Both the features of style on which I have commented - the high-flown
quality of Bonnefoy's tone, and his fondness for indirect statement -
show his conviction that the direct, over-facile formulation of a
truth will inevitably destroy it. This in its turn is connected with
his distrust of straightforward conceptual thought. At the end of an
interview with L'Express in 1959» lie replied to the question 'Notre
conversation vous a-t-elle permis d'exprimer l'essentiel de votre
pensee de la poesie?' in the following terms: 'Oh! non, malheureusement.
J'ai sfirement ete trop conceptuel, trop affirmatif. Alors pourtant
que je sais qu'il n'y a pas de verite qui ne se dissipe en partie
dans sa formule. J'ai sllrement commis le peche de reponse. J'aurais
prefere questionner'.(7) The notion of the unreliability of language
is central to Bonnefoy's thought on poetry and on art in general: and
this notion leaves its mark on his style, as everywhere else. We
should take note at this point of his fundamental distrust of straight¬
forward conceptual thought and its corollary, ordinary descriptive
language - or, he implies sometimes, as in Ti'Acte et le lieu de la
poesie', all language: 'Je m'en veux d'employer, quand il faudrait
vraiment dire, ce langage des a-peu-pres. Mais quels mots desormais
pourront ne pas nous trahir?' (i , p. 122). A large part of Bonnefoy's
poetic project is, in fact, the search for an answer to this question.
But before dealing explicitly with this, we must tackle the problem
of the philosophical background to his work.
(7) L'Express, 17 Beeember 1959
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II Philosophical influences; Plato, Plotinus. Hegel, Kierkegaard, Shestov
If it is true to say that Bonnefoy puts forward no abstract and separable
poetic theory, it is equally true that his thought cannot be assimilated
to any ready-formulated philosophical system. He nevertheless habitually
alludes to the work of philosophers, and for that reason it is justifiable
to investigate, a little more fully than Bonnefoy himself makes explicit
in his essays, his relationship with the work of the philosophers he
refers to - not in order to systematise his thought artificially, but
to shed light on certain of its aspects, for it is undeniable that
Bonnefoy does, at least some of the time, think in philosophical terms.
His mode of thought is not, however, that of what might be very generally
called linear logic: that is, of a system in which premise leads directly
to premise, until, by a series of logical steps, a watertight theory has
been evolved which will explain adequately all the phenomena from which
it is abstracted. Any such process of analytical reasoning is rejected
by Bonnefoy. Instead he proposes, though never in explicit and abstract
terms, a more roundabout procedure, a process of indirect allusion and
evocation rather than of direct definition and argument. It is as if
windows were being opened, from various angles, through which we might
glimpse the truth, but never for long, and never in such a way as to
allow us to grasp it completely. Bonnefoy makes this point in a passage
which is not only a direct statement of a general point of theory, and
incidentally a comment on Kierkegaard, but also, analogically, a state¬
ment, and at the same time an illustration, of Bonnefoy's own intellectual
method: 'II n'y a pas de ciel. Cette immortalite dont la joie retentit
par instants chez Kierkegaard n'est la fraicheur et l'echo d*une demeure
que pour ceux seulement qui passent. Pour ceux qui veulent posseder,
elle sera un mensonge, une deception, une nuit{ (I , p. 26).
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Bonnefoy's intellectual quest may be described as a movement towards
some form of certainty which nevertheless must be avoided at all costs,
because as soon as such a certainty has been formulated, it is betrayed
by the formulation itself. Language, of course, is intimately bound
up in this quest: but we may leave purely linguistic considerations
aside for the moment, and deal with Bonnefoy's philosophical position
- insofar as he may be said to take one up - and with the references
he makes in his essays to classical and modern philosophy.
The central element in Bonnefoy's philosophical outlook is his deep
distrust and rejection of what he calls the concept, and of its in¬
evitable consequence, the philosophical system. These words, as they
are normally used, sound innocuous enough: but throughout Bonnefoy's
writing, from 'Les Tombeaux de Ravenne' (1953) onwards, they carry a
precise and idiosyncratic pejorative meaning. This is not easily
conveyed in terms which must themselves be conceptual, but we can
see clearly the general drift of Bonnefoy's thought at the beginning
of 'Les Tombeaux de Ravenne':
Sans doute le concept, cet instrument presque unique de notre
philosophie, est-il dans tous les sujets qu'elle se donne un
profond refus de la mort. Je tiens pour evident qu'il est
toujours une fuite . . .
II y a une verite du concept, dont je ne pretends pas etre le
juge. Mais il y a un mensonge du concept en general, qui
donne a la pensee pour quitter la maison des choses le vaste
pouvoir des mots. On sait depuis Hegel quelle est la force
de sommeil, quelle est 1'insinuation d'un systeme. Je constate
au-del^, de la pensee coherente que le moindre concept est
1'artisan d'une fuite. Oui, l'idealisme est vainqueur dans
toute pensee qui s'organise. Mieux vaut refaire le monde, y
est-il dit obscurement, qied'y vivre dans le danger, (i , pp. 11-13)
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The ways in which Bonnefoy sees thought as interacting with the world
are complex, hut his statement may seem at first glance somewhat over-
emphatic. If we abandon rational thought entirely, what is left?
Bonnefoy would doubtless reply that if we give ourselves up to rational
thought, we risk abandoning everything else - not merely death, as
of
mentioned here, but also the whole/existential reality, with its in¬
evitable, and glorious, 'danger'. The concept, and its consequence,
the system, leave reality behind, in favour of a sterile abstraction.
According to Bonnefoy, reality is, properly speaking, not only ineffable
but also inconceivable in the terms of analytic thought: which is not
to say that it cannot be approached, either through the kind of privil¬
eged moment of experience which Bonnefoy calls presence, or through
language in one of its privileged registers concomitant with this
experience. I shall return later to the positive side of Bonnefoy's
rejection of the concept: for the moment I wish to consider only its
negative side. The act of conceptualisation, of the formulation of a
systematic process of thought and the inevitable invocation of 'le
vaste pouvoir aes mots', by which we must understand ordinary conceptual
language, is always a flight from the reality of the object to which
thought directs its attention: and Western philosopy, Bonnefoy claims,
has always been the slave of this abstraction. But one must point out
immediately that Bonnefoy is not always as resolutely 'anti-conceptual'
as he is in the passage quoted above. The multivalent ambiguities of
abstraction and of meditation anchored in the concrete, which we may
refer to in non-rigorous terms as essence and existence, pervade his
thought in permutations and combinations of bewildering complexity.
For instance, the pejorative tone of 'idealisme' in the passage quoted
above goes against Bonnefoy's clear distinction, later in the same essay,
between 'concept' and 'idee'. If Bonnefoy's use of the term 'idee'
sometimes moves dangerously close to his use of 'concept', while at
other times the word refers to something totally different, this in¬
consistency should not be seen as a fault in his thought, for he not
only makes no claim to be a systematic philosopher, but positively
claims the opposite: 'Je ne sais, je ne veux pas dresser la dialectique
du monde, placer le sensible dans 1'etre avec cet art minutieux de la
* * 2
patiente metaphysique: je ne pretends que nommer' (i , p. 21).
The use of 'nommer' here begs one or two questions which Bonnefoy
considers fully elsewhere. But we may say in general that the incon¬
sistencies discernible in Bonnefoy's thought are quite self-conscious,
springing from his concentration in any given context on the indivual-
ity of the objects of his scrutiny. One may nevertheless sometimes
criticise Bonnefoy for his apparent delight in complexity of thought
for its own sake, which his 'besoin maladroit d'une pensee coherente'
(AP, p. 151) may make rather more involved than is strictly necessary.
As Manuel de Dieguez remarks, Bonnefoy's early criticism, with its
insistence on the convoluted relationships between 'l'universel' and
'le singulier', still accepts those very 'perspectives de la logique'
which it criticises, and therefore has at its disposal no other tool
than 'celui qu'ont contamine deux millenaires de metaphysique de 1'etre'
However, it is perhaps not as easy as de Dieguez implies for a thinker
brought up in an analytical tradition to jettison this mode of thought.
Although such a line of metaphysical speculation may be, in his phrase,
'le premier falsificateur du langage', because it poses pseudo-problems
(such as that of the existence of 'the good') based perhaps, in this
(l) Manuel de Dieguez, 'Yves Bonnefoy et la critique du style',
Esprit (December 1960),p. 2123.
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instance, on nothing more solid than the grammar of most Western lan¬
guages, starting with Greek, a naturally analytical thinker cannot
simply shuffle off this particular intellectual coil, and arrive
directly at a simpler ana saner view of things. The process must be
more anguished, and must take in a full exploration of the paths which,
in his own case, Bonnefoy sees as typical of Western thought,accepting
those parts which are of genuine value: 'Hous sommes des Occidentaux
et cela ne se renie pas. Nous avons mange de l'arbre de science, et
cela ne se renie pas. Et loin de r§ver d'une guerison de ce que nous
sommes, c'est dans notre intellectuality definitive qu'il faut reinventer
+ 2
la presence, qui est salut' (I , p. 40). The development of Bonnefoy's
criticism shows just such a process. If, particularly in his earlier
essays, he exposes himself to the temptations offered by several philo¬
sophical systems,in the end he always rejects such systems, this whole
process being itself a necessary stage in his intellectual development.
Some consideration of the systems which have influenced him, to some
extent at least, may however be useful.
I must mention, first of all, the influence of Plato: for the dichotomy
between reality and concepts, or, on a different level of thought, be¬
tween reality and ideas, with which Bonnefoy is much concerned, may be
seen as having its roots in Plato's theory of Forms. This, however,
as I have remarked above, is not so much a precise philosophical in¬
fluence (which could simply be considered and accepted or rejected
by Bonnefoy) as an all-pervading climate of thought from which he may
wish to escape, but cannot. The precise ways in which Plato's influence
can be seen in Bonnefoy's work are indeed difficult to chart. One of
the difficulties which we encounter in trying to pin them down is the
fact that the Forms are used in different contexts by Plato in reference
to notions as disparate as, on the one hand, the generalising tendency
of ordinary language whereby individual instances of a category (say,
•dog') are recognised as belonging to it, and, on the other hand, the
immortality of the soul.
In addition to the immense range of reference encompassed by the theory
of Forms - and it would be possible to argue that the sharp distinction
which so concerns Bonnefoy between a mere generalising principle, or
concept, and a spiritual reality transcending physical existence, or
Idea (at least, as Bonnefoy uses that word in some contexts), is simply
not operative, and certainly not recognised as such, in Plato's thought
- we have the difficulty presented by Bonnefoy's varying references
to the actual mode of existence of the Forms (to stick for the moment
to the standard English term). His opinion on this point seems to
have changed radically between his first important work, Anti-Platon
(1947)> and'Les Tombeaux de Ravenne' (1953). In Anti-Platon, as its
title suggests, he sees the Forms purely as agents of abstraction,
like ordinary language, diverting man's attention from the unique
reality of the world: 'II s'agit bien de cet objet', ana the individual
object seen as such 'pese plus lourd dans la tete de 1'homme que les
parfaites Idees, qui ne savent que deteindre sur sa bouche' (P, p. ll).
This rather simplistic view of Plato as an enemy of the real world -
indeed, of life itself - comes out even more clearly in the following
passage, included in Anti-Platon on its first publication in 1947 but
subsequently deleted: 'J'imagine Platon calcaire, stratifie, horizontal
. . . qui se construit dans l'espace et ignore le temps. Un faux
soleil eclaire ce philosophe fixe; le vrai soleil est mouvement . . .
* ( 2 )
Que nous important les Idees! II y a 1'odeur et les bruits.'^
(2) La Revolution la nuit 2 (1947), PP- 14-15, quoted by Annie P. Prothin,
'The Substantive Language of Yves Bonnefoy', Sub-Stance 20 (1978), p. 55«
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Towards the end of 'Les Tombeaux de Ravenne', however, Bonnefoy writes:
Qui tente la traversee de l'espace sensible rejoint une eau
sacree qui coule dans toute chose. Et pour peu qu'il y touche,
il se sent immortel. Que dire, ensuite? Que prouver? Pour un
contact de cette espece, Platon dressait tout un autre monde,
celui des fortes Idees. Que ce monde existe, j'en suis sflr: il
est, dans le lierre et partcut, la substantielle immortalite.
Simplement il est avec nous. Dans le sensible. L'intelligible,
disait Plotin, est 1'expression du grand e^ changeant visage.
Rien qui puisse etre plus pres de nous. (I , p. 26)
This is a particularly interesting example of Bonnefoy's idiosyncratic
use of philosophical reference in his prose writings. The juxtaposition
of 'sensible' and 'intelligible' seems a deliberate (and deliberately
poetic and non-analytical) pointing-up of what Bonnefoy sees as the
ambiguous relationship, in the thought of Plato and of his successors,
between the experience of the mind and that of the senses. 'Intelligible'
in its normal philosophical usage is of course the opposite of 'sensible':
the Dictionnaire de 1'Academie Erancaise (8th edition) defines it as
'qui est perpu comme plus ou moins reel par la pensee pure et non par
les sens', and gives as an example 'Les idees de Platon constituent
un monde intelligible'. The implied adaptation here of Plato's ideas
to make them refer to existence as well as to essence is therefore
somewhat eccentric, for it is frequently considered - and Bonnefoy
seems to have considered at the time of Anti-Platon - that the prin¬
ciple behind the theory of Forms is that they are not incarnated in
physical substance, but exist above and beyond it.
Broad generalisations in this area are dangerous, but the question of
Plato's conception of the relationship of Forms (or Ideas) to parti¬
culars is summed up by Sir David Ross as follows:
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First, . . . Plato consistently thought of Ideas as different
from sensible things. Secondly, ... he thought of them as
completely objective, neither as thoughts nor as the 'contents
of thoughts' (whatever that phrase may mean), but as entities
whose existence in -presupposed by all our knowledge. Thirdly,
... he thought of them as existing separately from sensible
things; but to the question of whether Plato consistently so
(*)
thought of them no simple answer can be given.
Ross goes on to examine in Plato's work 'a group of words implying or
suggesting the immanence of the Forms, and a group implying or suggesting
their transcendence' - including several instances of contrasting usages
within a single dialogue. There is therefore no case for any single
dogmatic interpretation of what Plato 'really meant'. What is important
for our purposes is not to consider which interpretation of Plato is
correct, or indeed whether Plato can embrace a whole gamut of inter¬
pretations, but rather to note how Bonnefoy uses at different times
and in different contexts varying views of the work of a philosopher
with whom he has considerable sympathy as points of reference for his
own meditation on the nature of spiritual and physical reality, however
distant that meditation may be from conventional (and certainly from
Platonic) philosophical speculation. His later attitude towards, and
interpretation of, Platonic thought is perhaps best summed up in his
remark in his essay on Yalery that 'toujours, de Platon a Plotin et
au premier christianisme, la philosophie de l'Idee est venue se guerir
2
a cette eau plus vive, /die cette chose reelle/' (I , p. 98)•
What Bonnefoy may be searching for in Plato is possibly - as is in¬
dicated in the passage on '1'intelligible' from T,es Tombeaux de Bavenne'
quoted above - more readily to be found in Plotinus, to whom Bonnefoy
(3) Sir David Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford, 1951)> pp. 227-8
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sometimes refers explicitly, and more frequently evokes by the mention
of '1'Un' or '1'Unite'. This again is not so much a rigorously demon¬
strable influence - in the sense that Bonnefoy cannot be shown to
expound Plotinian doctrines - as an element in the general background
to Bonnefoy's own thought. The 'eau sacree qui coule dans toute chose',
for instance (i , p. 26), recalls - whether or not as a deliberate
echo by Bonnefoy hardly matters - such passages in Plotinus as the
following, which deals with what Stephen MacKenna translates in this
context as 'the One-and-All':
Imagine a spring that has no source outside itself; it gives
itself to all the rivers, yet is never exhausted by what they
take, but remains always integrally as it was; the tides that
proceed from it are at one within it before they run their
several ways, yet all, in some sense, know beforehand down what
channels they will pour their streams.
Or: think of the Life coursing throughout some mighty tree while
yet it is the stationary Principle of the whole, in no sense
scattered over all that extent but, as it were, vested in the
root: it is the giver of the entire and manifold life of the
tree, but remains unmoved itself, not manifold but the Principle
of that manifold life .(4)
may
The notion that reality(be imbued with a kind of vibrant and unifying
life, providing a spiritual validation of the existence of the phenomenal
world, which, however, must not be seen as something separate from that
world but as existing at its centre, is echoed in Bonnefoy's philo¬
sophical quest. His intellectual method also has affinities with that
of Plotinus. As we have already seen, Bonnefoy does not aim at the
formulation of a coherent body of abstract theory, but deals in individual
essays with a series of disparate subjects considered in their own terms;
(4) Plotinus, The Enneads III.8.10, trans. MacKenna (London, 4th edition,
1969), p. 249
- 21 -
the essays nevertheless spring from a common mode of thought which
might be expressed in a more abstract way, were it not that such a
form of expression would be foreign to its whole principle. Similarly,
the Enneads of Plotinus represent the consideration of individual
philosophical problems in the light of an overall mode of thought
which itself is never worked out explicitly; as P. Henry says, 'PlotinusIs
system is never explicit; it is not articulated into theorems as is
the case with Proclus, or into questions as with St Thomas, but is
(5)
throughout implicitly present as a totality in each particular theme'.
It would be wrong, however, to draw too close comparisons between the
thought of Bonnefoy and that of Plotinus. For all that Plotinus'
thought is not articulated systematically, it nevertheless implies a
system in which philosophical categories stand in certain definite
relationships one with another (however much interpretations may differ
as to what these relationships actually are). This is not the case
with Bonnefoy, whose essentially unsystematic perception of the world
does not admit of precise categorisation. Por this reason Bonnefoy's
use of philosophical terminology is liable to appear inconsistent.
In relation to Plotinus it may be worth looking more closely at what
Bonnefoy makes of 'l'Un' and '1'Unite'.
The One in Plotinus is, strictly speaking, ineffable. P. Henry expresses
this in clear but rather negative terms - the only terms, perhaps, which
do not entirely falsify the very difficult notion he is intending to
convey - when he writes:
The One is the One and nothing else, and even to assert that it
'is' or that it is 'One' is false, since it is beyond being or
(5) P. Henry SJ, 'The Place of Plotinus in the History of Thought',
introduction to The Enneads (trans. MacKenna), p. xliii.
- 22 -
essence. No 'name' can apply to it; it eludes all definition,
all knowledge; it can neither "be perceived nor thought. It is
not in movement, nor is it at rest. It is infinite, without
limits, and since it has no parts, it is without structure and
without form, (ibid., p. xlv)
Here Henry alludes to the connection between the One in Plotinus and
the various kinds of 'negative theology' in the Christian tradition
which see God as completely transcendent, unknowable, and therefore
capable of being referred to only in terms of negative attributes.
Although Bonnefoy refers to 'theologie negative' at a number of points
- most notably in the eighth section of 'L'Acte et le lieu de la
poesie' - it is clear that this bleak and transcendent notion of the
One is not entirely what he has in mind in his many references to
'l'Un' or '1'Unite', as for instance when describing the presence of
a salamander he writes, 'Uisons - car il faut sauver aussi la parole,
et du desir fatal de tout definir - que son essence s'est repandue
dans 1'essence des autres etres, comme le flux d'une analogie par
laquelle je perpois tout dans la continuite et la suffisance d'un
lieu, et dans la transparence de 1'unite', and goes on to remark
that 'c'est l'Un la grande revelation de cet instant sans limites,
ou tout se donne k moi pour que je comprenne et je lie' (i , p. 248).
What Bonnefoy means here by 'l'Un' does, however, connect with the
Plotinian system; and his less than rigorous use of the terminology
of that system may indeed be explained by his wish to 'sauver . . .
la parole . . . du desir fatal de tout definir'. We may see a closer
parallel to the notion which Bonnefoy has borrowed tinder the title
of 'l'Un' in Plotinus'5 description, quoted in part by Bonnefoy and
applied to 'l'Un* in the epigraph to L'Arriere-pays, of the 'higher
Heaven' of his treatise on intellectual beauty:
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For all There is heaven; earth is heaven, and sea heaven; and
animal and plant and man; all is in the heavenly content of
that heaven: and the gods in it, despising neither men nor
anything else that is there where all is of the heavenly order,
traverse all that country and all space in peace . . .
Each There walks upon no alien soil; its place is its essential
self; and, as each moves, so to speak, towards what is Above,
it is attended by the very ground from which it starts: there
is no distinguishing between the Being and the Place; all is
Intellect, the principle and the ground on which it stands,
alike.
The distance between the philosopher and the poet may indeed be seen
most clearly in L'Arriere-pays, where the kind of spiritual validation
of reality which Plotinus seems to offer is evoked, but is never
accepted as a permanently valid dogma. The habit of abstraction which
Bonnefoy sees as inherent in the Western intellectual tradition will
always intervene to set man yearning for something beyond reality -
and this, of course, is not always to be deplored, for in the Western
intellectual tradition such yearning is almost part of human nature
itself. If, in Bonnefoy's view, '1'equivoque profonde de l'idee
platonicienne est de prendre sur soi le plus vif, le plus pur de
l'apparence sensible' (H, p. 238), this equivocation must always, for
Bonnefoy, be formulated through an anguished dialectic. Even when
some form of spiritually valid contact with reality has been achieved,
the happy acceptance of physical substance may itself lead to a desire
for transcendence, as is seen in Bonnefoy's meditation on 'the road
not taken' at the beginning of L'Arriere-pays:
Ce n'est pas mon gofLt de rever de couleurs ou de formes
inconnues, ni d'un depassement de la beaute de ce monde.
J'aime la terre, ce que je vois me comble . . . Cette harmonie
(6) Plotinus, Enneads, V.8.3-4* op.cit. p. 425^
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a -on sens, ces paysages et ces especes sont, figes encore,
enchantes peut-etre, une parole, il ne s'agit que de regarder
et d'ecouter avec force pour que l'absolu se declare, au bout
de nos errements. Ici, dans cette promesse, est done le lieu.
Et pourtant, e'est quand j'en suis venu a cette sorte de foi
que I'idee de 1*autre pays peut s'emparer de moi le plus
violemment, et me priver de tout bonheur a la terre. Car
plus je suis convaincu qu'elle est une phrase ou plutot une
musique - a la fois signe et substance - et plus cruellement
je ressens au'une clef manque, parmi celles qui permettraient
de 1'entendre. Nous sommes desunis, dans cette unite, et ce
que pressent 1'intuition, 1'action ne peut s'y porter ou s'y
resoudre. (AP, pp. 10-11)
Bonnefoy is searching here for something which is la fois signe
et substance', both itself and a pointer beyond itself: and this of
its very nature is, in his view, impossible to incorporate in a
philosophical system, however sympathetic a philosopher may be to
the quest (and Plotinus is indeed very sympathetic to it). The
kind of certain but still dynamic unity which Bonnefoy seeks could
perhaps only be expressed by a Christian mystic like St John of the
Cross, whose experience of oneness with *le soleil ... la lune
et les etoiles ... la mere de Dieu' Bonnefoy quotes elsewhere
(I2, p. 248).
It is indeed a measure of the development shown in Bonnefoy's more
recent work that, in such passages as that from L'Arriere-pays
quoted above or in the identification of the poet with, and his
consent to, 'les pierres du soir . . . le feu ... la nuee . . .
le depart/Des mapons attardes vers les villages . . . le bruit de
la fourgonnette qui se perd' in 'La Terre' from Bans le leurre du
seuil (P, pp. 286-7), he expresses his yearning for, and achievement
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of, contact with physical substance through an evocation of his own
human experience rather than through reference to philosophy. I will
expand somewhat on this once I have considered in more detail Bonnefoy's
view of poetic language. At the period of his work with which I am
primarily concerned, however, he would have looked first to philosophy,
and would probably have considered Plotinus as one of the philosophers
who came closest to defining a true contact between the mind and reality.
Such a contact however would in Bonnefoy's view be well-nigh impossible
for Western man because Western man is caught in the net of conceptual
thought; the only hope might be to reinvent some similar experience
through a transcended form of that thought itself.
Such a process may again be seen in Bonnefoy's acceptance, and simul¬
taneous violent rejection, of Hegel's refutation of the naive sense-
certainty which points to the particular, the Here and How, as an
immediate object of consciousness. Bonnefoy's references to the Here
and How may indeed be compared, as an example of the somewhat free
use he makes of philosophy in his writing, to his references to 'I'Un'
or '1'Unite' in a context of implicit reference to Plotinus. The Here
and How will best be dealt with later, in connection with Bonnefoy's
ideas on poetic language: but some mention of his general attitude
to Hegel as a system - builder may be appropriate at this point.
Although not as attractive in its content as the thought of Plato or
Plotinus, Hegel's system presents, in Bonnefoy's terms, a more insidious
temptation than do conceptual systems built up by what I have called
linear logic, precisely because it claims to transcend such systems
while constituting what is in fact merely a more elaborate version
of them. At the beginning of his PMnomenologie des Geistes Hegel
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insists, firstly, on the inclusion of previously fixed systems as mere
moments in a dynamic mode of thought which will then attain authoritative
status through this very inclusiveness; and secondly, on the importance
of the whole dialectical process being worked through, rather than its
conclusions being merely stated as empty universals. Hegel is therefore
asserting that philosophy must include and transcend the history of
philosophy, and that this process will lead, not simply to another
interpretation of truth, but, through its dynamic character, to truth
itself. The passage is worth quoting at some length:
D'autant plus rigidement la maniere commune de penser conpoit
1'opposition mutuelle du vrai et du faux, d'autant plus elle a
coutume d'attendre dans une prise de position a l'egard d'un
systlme philosophique donne, ou une concordance, ou une contra¬
diction, et dans une telle prise de position elle sait seule-
ment voir l'une ou l'autre. Elle ne conpoit pas la diversite
des systemes philosophiques comme le developpement progressif
de la verite: elle voit plutSt seulement la contradiction dans
cette diversite. Le bouton disparait dans 1'eclatement de la
floraison, et on pourrait dire que le bouton est refute par la
fleur: a I'apparition du fruit, egalement, la fleur est denoncee
comme un faux etre-lli de la plante, et le fruit s'introduit S,
la place de la fleur comme sa verite. Ces formes ne sont pas
seulement distinctes, mais encore chacune refoule l'autre,
parce qu'elles sont mutuellement incompatibles. Mais en meme
temps leur nature fluide en fait des moments de 1'unite organique
dans laquelle elles ne se repoussent pas seulement, mais dans
laquelle l'une est aussi necessaire que l'autre, et cette egale
necessite constitue seule la vie du tout . . .
La chose, en effet, n'est pas epuisee dans son but, mais dans
son actualisation; le resuitat non plus n'est pas le tout
effectivement reel; il l'est seulement avec son devenir; pour
soi le but est 1'universel sans vie, de meme que la tendance
est seulement l'elan qui manque encore de sa realite effective,
et le resultat nu est le cadavre que la tendance a laisse
. - • (7)derriere soi.
(7) Hegel, La Phenomenologie de 1'esprit, trans. J. Hyppolite
(Paris,2 vols., 1939 and 1941),vol. 1, pp. 6-7.
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The dynamism of this approach could he taken to he, potentially
at least, congenial to Bonnefoy's mode of thought. Indeed, in 1953
Bonnefoy took Hegel seriously enough to place his remark that 'la
vie de l'esprit ne s'effraie point devant la mort et n'est pas celle
qui s'en garde pure. Elle est la vie qui la supporte et se maintient
(s)
en elle'^ 'as epigraph to his first important hook of poems. Bonnefoy
(?)has since claimed, however, that this epigraph is ironical, not Because
it does not represent, in his view, a valuable and indeed essential
insight, hut Because its original context is a hook in which the
dialectic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis is used to escape
death By Building up a complex conceptual theory in which the reality
of death has no place. In this system in fact, Bonnefoy sees death
as Being reduced to the status of a concept. When Bonnefoy writes
in 'Les Tomheaux de Eavenne*: 'on sait depuis Hegel quelle est la
force de sommeil, quelle est 1'insinuation d'un systeme'(l^, p. 12),
he means not that Hegel ignores death - or at least the concept of
death - hut that Hegel's thought is all the more subtly dangerous
Because it goes half-way towards a rejection of fixed systems, only
to integrate them into an overall philosophical mechanism which is
itself the most gargantuan system of all. If death is reduced to a
(8) P. p. 21: cf Hegel, La Phenomenologie de 1'esprit, vol.1, p. 29
(though Bonnefoy does not use Hyppolite's translation).
(9) In conversation, Nice, 14 May 1975; subsequently confirmed in the
interview with John E. Jackson (L'Arc 66, (October 197&), P* 90)»
where Bonnefoy mentions having used the quotation from Hegel 'non
sans ironie, en raison du contexte d'origine'. It is interesting
also that in writing of the substantive existence of the tombs of
Ravenna at the end of his essay on them Bonnefoy says 'Voici la
vie qui ne s'effraie pas de la mort2(ici je parodie Hegel) et qui
se ressaisit dans la mort meme' (I , p. 28). The 'parody' here
does not consist of intentional misquotation hut of accurate
quotation out of the context of the system which Hegel proposes.
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concept, so is existence itself. The only way to grasp phenomenal
existence is to move out of the comforting realm of the concept, and
to face the risk, and danger, of reality and death:'T a-t-il un
concept d'un pas venant dans la nuit, d'un cri, de l'eboulement
d'une pierre dans les broussailles? he 1'impression que fait une
maison vide? Mais non, rien n'a ete garde du reel que ce qui convient
notre repos' (I , p. 13).
We may also look in passing at the case of Kierkegaard, a philosopher
who seems to make criticisms of Hegel very similar to those implied
by Bonnefoy himself. In his Journals he writes, 'If Hegel had written
his whole logic and had written in the preface that it was only a
thought-experiment, in which at many points he still steered clear
of some things, he undoubtedly would have been the greatest thinker
who has ever lived. As it is he is comici*^ This seems to agree with
Bonnefoy's implied view that Hegel left the reality of some issues,
and among them the most important, out of his so-called comprehensive
theory, although he did not lack valuable insights. Another remark of
Kierkegaard's echoes Bonnefoy's view of the ponderous uselessness of
systematic thought's pretensions to dynamism, as compared with the
spontaneity of existential reality:
The System 'goes forward by necessity', so it is said. And look,
it never for a moment is able to advance as much as half an inch
ahead of existence, which goes forward in freedom.
This was the fraud. It was just as if an actor would say: It
is I who speak, these are my words - and then has not a single
(11)
word to say the second the prompter is silent.
(10) Kierkegaard, Journals V A 73 (1844)» ©8.. and trans. Hong
(Bloomington, 1970), vol.2, p. 217.
(11) op.cit X5 A 786 (1851), vol.2, p. 225.
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But even Kierkegaard., according to Bonnefoy, was a prisoner of the
concept, though he went a stage beyond Hegel in awareness of its
dangers, and of the necessity of escape. He could only try to escape,
however, through the occasional 'jaillissements . . . de la joie la
moins prevue' which his idiosyncratic Christianity granted him: "Si
jamais coeur fut prive des biens terrestres, et separe de I'objet
sensible par un detour infini, c'est bien celui tr£s anxieux de
savait qu'il
Kierkegaard, qui(n'obtenait que 1'essence, et restait enclos dans
le general. II combattait le systeme. Mais le systeme est la
* 2
fatalite du concept, seul bien que Kierkegaard ettt' (i p. 18).
Such outbursts of joy can only be exceptional for '1'homme conceptuel
/£hez qui il y aJ7 un delaissement, une apostasie sans fin de ce qui
est' (I2, pp. 18-19).
Before concluding this summary of Bonnefoy's attitude to philosophy,
we must look at the one thinker to whose influence he pays unstinting
tribute, and to whom he has devoted an entire essay. In his interview
with John E. Jackson published in L'Arc in 1976 Bonnefoy speaks of
'la rencontre peu previsible sans doute pour un jeune surrealiste,
mais que le hasard me valut tres tSt, d'un theologien, si le mot a
du sens pour lui, le russe Leon Chestov' (L'Arc 66 (1976), p. 88).
Shestov (1866-1938) (I adopt the more usual English transliteration)
is a prolific and sometimes repetitious writer whose ideas are diffi¬
cult to summarise without distorting their directness into banality.
His essays show deadly seriousness curiously coupled with a sardonic
irony of tone - a combination which is necessary to express in some
degree the truth which he sees as both simple and inexpressible
through the mechanisms of ordinary language and thought, whose
complexities can only serve to distort it. Even a cursory examination
of Shestov's writings, however, will throw up similarities with
Bonnefoy's ideas. He has the same contempt for philosophical systems,
and the same confidence in the ability of reality (and its concomitant,
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death) to confound them:
In these anxious days, when positivism seems to fall short,
one cannot do better than turn to metaphysics. Then the young
man need not any more envy Alexander the Macedonian. With
the assistance of a few books not only earthly states are
conquered, but the whole mysterious universe. Metaphysics
(12)
is the great art of swerving round dangerous experience.
The irony here is typical of Shestov, and brings to mind Bonnefoy's
'Oui, l'idealisme est vainaueur dans toute pensee qui s'organise.
Mieux vaut refaire le monde, y est-il dit obscurement, que d'y
vivre dans le danger' from Ties Tombeaux de Ravenne' (I , pp. 12-13).
Shestov's attack on rational thought goes hand in hand with an
assertion of the unique and mysterious quality of individual phenomena
and individual human experience, and of what we are accustomed to
consider the world of the imagination, though Shestov would no doubt
insist that this is no less real than the 'real' world as delineated
- perhaps as constructed - by mechanistic science and rational thought.
This is the context in which Shestov goes so far as to question the
immutability of historical fact, if that fact does not concur with
imaginative reality. Bonnefoy draws attention to this in his essay
on Shestov: 'Chestov estime en effet qu'on peut aneantir 1'evenement
detestable dans son essence d'evenement. Quoi, nous dit-il a peu
pres, Socrate est mort, et encore par injustice, et on supporte que
cela dure?' (I2, p. 274).
Here the moral force of what should be is seen as capable of overcoming
what is. Shestov hankers after the faith which can move mountains;
and an idea closely related to this is his questioning of the value
(12) Shestov, All Things Are Possible, trans. S. S. Koteliansky
(London, 1920), pp. 146-7.
- 31 -
of rational -understanding itself, often expressed through meditation
on the 'certum quia impossibile' of Tertullian:
Mankind, which is haunted by the idee fixe of rational comprehension,
on rising every morning should repeat the words of Tertullian:
Crucifixus est Dei filius; non pudet, quia -pudendum est. Et
mortuus est Dei filius; prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum
est. Et sepultus resurrexit; certum est quia impossibile est.
Tertullian wishes to know, and that is why he does not wish
to understand, feeling clearly at that moment (but at that
moment only) that understanding is hostile to knowledge and
that this hostility will never end; that it is enough to
'understand', i.e., to pluck the fruit of the tree of knowledge
and taste it, immediately to lose all possibility of access to
the other marvelous trees which grew so abundantly in the
garden of Eden. The knowledge of good and evil has no positive
value, as we have always been taught, but rather a negative
(13)
one.
A thinker like Shestov who refuses to subscribe either to the tenets
of any conventional and fixed religious faith or to any theory setting
up either science or art as an alternative absolute, but who neverthe¬
less doggedly pursues his philosophical quest along every possible
intellectual path, even when he knows in advance that any form of
certainty must almost by definition elude him, is a quixotic figure,
but a very attractive one for Bonnefoy; but the difference between
the two is that through the writing of poetry Bonnefoy has at least
the possibility of a different kind of contact with reality than
that offered by a line of thought which must be fettered by having
to use, in ordinary language, the very conceptual tools which it
sets out to reject. A criticism of Shestov based on the mere
assertion of the primacy of factual over imaginative truth would
(13) Shestov, from Potestas Clavium. quoted in Bernard Martin,
A Shestov Anthology (Athens, Ohio, 1970), p. 172.
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miss the point, since Shestov's whole endeavour rests on the assertion
of the equal or greater reality of imaginative truth. It might however
be validly argued that Shestov can only frustrate his own aims by
pursuing them through the kind of discursive reasoning to which they
are intrinsically alien. Bonnefoy adopts a somewhat more relaxed
attitude in suggesting that Western man must work through his analytic
philosophical tradition and attempt to transcend it rather than simply
to bypass it: 'nous avons mange de l'arbre de science, et cela ne se
renie pas . . . c'est dans notre intellectuality definitive qu'il
+ + 2
faut reinventer la presence, qui est salut' (i , p. 40)•
Bonnefoy would indeed claim in any case that Shestov is, to some degree
at least, tainted by conceptual thought, and would see the gap that
separates his own thought from that of Shestov in terms of the difference
between their views of the place of time in the achievement - or poss¬
ible achievement - of contact with reality. Whereas Bonnefoy relies
on a development of his idiosyncratic view of the possibility of
expressing, in non-rational and non-discursive terms, the instantaneous
Here and NowP"^he sees Shestov as being - no less idiosyncratically,
perhap,s - bound to a notion of temporal continuity which comes danger¬
ously close to being a fixed dogma:
/la philosophie de Chestov/ s'obstine a penser I'absolu dont
elle est hantee, legitimement, sous la forme certes naive de
l'eternite temporelle. Chestov lui-meme a peur du temps, il
reste forclos de 1'instant dont il ne sent pas la valeur.
Qu'on ne retienne que ses valorisations, - la presence contre
l'essence, ce qu'on aime contre ce qui est, ou passe pour etre
- et on pourra aboutir \ une negation de 1'absence, une
resurrection de ce qui se perd, a mon avis mieux fondees en
(14) see below, pp. 50-59•
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comprenant que l'absolu que nous desirons git dans la plenitude
d'une seconde ou intensite vaut etemite. (L'Arc 66, p. 89)
Evocation of 'la plenitude d'une seconde ou intensite vaut eternite'
may indeed be a means of avoiding the elaboration of a philosophical
system with claims to permanent validity, as we have seen in the
analogous case of Bonnefoy's hesitation over the expression of belief
in '1'autre pays' (AP, p. 10). Thus we see that Bonnefoy rejects
clearly, though in some cases regretfully, any kind of coherent elaboration
of thought, even if such an elaboration leads to a rejection of system-
building or indeed organised thought itself, because conceptual thought
is, by its very nature, associated with the project of making sense of
the world - that is, of systematising it. The thinker who thinks non-
systematically must turn elsewhere, and it is, for instance, in
Kierkegaard's 'eclats . . . de joie' that Bonnefoy sees some gleam of
possible salvation, even if Kierkegaard was himself not fully aware of
their irrationality, bound up as he was in a more strictly philosophical
enterprise:
II y a dans l'homme conceptuel un delaissement, une apostasie
sans fin de ce qui est. Cet abandon est ennui, angoisse,
desespoir. Mais parfois le monde se dresse, quelque sortilege
est rompu, voici que comme par grace tout le vif et le pur de
l'§tre dans un instant est donne. Be telles joies sont une
percee que 1'esprit a faite, vers le difficile reel, (i2, pp. 18-19)
That such an illumination might come 'comme par grace' is a typical
example of Bonnefoy's apparently casual use of the vocabulary of a
mode of thought which is not his own, however tempting he may find it.
Another example occurs in his essay on Balthus, where he writes: 'En
termes de theologie on dirait que c'est au lieu du peche que surabonde
la grace' (i , p. 41)• In the same way, he habitually uses the terms
'ici' and 'maintenant' with reference to a piece of Hegelian reasoning
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whose conclusions he nevertheless feels bound to reject; and, as we
have seen, his use of 'l'Un' and '1'Unite1 does not seem to be an
entirely accurate reflection of the way in which Plotinus uses these
terms. This is, in fact, his general attitude to philosophy and to
the more analytical areas of theology. While in no sense denying
the seriousness of their concerns, he nevertheless feels able to
borrow notions from various thinkers and to use them, negatively or
positively, in his own reflexion. One should not assume from this,
however, that Bonnefoy is simply using such notions as a kind of
metaphor. It might be more accurate to talk of his giving these ideas,
seen as ideas, his provisional and temporary assent, while always
retaining, on a different level, his own independence of mind.
More important than Bonnefoy's rejection of the concept, and all that
it implies in terms of fixed philosophical systems, is his complementary
affirmation of the importance of presence, at once the true mode of
being of phenomenal reality and the possibility of the expression in
art of that mode of being. Presence is not a state or a notion, but
an act of being. As Bonnefoy says, 'l'objet sensible est presence.
II se distingue du conceptuel avant tout par un acte, c'est la presence'
(I , p. 23). And this act springs from the apprehension of physical
substance as such, a reality deeper and more durable than the concept:
Mais je defends me verite tenacement presente sous la verite
du concept, tenacement combattue. Et il est de 1*essence de
cette verite que toute ville ou l'on pourrait vivre, et par
exemple Eavenne, vaille un principe et soit aussi apte que
lui a fonder l'universel. Qp.e les chemins et les pierres de
Eavenne vaillent la deduction conceptuelle et puissent s'y
substituer
This is a difficult notion to grasp, precisely because it cannot be
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expressed in conceptual terms: any formulation which takes it into
the realm of the concept, as ordinary intellectual discussion must
do, inevitably falsifies it. It is nevertheless - as one might
say - the corner-stone of Bonnefoy's thinking. Much of the diffi¬
culty of his writing in the essays may be seen as stemming from
the inevitable falsification attendant on any coherent discussion
of such notions at all.
Ill Perception: simple classification, mauvaise presence, presence
Most of the quotations from Bonnefoy I have given so far come from
'Les Tombeaux de Bavenne', an essay which sets out more clearly
than any other Bonnefoy's distrustful attitude towards philosophy,
and his attachment to the substance of phenomenal reality as such.
In order to see how this attachment is developed into something
approaching an overall aesthetic theory, however, we must look at
other essays where the relevance of these ideas to art is more
explicitly brought out. Presence is most coherently discussed in
the much later 'La Poesie franpaise et le principe d'identite':
and while the very coherence of the discussion may to some extent,
as I have just suggested, over-simplify and falsify its object,
it is from this account that we must start if we are to make any
real progress in understanding Bonnefoy's overall aesthetic.
Presence is here seen as a mode of perception: for the moment, for
the sake of simplicity of exposition, I shall leave out of account
its close relationship with language, with which it stands in
^ 2
'continuite naturelle' (I , p. 249)•
The three stages of perception of a salamander which Bonnefoy des¬
cribes in the fourth section of 'La Poesie franpaise et le principe
- 36 -
d'identite' may be called 'simple classification', 'mauvaise presence'
and '(vraie) presence'. Although in this context these three stages
are presented as a progression, in other contexts they appear separately:
it is only for convenience of exposition that I discuss them here
as a triadic development, since presence is by no means an inevitable
or straightforward continuation of mauvaise presence, which conversely
does not necessarily precede a true apprehension of presence.
The first mode of perception, which we may call simple classification,
occurs when the observer looks at the salamander and labels it in his
mind 'a salamander': 'Je puis analyser ce que m'apporte ma perception,
et ainsi, profitant de 1'experience des autres etres, separer en
esprit cette petite vie des autres donnees du monde, et la classer,
comme ferait le mot de la prose, et me dire: "Une salamandre", puis
poursuivre ma promenade, toujours distrait, demeure comme A la surface
de la rencontre' (i , pp. 246-7). The element of analysis in this
mode of perception is very small: the observer passes over the object
of his attention without pondering on its nature, contenting himself
merely with assigning it to an already established conceptual and
linguistic category. We may say that the object is a classified,
but basically unanalysed, particular. Bonnefoy's mention of 'le
mot de la prose' here may however raise one or two questions. It
seems to be related to his preceding implied criticism of any kind
of linguistic analysis based purely on the classificatory function
of words: 'Que serait-ce que "le cheval", sinon un concept? Un
cheval, oui, devant moi, et "le cheval" comme sa notion, quelle que
soit la fapon dont cette notion se determine. - J'admets que ce
point de vue permet de decrire correctement la fapon dont la langue
est disponible pour la plupart des usages' (I , p. 245). The
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implication here of a sharp dividing line between the 'normal* or
•prose' use of words, and their function in poetry, is unfortunate,
since the general trend of Bonnefoy's thought stands against any
such rigid dichotomy: however, this point will be dealt with later,
when I come to consider specifically linguistic questions.
So far, then, all is clear, but superficial. The next mode of
perception (or failure of perception), mauvaise presence, results
from an attempt to understand its object through analysis - an
attempt which fails because of the shortcomings inherent in the
analytic process itself, and leaves the observer face to face with
a conceptual emptiness:
je puis garder les yeux sur la salamandre, m'attacher aux
details qui m'avaient suffi pour la reconnaitre, croire
continuer 1'analyse qui en fait de plus en plus une sala¬
mandre, c'est-a-dire un objet de science, une realite
structuree par ma raison et penetree de langage - mais
tout cela, bientSt, pour ne plus rien percevoir, dans ces
aspects brusquement comme dissocies l'un de 1'autre, dans
ce contour d'une patte absolu, irrefutable, desert, qu'un
* 2
faisceau effrayant d'enigmes (i , p. 247)•
The particular, subjected to an attempt at analysis, loses its
true particularity and becomes a jumble of fragmented aspects,
mere hollow universals - concepts, in fact: for here we see a
concrete example of what, according to Bonnefoy, conceptual thought
does to the contemplation of reality. The aspects of the sala¬
mander separated out by the analytic process can each, at this
point, be considered on the level of simple classification, or
labelling. However, because the analytic mind is not considering
them as themselves, but as parts of something else (the salamander),
perception has lost something which existed, albeit without much
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true validity, in simple classification. It is this loss which
marks the dissociation characteristic of analytic thought, and
leads to the apprehension of the object as a 'faisceau effrayant
d'enigmes'. Bonnefoy makes clear the intimate relationship between
this process and language by adding that 'ces choses ont un nom,
^ 2
mais se sont faites d'un coup comme etrang&res au nom' (I , p. 247) •
Simple classification, in other words, gives things a tentative
link with the names it assigns to them, but only on condition that
no attempt is made to investigate further the nature of that link.
As soon as such an attempt is made in analytic terms, the weakness
of the link becomes apparent, and it disappears, giving the condition
of mauvaise presence, where the word is separated from the thing it
is being used to label, and exists in a state of independence which
Bonnefoy calls 'I'angoissante tautologie des langues, dont les mots
ne disent qu'eux-memes, sans prise vraie sur les choses - qui peuvent
^ 2
done se detacher d'eux, s'absenter' (I , p. 247). In ordinary language
as perceived by the analj'-tical consciousness, words have no automatic¬
ally valid link with the existence of the objects to which they refer.
This is a reflection of the distance between subject and object imposed
by conceptual thought, which in Bonnefoy's terms takes on the positively
evil quality of an abyss opening up before the observer - though in
the 1980 edition of the essay Bonnefoy has deleted his earlier, rather
melodramatic, reference here to *un gouffre, au fond duquel resonne
la chute inutile du temps' (EFM, p. $6).
The attempt to analyse the experience, then, fails. But in a para¬
doxical way the full awareness of this failure, which in the observer's
mind takes on, beyond its futility, a positively evil quality, can
lead to the third mode of perception, in which the second is comprehended
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and overtaken. This is the realisation of "presence itself - which
can of course be attained as a 'given' insight, without reference
to mauvaise presence, but which here is seen as following on from
it. Here the object of perception regains in full measure the
particularity it possessed in simple classification, while at the
same time retaining the universality of mauvaise presence - a
universality, however, which both transfigures and is transfigured
by the particularity in which it fully participates:
/La salamandre/ s'est devoilee, devenue ou redevenue la
salamandre - ainsi dit-on la fee - dans tin acte pur d'exister
.. 2
ou son 'essence' est comprise. (I , p. 248)
II n'y a plus une salamandre par opposition a cet &tre ou
une ou cent hirondelles, mais la salamandre, presente au
coeur des autres presences, (i^, p. 249)
The universality of mauvaise presence has gone beyond its state of
separation and abstraction to be re-embodied, consciously, in the
particular object from which it started. At the same time, this
embodiment of universality in a particular includes also the
particularity of other objects and of the observer, with the result
that the distinction between subject and object is abolished. This
notion implies a rejection of the logically-conceived spatial con¬
text in which objects are normally supposed to exist. The feeling
behind it is similar to that experienced by the mystics, but the
thought behind it is Bonnefoy's deeply ambiguous attitude towards the
ineffable nature of the Here and Now, as formulated, for instance,
by Hegel. We will investigate this further in connection with
Bonnefoy's views on poetic language: for the moment we may simply
draw attention to the fact, not only that the experience of presence
abolishes the distinction between particularity and universality,
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and therefore breaks the normal spatial mould of human consciousness,
but also that it breaks the normal temporal mould as well, and takes
place, as we have seen,as an act outside the ordinary flow of time.
The distinction between instantaneity and eternity is abolished,
no less than that between subject and object: 'c'est l'Un la grande
revelation de cet instant sans limites, ou tout se donne I. moi pour
que je comprenne et je lie' (I , p. 248).
Bonnefoy's description of -presence at this point has definitely
essentialist overtones. This notion of unity implies a separation
from reality which in other contexts he would see as potentially
dangerous. After talking of 'la salamandre, presente au coeur des
autres presences' (and the possible generalising force of the
definite article is never absent from Bonnefoy's own poetic practice)^
he goes on to say: 'L'idee d'un etre, sur cette voie - illusoire
ou non, peu importe - implique son existence, et cela vainc le
concept, qui doit abolir cel]e-ci pour que les formules prosperent'
(i2, p. 249). This recalls Bonnefoy's exposition of Plotinus, in
'Le Temps et l'intemporel dans la peinture du Quattrocento':
Plotin . . . condamne l'idee, si profondement etablie dans le
monde antique, selon laquelle la beaute est f'^,
harmonie, correspondance reciproque entre les parties et le
tout. L'harmonie, dit Plotin, suppose des parties, c'est-^-dire
du divise. Or, c'est l'Un, c'est la participation l'Un,
directe, qui est le beau. Voici que l'art est requis de prendre
pour objet, pour impossible objet, une realite transcendante.
(I2, p. 67)
Presence, as described in this part of 'La Poesie franpaise et le
(l) for a discussion of a concrete example of this see, for instance,
my article on 'Movement and Immobility in a poem by Yves
Bonnefoy', Modern Language Review 72, 3 (July 1977)» P» 568
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principe d'identite', is like the One (though we have seen that
Bonnefoy's use of this term is not always faithful to Plotinus), as
against the aspects which would he seized upon hy conceptual analysis;
and it seems too perfect a notion to he attainable - hence, one
imagines, the suggestion that it is of little importance whether or
not it is illusory, though this could also imply that in presence
even the categories of illusion and reality are transcended. But
this essentialist notion must still he a reality, albeit perhaps a
reality which cannot he attained, rather than any of the kinds of
abstraction which may he associated with conceptual analysis. The
aesthetic implied is something like that which Bonnefoy sees in
Racine:
Le monde est remplace par un monde plus resserre d'essences
intelligibles. Et celui-ci n'est pas pour autant un monde
ahstrait - puisque 1'equivoque profonde de l'idee platonicienne
est de prendre sur soi le plus vif, le plus pur de l'apparence
sensible - mais c'est un lieu separe ou l'on peut ouhlier la
diversite du reel et 1'existence du temps, de la vie quotidienne,
de la mort. (H, p. 238)
Since Bonnefoy insists repeatedly on the importance of capturing 'la
diversite du reel', the idea that presence should he simply equated
with a transcendent form of reality, however far removed that might
he from abstraction, must he rejected: and it is, precisely, only
when presence is described in abstract terms that it may seem to
take on an abstraction which is basically foreign to its nature.
The all-embracing and universal quality of presence can only be
seen in its manifestation through particulars. Furthermore, the
exposition which I have given above - and, to a lesser exrfcent, the
exposition in 'La Poesie franpaise et le principe d'identite' on
which it is based - fails to convey the fact that presence cannot
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"be attained, or even described, by a process of logical reasoning.
The experience of presence has a random, 'given' quality, and a
highly-charged emotional content, which can be seen in the use, in
Bonnefoy's account, of the terms 'demon . . . je suis pris et sauve
. . . 1'amour . . . l'ange', and in his final quotation from St.
John of the Cross (I , p. 247-8). Although we may postulate a
philosophical framework for presence, Bonnefoy deals with it with
neither the rigour nor the aridity which a philosophical statement
would demand: he is more likely to use the language of mysticism.
(IV) The concept and meaning: signification and sens
It may now be worth going over again the ground I have so far rather
sketchily covered, in order to reach a fuller understanding of what
presence actually involves. Through its very intractability to
analysis, the notion of simple classification cannot be developed
to any extent, although I shall have something to say later about
its implicit connection with the notion of the linguistic sign as
posited by modern linguistic analysis. Simple classification, when
subjected to analysis, inevitably turns into mauvaise presence.
This is par excellence the domain of the concept, or rather of the
concept pushed to extremes in analytic thought, which leads to a
perception of anguished emptiness. We may situate 'concept' here
in a specialised area of vocabulary of which one must be aware
when reading Bonnefoy. In his description of mauvaise presence,
he says: *Et ces concepts, ces definitions, ces aspects, tout cela
ne m'est plus qu'une coherence vide, sans reponse a nulle question'
(I , p. 247). The 'coherence vide' is the same as that of a philo¬
sophical system, and its agents are obviously 'concepts, definitions,
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aspects'. On the other hand, the word 'idee', at least in certain
contexts and at certain points in Bonnefoy's oscillating love-hate
relationship with Platonic thought, takes on the opposite meaning,
that of the universal particular realised in presence, with which
I have already dealt. In the 'idee', reality, far from being for¬
gotten, comes into its own: 'Si rien n'est moins reel que le concept,
rien ne l'est plus que cette alliance d'une forme et d'une pierre,
de 1'exemplaire et d'un corps: rien ne I'est plus que l'Idee'
(i, p. 19). Typically enough, Bonnefoy had second thoughts on his
use here of the term 'idee', and changed it, in later editions of
* + 2
the essay, to '1'Idee risquee' (NRP, p. 27, I , p. 17), implying
that the Idea, too, in order to attain a true mode of "being, cannot
take refuge in a stable, spiritually validated realm of essences,
but has to be perceived in the dangerous, random and ephemeral
illumination of presence. The hierarchy of vocabulary, however,
is clear enough in outline, and a further element may be seen in
Bonnefoy's summary description of presence, of which I have already
quoted the first sentence: 'L'idee d'un §tre, sur cette voie -
illusoire ou non, peu importe - implique son existence, et cela
vainc le concept, qui doit abolir celle-ci pour que ses formules
prosperent. Dans l'esperance de la presence, on ne "signifie" pas,
on laisse une lumiere se desenchevetrer des significations qui
I'occultent' (i , p. 249). The use of 'signification' here to
designate something analogous to 'concept' may at first seem puzzling:
but it is easily enough explained if we consider 'signification'
as the communicative function of the one-to-one labelling process
which I have called 'simple classification'. This process takes
no account of any possible valid link between a word and the true
existence of the thing which it names. Bonnefoy is not, in this
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context, an enemy of meaning, but only of meaning in the very re¬
stricted sense of 'conceptual reference'. In his essay on Jouve
and elsewhere he makes a clear distinction between 'signification'
and 'sens', and asserts that it is with the latter that poetry is
concerned:
En verite, il y a dans la creation un autre pSle que celui
ou s'engendrent k l'infini, hors du temps, desinteressees
du destin, les metonymies et les metaphores. Un pole qui
oriente non les significations mais le sens, lequel a sa
beaute lui aussi, bien qu'aux limites de 1'invisible . . .
Ne d'un desir qu'aucune richesse de proportions ou d'images
ne peut combler, parce qu'il est memoire de la presence, on
peut dire ce pSle - ce desir encore -,1a poesie. (NR, p. 2J6)
'Le sens' - it is no coincidence that this singular is opposed to
the plural *les significations' - is not restricted to the series of
connections which we may call 'les significations', and represents
something more than, and of a different order from, their sum total.
In the case of a poem, one could say that 'le sens' is what Bonnefoy
later in 'La Poesie franqaise et le principe d'identite' calls 'une
intention de salut, qui est le seul souci du poeme' (I , p. 250),
rather than the poem's referential meaning: but the notion cannot be
said to apply to poetry alone, and indeed has close affinities with
the participation in existence which Bonnefoy sees as characteristic
of the Plotinian One.
On a rather more mundane level, we can take 'aspect', 'concept' and
'signification' as terms marking an abstraction from, and therefore
a falsification of, the true existence of things: 'aspect' being
the detail of a being seized on by analytic thought, 'concept' the
mental image of this detail, and Signification' the relationship
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between the object and its verbal equivalent, the value of a word
used purely to label it. 'Idee', on the other hand, is the perceptual
element in an experience of -presence, and 'sens' that experience seen
in terms of the communication - through the abolition of the distinctions
between subject and object, instantaneity and eternity - that it
represents.
All of this carries many essentialist overtones. But there is a world
of difference between an essence endowed with inner spiritual validity
and one which is mere abstraction. This is a notion running through
all Bonnefoy's work: one can see it in the contrasts between 'concept1
and*Ldee', and between 'signification' and 'sens'. It is also present
in the vocabulary Bonnefoy uses to criticise the fin-de-siecle inter¬
pretation of Byzantium:
Tous les signes de 1'ideal - plutSt que de 1'absolu -, de l'aristo-
cratie - plutSt que de la noblesse -, mais une immobilite perni-
cieuse, comme d'un coeur qui ne voudrait pas des joies et des
souffranees de vivre et se deroberait au reel, quitte A subir
1'instinct comme une brusquerie inintelligible et fatale, dans
l'attente passive de la mort. Alors 1'affirmation du Beau ne
se distingua plus d'une haine de 1'existence, (i , p. 173)
(We may see here, incidentally, Bonnefoy's profoundly equivocal
attitude to 'l'Idee' hovering behind his use of the word 'ideal'.)
As soon as an essence loses touch with reality, it atrophies: and
Bonnefoy's attachment to reality is no less strong than his yearning
for something beyond. The Idea must be embodied in 'la substantielle
o
immortalite' (i , p. 26) - we find this notion everywhere in Bonnefoy's
work, from 'Les Tombeaux de Bavenne' to his warning against '/Te7
mauvais desir de i'infini' in Bans le ieurre du seuil (p, p. 264),
or this confessional moment in his essay on Jouve:
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Et 1&, peut-etre y a-t-il coupure entre 1'oeuvre de Jouve et
le souci que j'en ai, car je dois marquer maintenant & quel
point cette pensee de la nature souillee m'est etrangfere.
Quels qu'aient pu etre mes doutes et mes contradictions,
je n'ai jamais mis 1'evidence terrestre en cause, elle me
semble porter le vrai, et je ne vois rien de coupable dans
ses incitations, ses evenements et ses fins. (MR, p. 241)
In going on to look more closely at presence itself, it may be
profitable to consider it from an existentialist, rather than
from an essentialist, point of view, if we can at least partially
divorce the word 'existentialist' from its standard referent in
modern philosophy.
V L'ephemere
At this point we may well turn back to 'Les Tombeaux de Ravenne',
where Bonnefoy's line of argument following on from his condemnation
of the concept is itself interesting. He does not try to establish
a direct logical continuation, but instead proceeds by the doubly
indirect route of a false analogy, between the concept and the
'ornement' of the monuments of Ravenna. Thus he avoids the empty
directness of ordinary conceptual analysis - what I have called
linear logic -, and by bringing in the idea of 'ornement' in this
context moves both inwards - away from abstract considerations and
towards a meditation on the concrete (in every sense of the word)
(l) This must be a thorny point of vocabulary. Given that one needs a
couple of adjectives meaning 'pertaining to existence' and 'pertaining
to essence', where 'existence' and 'essence' are used in a fairly
wide-ranging, non-technical sense, 'existentialist' and 'essentialist'
are unsatisfactory because of the former's inevitable overtones of
Sartre and his school, whereas 'existential' and 'essential' are
impossible because of the latter*s much wider range of ordinary
meaning. At the same time, consistency of style would demand a pair
having a similar morphological form. In general, I have preferred
to use 'existentialist' and 'essentialist' where a direct comparison
is being made, but I also use 'existential' on its own from time to time.
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reality of the main subject of his essay - and outwards, by intro¬
ducing a theme which he develops elsewhere, both directly, in his
essays on Baroque architecture, and more generally, through the
notion which for convenience I will call 'l'ephemere': the idea
that something incidental - the ornamentation of a Baroque church,
or a fragment of ivy-leaf, or some quite inconsequential, random
event - can, through the very quality of its apparent unimportance,
become the centre of an aesthetic experience. This idea should
become clearer as I develop it.
The false analogy in 'Les Tombeaux de Ravenne' depends on the notion
that both concept and ornamentation are closed systems, pursuing a
kind of game within themselves which excludes and ignores awkward
or mysterious sides of reality, and in particular death. But this
theory, in which ornamentation is considered, like the concept, as
a kind of narcotic, shielding the analytical mind from reality, fails
to explain the 'allegresse' which Bonnefoy feels when meditating on
the tombs of Ravenna, or the 'pouvoir d'apaisement' (i , pp. 14-15)
which their ornamentation has over him. This, he suggests, is because
the theory fails to take into account the substantive existence of
the ornamentation: 'Mais c'etait compter sans la pierre, qui appartient
Si 1'etre meme de l'ornement, et retient dans le monde sensible ses
etranges universaux' (i^, p. 16).
Here we find again the idea of an abstraction losing its abstraction
and becoming actual physical substance - an idea which, by its very
nature, resists formulation in abstract terms, but which is central
to the understanding of the difference between analytical perception
and the apprehension of presence. This must be considered a mystical
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notion, to be fully grasped only through participation in, rather
than intellectual contemplation of reality,as indeed Bonnefoy
implies when he accuses Valery of not having appreciated 'le mystere
de la substance' (i, p. 138) (significantly varied in the 1980
reprint to 'le mystere de la presence' (i , p. 98)): but its
mysticism is not that of a remote Beyond, but rather that of a
transcendental Here and How. Postponing for the moment any philo¬
sophical elaboration of this idea, we may quote Bonnefoy on '1'universel',
a little later in Ties Tombeaux de Ravenne': '1'universel, cette
notion la plus utile au bonheur possible de 1'homme, est entierement
a reinventer. L'universel n'est pas une loi, qui pour etre partout
la meme ne vaut vraiment nulle part. L'universel a son lieu'
(I2, P. 19).
This fairly dense statement enacts by indirect allusion both the
poetic and the emotional content of presence. With the echoes from
Rimbaud (L'amour est k reinventer')^ and Baudelaire (Singuliere
fortune ou le but se deplace,/Et, n'etant nulle part, peut etre
(2)
n'importe ou!')v , Bonnefoy invokes the tutelary presence of the
two French poets he admires above all others: but further, the actual
content of the echoes hints at the wideness of range he wants to
give 'l'universel', no matter how particular its incarnation may be.
For love must form part of the emotional content of presence ('je
suis passe de la perception maudite ii 1'amour, qui est prescience
de I'invisible' (I , p. 248)), and travel, 'le voyage' itself, is
more than a metaphor for the quest for presence, but rather one of
the supreme initiatory enterprises by which it can be attained:
(1) Rimbaud, 'Delires I' (Une Saison en enfer), Oeuvres, ed. Bernard
(Paris, i960),p. 224.
(2) Baudelaire, 'Le Voyage', Les Fleurs du mal. ed. Adam (Paris,1961),
p. 156.
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'Poesie et voyage sont d'une m§me substance, d'un m§me sang, je le
redis apres Baudelaire, et de toutes les actions qui sont possibles
k 1'homme, les seules peut-§tre utiles, les seules qui ont un but'
(I2, p. 20).
But what is the 'lieu' where the universal becomes particular, where
presence is actually embodied in physical substance endowed with
spiritual aspiration at the highest level? It is not situated in
some form of ideal perfection. On the contrary, it must be seen
as necessarily imperfect, insignificant and everyday. In Bavenna,
it is precisely the ornamentation of the monuments - perceived as
physical substance, as stone - which bears the spiritual force of
true -presence. And, as in the poem 'L'Imperfection est la cime'
(P, p. 117), perfection must be denied:
Je dirai par allegorie: /T'acte de la presence/ est ce fragment
de 1'arbre sombre, cette feuille cassee du lierre. La feuille
enti^re, bUtissant son essence immuable de toutes ses nervures,
serait deja le concept. Mais cette feuille brisee, verte et
noire, salie, cette feuille qui montre dans sa blessure toute
la profondeur de ce qui est, cette feuille infinie est presence
pure, et par consequent mon salut. (l^» P- 24)
The object in question - the actual site of presence - does not
matter, in the sense that it might be anything, anywhere, as one may
see from the list of 'vrais lieux' Bonnefoy gives in 'Devotion'
(I , pp. 133-5)• Some of these references recur in other contexts -
Saint-Yves de la Sagesse and Sainte-Marthe d'Aglie are mentioned in
'La Seconde Simplicite' (i , p. 187), Galla Placidia is associated
with Bavenna, and the Brancacci chapel and Delphi are the subjects
of poems (P, pp. 86 and 149) -, while others are obviously of a more
private nature, and the whole series is dominated by the reminiscence
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of Rimbaud's 'Devotion' from Les Illuminationsbut the factor of
central importance in the naming, and sanctifying, process of the
poem is the reciprocal nature of the experience of presence, involving
as it does the observing, articulate subject equally with the (often
unremarkable) object observed. In the quotation on 'l'universel'
which I began earlier, Bonnefoy goes on: 'L'universel est en chaque
lieu dans le regard qu'on en prend, 1'usage qu'on en peut faire'
(r, P. 19). it is through a true realisation of its inner being
that the undistinguished particular becomes a site for presence, 'le
seuil unique de l'absolu qui est la chose quelconque, vraiment aimee
comme telle' (i , p. 251): and if this realisation could happen any¬
where, the realisation, once achieved, transcends the random triviality
of the particular object in and through which it is experienced. 'Le
vrai lieu est donne par le hasard, mais au vrai lieu le hasard perdra
^ 2
son caractere d'enigme' (I , p. 128).
VI The Here and How : Hegel and poetic articulacy. The notion of seuil
The 'vrai lieu', the site for presence, is not to be considered as
falling into the categories of space and time, as these are ordinarily
conceived. This notion needs clarification, for it is one which
Bonnefoy does not make totally explicit: he often uses the terms
'ici' and 'maintenant', but it is not always clear that these refer
to the Here and How as discussed by Hegel in a piece of reasoning
which Bonnefoy explicitly rejects, but obviously finds convenient
as a reference. The specific context is Hegel's refutation of the
na'ive sense-certainty which points to the particular as an immediate
(5) Rimbaud, Oeuvres, p. JOG
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object of consciousness, and his denial of the possibility of giving
utterance to that particular. Bonnefoy's main concern is with the
linguistic aspect of the argument: for the moment, however, we may
deal with its more strictly philosophical side.
In 'L'Acte et le lieu de la poesie' Bonnefoy says of Hegel: 'Hegel
l'a montre, avec soulagement croirait-on, la parole ne peut rien
retenir de ce qui est l'immediat. Maintenant, c'est la nuit, si
par ces mots je pre'tends exprimer mon experience sensible, ce n'est
plus aussitSt qu'un cadre o^ la presence s'efface' (I , p. 114)«
In his PMnomenologie des Geistes Hegel divides the 'This' - the
particular object as perceived by naive sense-certainty - into its
temporal and spatial elements, the 'Now' and the 'Here', and shows
that each of these is a universal, existing as itself only through
a denial of any immediate instance of its application. Of the Now
he says:
A la question: qu'est-ce que le maintenant? nous repondrons,
par exemple: le maintenant est la nuit. Pour eprouver la
verite de cette certitude sensible une simple experience
sera suffisante. Nous notons par ecrit cette verite; une
verite ne perd rien k etre ecrite et aussi peu Stre
conservee. Eevoyons maintenant & midi cette verite ecrite,
nous devrons dire alors qu'elle s'est eventee . . .
Sans doute le maintenant lui-mSme se conserve bien, mais
comme un maintenant tel qu'il n'est pas la nuit; de meme
k 1'egard du jour qu'il est actuellement, le maintenant se
maintient, mais comme un maintenant tel qu'il n'est pas le
jour, ou comme un negatif en general.^
And a little later, he says of the Here:
Le meme cas se produit pour 1'autre forme du ceci, c'est-a-dire
pour l'ici. L'ici est, par exemple, 1'arbre. Je me retourne,




cette verite a disparu et s'est changee en verite opposee:
l'ici n'est pas un arbre, mais plutSt une maison. L'ici
lui-meme ne disparait pas, mais il est et demeure dans la
disparition de la maison,de 1'arbre, etc.; il est de plus
indifferent "h etre maison ou arbre. De nouveau le ceci se
montre comme simplicite mediatisee, ou comme universalite.
Furthermore, language is a reflection of this failure of immediate
perception in that when we use the word, say, horse, we are no doubt
thinking of a particular horse, and may indeed be pointing one out:
but what we actually say is a universal, a term with no particular
referent, applicable to an indefinite number of quadrupeds:
C'est aussi comme un universel que nous prononoons le sensible.
Ce que nous disons, c'est ceci, c'est-^-dire le ceci universel,
ou encore il est, c'est-a-dire 1'etre, en general. Nous ne
nous representons pas assurement le ceci universel ou l'etre
en general, mais nous prononoons 1'universel. En d'autres
termes, nous ne parlons absolument pas de la meme fafon que
nous visons dans cette certitude sensible. Mais comme nous
le voyons, c'est le langage qui est le plus vrai: en lui,
nous allons jusqu'a refuter immediatement notre avis; et
puisque 1'universel est le vrai de la certitude sensible,
et que le langage exprime seulement ce vrai, alors il n'est
certes pas possible que nous puissions dire un etre sensible
que nous visons.
Bonnefoy accepts these arguments, at least within their own terms
of reference. But his 'Hegel l'a montre, avec soulagement croirait-on
. . . ' shows his true attitude: the 'soulagement' is that of a
conceptual flight from reality, in contrast to the 'allegresse' which
he feels in Ravenna, or the 'amour' which must enter into the
experience of presence. The only mode of refutation for such
(2) ibid, pp. 84-5
(5) ibid, p. 84
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arguments is a kind of passionate and irrational assertion of the
contrary, rather than any attempt at conceptual reasoning:
Et je suis pret quant a moi, dans le devenir poetique, dans
la parole en tant qu'invention ou retour, et pour aller sur
la voie qui se decouvre la seule, a affirmer follement cet
ici et ce maintenant qui sont dej^,, c'est vrai, un 1^,-bas
et un autrefois, qui ne sont plus, qu'on nous a voles, mais
qui, eternellement dans leur finitude temporelle, universelle-
ment dans leur infirmite spatiale, sont le seul hien concevable,
le seul lieu qui merite le nom de lieu. (I*-, p. 123)
In his essay on Valery he makes the same magnificent assertion in
less personal terms: 'La poesie . . . doit se vouer a cet Ici et ce
Maintenant que Hegel orgueilleusement avait revoques au nom du
lamgage, et faire de ses mots qui, en effet, quittent l'etre, un
p
profond et paradoxal retour vers lui' (l , pp. 98-9)-
I will elaborate on the linguistic side of this question when dealing
with Bonnefoy's ideas on language in poetry. For the moment we may
note his ambiguous attitude to Hegel, and - another example of his
adaptation of given philosophical notions for his own ends - his
tendency to use the terms 'ici' and 'maintenant1 in a sense, or at
least with certain implications, diametrically opposed to Hegel's
- though Hegel's argument is always in the background, so that the
words carry a much greater weight of philosophical content than they
do in normal use.
Inasmuch, then, as the 'vrai lieu' is an absolute Here, the act of
presence is an absolute Now, and as such it stands in suspension
outside the continuity of time and makes the experience of presence
a polarity in which death, as timeless instant, and substance, as
timeless eternity, are set against each other, and at the same time
identified with each other.
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The introduction of the notion of death at this point needs some
explanation. We have already seen that Bonnefoy's central criticism
of conceptual thought relates to its inability to take account of
death, or rather to its flight from the reality of death, and its
replacement of death by coherent but spiritually empty systems:
Pour autant qu'elle fut pensee, depuis les Grecs, la mort
ntest qu'une idee qui se fait la complice d'autres, dans un
regne eternel ou justement rien ne meurt. Telle est bien
notre verite: elle ose definir la mort, mais pour la remplacer
par du defini. Or le defini est incorruptible, il assure
malgre la mort et pourvu qu'on oublie les apparences brutales
une etrange immortalite.
* 2
Provisoire immortalite, mais suffisante. (i , p. 12)
We may readily accept that death is necessarily the most important
of human concerns. But when it becomes a concern, when we reflect
on it, we immediately confront the danger represented by conceptual
thought: that we should forget death as death, and instead integrate
it into a system, and thus escape from 'les apparences brutales'.
Ironically, as we have seen, Hegel, whose insight into the nature of
death Bonnefoy esteems highly enough - as an insight - to quote as
epigraph to Du mouvement et de l'immobilite de Douve, invalidated
that very insight by incorporating it into an all-embracing philo¬
sophical system. Hegel's immediate context, however,is relevant to
Bonnefoy's thought:
Le cercle qui repose en soi ferine sur soi, et qui, comme
substance, tient tous ses moments, est la relation immediate
qui ne suscite ainsi aucun etonnement. Mais que l'accidentel
comme tel, separe de son pourtour, ce qui est lie et effective-
ment reel seulement dans sa connexion k autre chose, obtienne
un etre-la propre et une liberte distincte, c'est lk la puissance
prodigieuse du negatif, l'energie de la pensee, du pur moi. La
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mort, si nous voulons nommer ainsi cette irrealite, est la
chose la plus redoutahle, et tenir fermement ce qui est mort,
est ce qui exige la plus grande force. La beaute sans force
hait 15entendement, parce que 15entendement attend d'elle ce
qu'elle n'est pas en mesure d'accomplir. Ce n'est pas cette
vie qui recule d'horreur devant la mort et se preserve pure
de la destruction, mais la vie qui porte la mort, et se main-
tient dans la mort meme, qui est la vie de l'esprit. L'esprit
conquiert sa verite seulement a condition de se retrouver soi-
meme dans 1'absolu dechirement. L'esprit est cette puissance
en n'etant pas semblable au positif qui se detourne du negatif,
(comme quand nous disons d'une chose qu'elle n'est rien, ou
qu'elle est fausse, et que, debarrasse alors d'elle, nous
passons sans plus a quelque chose d'autre), mais 1'esprit est
cette puissance seulement en sachant regarder le negatif en
face, et en sachant sojourner aupres de lui. Ce sejour est
le pouvoir magique qui convertit le negatif en ^tre.^''
Hegel is in fact attempting to integrate death, which he sees almost
casually, in abstract terms - 'si nous voulons nommer ainsi cette
irrealite' -, into a kind of conceptual spiral which, Bonnefoy would
suggest, is just as much a flight from reality as the conceptual
circle which Hegel sees death as breaking up. Taken as a simple
insight, however, and mediated on in a quite different way, Hegel's
perception that death must be seen as the essential opposite side
of the coin to life, that life must explore and investigate the
full reality of death, and that death, thus explored, is a force which
can transform nothingness into being, is of the utmost value. Heath
in this context must be seen, neither simply as an abstract idea,
nor as merely the physical fact of death, although that fact is
always central to a full apprehension of death. The emotional
content of such an apprehension, rather, is like that of mauvaise
(4) Hegel, La Phenomenologie de 1'esprit, vol.1, p. 29
_ 56 -
presence: and it is only, for instance, after full exploration of the
desolation and hopelessness of possible poetic utterance that a
miracle may take place, as happened, Bonnefoy believes, in Baudelaire's
case:
Le neant consume 1'objet, nous sommes pris dans le vent de
cette flamme sans ombre. Et nulle foi ne nous soutient plus,
nulle formule, nul mythe, le plus intense regard s'acheve
desespere. Restons pourtant devant cet horizon sans figure,
vide de soi. Tenons, si je puis dire, le pas gagne. Car
il est vrai que deja un changement se produit. L'astre
morne de ce qui est, 1'elementaire Janus, tournamt avec
lenteur - mais dans 1'instant - sur lui-meme, nous decouvre
son autre face. Un possible apparait sur la ruine de tout
p
possible. (I , pp. 121-2)
It may seem ironical that, after the affirmation that '/nul mythe/
ne nous soutient plus', we have the invocation of Janus. But one
of the features of presence can be the revalidation of myth: and
the miracle itself must come about 'avec lenteur', because of the
force of introspection needed (in this case, at least) to accomplish
it, but also 'dans 1'instant', because the experience must take
place outside the prison of the Now considered as an abstract
universal and in the freedom of the affirmed, but ineffable, present
moment. At the same time, this only indicates part of the richness
of presence: the other essential element in its incarnation is
substance, representing a similar liberation from the abstract Here,
as seen in a widespread ornamental motif in Ravenna: 'II represente
deux paons. Dresses, affrontes, savants et simples comme des
hyperboles, ils boivent dans un meme calice ou mordent la meme
vigne. Dans un entrelacs de 1'esprit qui reprend et acheve celui
^ 2
du marbre, ils signifient la mort et 1'immortalite* (I , p. 16).
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In -presence, then, spirit and substance, death and immortality, are
combined. But as soon as we reach any such formulation, we have
already, perhaps, fallen into the trap of conceptualisation. The
danger of the fixed system is ever-present, and inevitable: it is a
fault inherent in the very stuff of ordinary discursive prose, the
language of essays and theses. Before explaining this further, then,
and tackling the relationship of language to the whole complex of
ideas I have been discussing, it may be well to sound yet again a
note of warning. Bonnefoy's affirmations of the power of the poetic
word, full of strength and inspiration though they are, are neverthe¬
less rare and fleeting, and confront, within Bonnefoy's own thought,
a great weight of rational argument against the over-facile formulation
of the notion of an absolute Heie and Bow to which access might be poss¬
ible, through language or by any other means. The experience of
presence is mystical in the sense that it cannot be attained by a
rational process of even non-linear thought. When Bonnefoy talks of
^ 2
•la chose quelconque, vraiment aimee comme telle' (I , p. 251), this
is not an absolute, but merely 'le seuil unique de l'absolu'.
The notion referred to now and then in Bonnefoy's criticism in terms
of 'seuil' is of great importance, and can very easily be overlooked.
He may use it in a sense which implies that no progress can be made
beyond it: but this does not mean that he is proposing an aesthetic
of total defeat. On the contrary, the poet must cross the threshold:
but the threshold is the place where articulacy, in the sense of
discursive reasoning, stops. Bonnefoy could take over Wittgenstein's
(5)
'what we cannot speak about we must consign to silence y ' t>ut as a
positive doctrine, adding perhaps, as a rider, 'but name it'. In
terms of logic, and even in terms of ordinary uses of language,
Bonnefoy often deals with a world of 'as if's': and this is reflected,
(5) Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. Pears and
McGuiness (London, lybl), p. 151
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as I have pointed out, in his fondness for qualifications and parentheses.
In 'La Poesie fran9aise et le principe d'identite', immediately after the
triumphant affirmation of presence in the quotation from St John of the
Cross, he retreats and seems to qualify his vision in rather more sober
language: 'J'appellerai cette unite retablie, ou tout au moins qui affleure,
la presence' (i^, p. 249). But it would be a mistake to take 'ou tout au
moins qui affleure' as anything more than a definition of the limits beyond
which discursive language cannot go. It is in no sense a qualification of
the reality of presence, but rather an acknowledgement of its existence
outside normal human conceptual processes.
In this context we may see the apparent questioning in the title of Dans le
leurre au seuil of even the limited certainty of the notion of 'seuil' as,
in fact, ambiguous: 'le seuil' could be a 'leurre' in that, in conceptual
terms, even such a tentative degree of certainty is unsound; but it could
also be a 'leurre' in the sense that poetic endeavour cannot rely on a neat
assertion of conceptual uncertainty but must plunge into the attempt to
name, grasp, and consent to reality, thus hoping to enact presence. The
ironical ambiguity of the title is no doubt intentional.
This does not mean, however, that the kind of reservations with which
Bonnefoy hedges round the assertions in his essays are not valid on their
own terms: and their own terms are, by definition, the only ones we have
to work with, for we are limited to conceptual discourse. As we go on
to deal with Bonnefoy's ideas on language and poetry, we would do well to
heed his remark in 'L'Acte et le lieu de la poesie': 'La parole peut bien,
comme je le fais maintenant, celebrer la presence, chanter son acte, nous
preparer en esprit & sa rencontre, mais non pas nous permettre de
I'accomplir' (I , pp. 123-4). It is only with this notion firmly fixed
in our minds that we mas'" now consider the possibilities and conditions
of its validity being suspended.
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B. LANGUAGE AMB POETRY
VII Nommer: the case of the proper r^a.mp
As I have implied throughout this study so far, Bonnefoy postulates
a close parallel between language and experience: '/le langage/ est
en continuite naturelle avec 1'experience que j'ai decrite - et
dans I'un comme 1'autre de ses aspects' (I , p. 249)• That is, the
communicative powers of language can be analogous either to mauvaise
•presence or to presence. He goes on to develop this idea by saying
'La langue - et c'est pourquoi on a pari! de logos, de "Yerbe" -
semble promettre au-dela de son moment conceptuel la meme unite que
celle que propose la vie au-dela des aspects qui ont fragment! sa
presence. Elle semble nous inviter a porter dans sa profondeur la
parole qui fera etre ce qu'elle nomme'(i^ pp. 249-50).
Here, typically, the qualifications are essential. If, on the level
of experience, one can only attain - or at least, only conceive
rationally of attaining - the 'seuil de la possession de l'etre' (I ' p. 2(
which is the 'vrai lieu', language, for its part, can only hold a
tentative promise of absolute communication, which may itself be
illusory ('semble promettre . . . semble nous inviter'): and the
mention of logos, of language as the complete expression of divine
creation (as act and as substance), must be consigned to a parenthesis.
But the fact that these things can be mentioned at all is itself
significant. As we have seen, Bonnefoy is ready in certain circum¬
stances to assert that somehow, beyond all rational argument, and
without - and I shall return to this point later - the kind of
guarantee that a settled religious faith might appear to provide,
poetic language can in fact conjure into being the things which it
names.
- 60 -
I have already discussed the background of Hegelian reasoning against
which Bonnefoy asserts the sporadic but none the less glorious power
of the poetic word. It may be relevant here to discuss a special
category of words to which neither Bonnefoy nor, apparently, Hegel
gives a great deal of explicit attention, but which nevertheless
raises a number of interesting points in this context. This is the
category of proper names. Bonnefoy remarks, in 'La Poesie franpaise
et le principe d'identite': 'Pour tous les linguistes . . . le mot
cheval ... a pour contenu une quiddite, rien d'autre, et ainsi
n'est-il nullement dans sa fatalite d'evoquer, comme peut le faire
un nom propre quand on le crie, 1'existence effective, ici, devant
moi, du "cheval"' (i^, p. 245).
It is clear what Bonnefoy is referring to. Proper names are, in fact,
different from other words, in that they do not express universais,
in Hegel's sense (see pp.51-2 above). According to Ivan Soil, Hegel
in his Logic denies proper names any meaning at all, because
'individual names can be assumed, bestowed or even changed arbitrarily'.
Soil adds:
In assigning proper names one cannot be mistaken in the same
straightforward sense as one can be in describing something.
To name one's son 'Jane' is merely peculiar, but to describe
a window as 'a horse' is mistaken. The complete inter-
changeability of proper names might be accounted for by
arguing that all proper names have the same meaning - no
• (1)meaning.v '
We may criticise Soil for failing to point out that the difference
between assigning a proper name, or 'naming', and assigning a common
noun, or 'describing (something) as' is itself a reflection of the
(l) Ivan Soil, An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics (Chicago, 1969),
p. 98.
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differen.ee between the two kinds of word. I shall develop this notion
presently. The behaviour of the category of 'proper names' itself,
however, is more complicated than Soli implies. We may admit, as
Graham Martin points out, that 'the claim that proper names can be
(2)
arbitrarily applied to anything you like, is at best a half-truth*. v '
Proper names can, and frequently do, gather connotations in uses like
'He's a Scrooge': and in their ordinary use, they take up the connotations
of the individual to whom they refer, and thus connote a greater number
(3)of attributes than do common nouns. v '
There is, however, a difference between common nouns and proper names,
beyond Martin's admission of the latter's lack of a 'generalising
function', because of the ways in which the two categories are assigned.
If I see on the horizon a red-haired, kilted figure standing beside
an object, I may assume 'Ah! there is my friend Alexander standing
beside a tree'. On closer inspection, however, I may turn out to be
wrong on both counts, and this is where the difference comes in. As
I approach,the tree' may turn out to be a bush, or a shrub, or (if I
am very blind) a flag-pole or lamp-post: but I will not usually be at
a loss in categorizing the object according to my more accurate obser¬
vation, because its connotations will assign it to a linguistic category
with whose use I am familiar. Even if I do not know what it is called,
I can still describe it in terms of its attributes, and someone better
acquainted than I with the class of objects to which it belongs could,
from my description, enlighten me.
If I am mistaken about the red-haired, kilted figure, however, I cannot
have recourse to the same criteria for correcting myself, nor have I
(2) Graham Dunstan Martin, Language. Truth and Poetry (Edinburgh, 1975)>
P • 37 •
(3) Otto Jespersen, quoted in Martin, op.cit.. p. 36.
- 62 -
any particular interest in doing so. It may turn out that the figure's
name is mere likely to he Dorothy or Sheila: but that is about as far
as the connotations of proper names themselves will take me. If the
person in question is not Alexander, then it is of little consequence
to me whether he is John or Marmaduke, if I do not know these people.
The proper name, once assigned, possesses a quality of unique and
immediate reference which is quite different from the reference of
common nouns, and which implies some relationship between its user,
its referent and the context in which it is being used - the person
its user is addressing, for instance. Per this reason, when it is
being used in ordinary discourse, it carries a much greater weight
of connotative content than do common nouns. On the other hand, when
it is not assigned to a single individual, it has relatively little
connotative content: and if we have a change in assignation, the
connotative content changes too. The hero of Orwell's 1984 is called
Winston Smith, a name presumably bestowed upon the hapless infant be¬
cause of its Churchillian connotations, and used by Orwell with ironical
effect, because of the very different path which he makes his fictional
Winston tread. But in real life, such irony would be barely perceptible.
The name Winston, within the circle of the individual's acquaintances,
would simply take on the connotations of the person to whom it applied.
I am postulating, therefore, two categories of use for proper names:
connotative, where the name itself carries connotations as common nouns
do, and where it may indeed carry a certain generalizing function, as
in phrases like 'the Jeremiahs of this world'; and assigned, where the
na.-mA carries a "unique weight of reference to a single individual. This
reference may, and usually does, include the more usual connotations
of the first category (for instance, Anguses are practically always
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male and quite often Scottish), but there is nothing to stop the
assigned usage from completely overturning these connotations, which
are in any case basically irrelevant to it. What is relevant is
that the assigned proper name implies a human relationship (or, in the
case of animals or inanimate objects, a pseudo-human relationship)
between its user and its referent. We might say that the difference
between common nouns and proper names is one of degree rather than
of kind, in that, if the object beside which Alexander is standing
turns out to be a hitherto unknown piece of celestial machinery
newly arrived from Mars, he and I will assign a name to it, in a
way similar to that by which proper names are assigned: but such a
name would immediately begin to be generalised, and become applicable
to other similar objects by virtue of their connotations. Proper
names in their normal usage, however, always remain fairly definitely
fixed at the 'assigned' end of the assigned/connotative spectrum.
It is this uniqueness of reference of the assigned proper name which
Bonnefoy is referring to when he talks of a name evoking its object's
'existence effective, ici, devant moi' (i^, p. 245). -Anh this, it
appears, is what the words of poetry may do also. One is reminded of
the question of the assignation of proper names by Bonnefoy's remark
that 'le vrai lieu est donne par le hasard, mais au vrai lieu le
j 2
hasard perdra son caractere d'enigme' (I , p. 128). The ways in which
ordinary language as a whole may be transformed, and may participate
in a mode of reference analogous to that enjoyed in ordinary discourse
only by proper names, are difficult to pin down, the very action of
pinning down being against the spirit of Bonnefoy's thought. We may,
however, discuss one or two questiors which provide pointers towards
the better understanding of the issues involved.
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VTII Les mots profonds and le principe d'identite
Bonnefoy admits, first of all, that the view of language as a
simple labelling process 'permet de decrire correctement la fapon
dont la langue est disponible pour la plupart des usages*: 'Que
serait-ce que "le cheval", sinon un concept? Bn cheval, oui,
devant moi, et "le cheval" comme sa notion, quelle que soit la
^ 2
fapon dont cette notion se determine' (i , p. 245)• Contrasting
this with poetic language, he goes on to present a positive state¬
ment of what poetic discourse may involve:
Voici ce qui, je crois, commence la poesie. Que je dise
'le feu' (oui, je change d'exemple, et cela dejk signifie)
et, poetiquement, ce que ce mot evoque pour moi, ce n'est
pas seulement le feu dans sa nature de feu - ce que, du feu,
peut proposer son concept: c'est la presence du feu, dans
1'horizon de ma vie, et non certes comme un objet, analysable
et utilisable (et, par consequent, fini, remplapable), mais
^ 2
comme rndieu, actif, doue de pouvoirs. (i , p. 246)
This calls for one or two comments. Bonnefoy's insistence that
the presence of fire should come within '1'horizon de ma vie' may
recall the point I make above about the proper name implying a
human, or pseudo-human, relationship between its user and its
referent. Further, the first parenthesis in the above quotation
is,characteristically, crucial: the notion that there should be
some kind of intrinsic difference between a word like 'cheval'
and one like 'feu' raises the whole question of .'les mots profonds'
(I , p. 252). I shall return to this issue presently. First,
however, it may be worth considering the terms in which Bonnefoy
talks of the poetic evocation of 'feu', for these clarify his
attitude to the object as such. It is clear that statements like
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'la poesie franpaise . . . commence "en Bieu", quand elle peut,
n
pour finir par 1'amour de la chose la plus quelconque' (i , p. 267)
do not, in fact, imply a unique concern for the object as object,
but as a catalyst for presence, in which the distinction between
subject and object is abolished, although the full particularity of
the object is retained. This makes presence a difficult concept to
grasp: but presence is, precisely, not a concept i for-
Bonnefoy's approach to objects in the world seeks to grasp their
full particularity - we may recall his reference to 'le seuil unique
de l'absolu qui est la chose quelconque, vraiment aimee comme telle'
(I , p. 251) -, but neither through the conceptual approach which
considers the object as 'analysable et utilisable (et, par consequent,
fini, remplapable)' (i , p. 246) nor through any other approach
which starts from linguistic investigation of the aspects of the
object.
Here we may draw a comparison in passing with the work of Francis
Ponge, whose interest in objects leads him to seek to define them
by reference to their contexts - whether physical, historical,
linguistic or mythological - but specifically not to attempt to
evoke through language the mysterious inner kernel of their being,
and with it the being of the whole world around them, which is closer
to Bonnefoy's project. I make the comparison not in order to call
into question the achievement of Ponge (which, in its very different
way, is as valid as Bonnefoy's) but to point up the contrast between
two poets whose work starts from similar preoccupations. Ponge, in
his theoretical writings and in his poems - and the inter-penetration
of the two modes of writing is even more noticeable in his case than
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in Bonnefoy's, embracing as it does the form of his work as well as
its substance - is much concerned with the inadequacy of language,
and its inability to express reality. This is shown, for instance,
in a striking passage from 'Les ecuries d'Augias':
Helas, pour comble d'horreur, a l'interieur de nous-memes. le
meme ordre sordide parle, parce que nous n'avons pas a notre
disposition d'autres mots ni d'autres grands mots (ou phrases,
c'est-a-dire d'autres idees) que ceux qu'un usage journalier
dans ce monde grossier depuis l'eternite prostitue. Tout se
passe pour nous comme pour des peintres qui n'auraient I, leur
disposition pour y tremper leurs pinceaux qu'un meme immense
pot ou depuis la nuit des temps tous auraient eu a delayer
leurs couleurs.
This dissatisfaction with the expressive qualities of language is
not far removed from Bonnefoy's discovery, in the context of the
linguistic equivalent of mauvaise presence, of 'l'angoissante
tautologie des langues, dont les mots ne disent qu'eux-memes, sans
prise vraie sur les choses' (i , p. 247)• But it is significant
that in order to convey his dissatisfaction to the reader Ponge uses
a comparison between language and another aspect of the world,
rather than seeking a way in which language could achieve the power,
whose absence he deplores, to evoke the whole of the world through
any one of its particulars. Ponge's approach to the object accepts
therefore that language cannot evoke things; instead, he uses language
to explore the world through the aspects of the world which he takes
language to refer to, and in some degree to create. In contrast to
Bonnefoy, he always sees the world, and language, as diffuse and
aspectual. In one of the early drafts of 'La Pigue' published in
Comment une figue de paroles et pourquoi he writes of the creative
(l) Francis Ponge, from Proemes, in Le Parti pris des choses (Paris,
1967), PP. 155-6.
- 67 -
process, 'nous aboutissons par negation (negativite) au myst&re de
l'objet, a la preuve de 1'existence indescriptible, a la qualite
differentielle de l'objet (ici, de chaque fruit)'. Bonnefoy
would no doubt applaud the aim of art reaching out for 'le mystere
de l'objet', and would insist on the particularity of the experience
which constitutes presence, but would not see the attempt to express
presence as a descriptive process addressing itself to 'la qualite
differentielle de l'objet (ici, de chaque fruit)', because this
would result in a view of the object from outside (inevitably in¬
volved with the concept of the object) rather than a true evocation
of its existence. When Bonnefoy speaks of the aim of art as being
'd'evoquer dans une saveur celle plus profonde de 1'unite que I'on
cherche. Be convoquer ce supreme fruit dans le fruit sensible'
(I , p. 266) the emphasis must be on 'le fruit sensible', but not
on its aspects nor - a point that is made clearer elsewhere - on
any kind of abstract Idea lying behind it. It is interesting to
note, incidentally, that this is one of the few passages which
Bonnefoy has revised in a way which appears to tend more towards an
essentialist view than was expressed in its first appearance in Un
Reve fait a Mantoue - 'd'evoquer dans une saveur la saveur de
1'unite que l'on cherche. Be conjurer le vrai fruit dans le fruit
sensible' (RIM, p. 120).
If Bonnefoy then is not interested (as Ponge is) in the details and
aspects of objects - or the details and aspects of language which
is in 'continuite naturelle' with the world of objects (I , p. 249)
- we must ask how he sees language in poetry as in some way evoking
presence, and how his own poetry may attempt this. When Bonnefcy




talks of 'la presence du feu' (i , p. 246) he is claiming, as we
have seen, that he is not interested even in the object as such,
'le feu dans sa nature de feu', because that too is a concept,
something separate from the observer, whereas presence must bring
about the transformation of the observer, and of the whole phenomenal
world, through the object.
This is reasonable enough, both from the point of view of Bonnefoy's
theory and from that of his poetic practice. As we have seen, he
explicitly, and repeatedly, affirms the ineffable nature of the
particular, and holds out only the hope of the possible expression
of presence, which is, among other things, something like Bonnefoy's
interpretation of the Plotinian One. We might contrast Ponge's
'galet' with the whole series of poems in Pierre ecrite entitled
'Une Pierre', which encompass, individually and collectively, a
vast range of phenomenal reference. Por example:
0 dite a demi-voix parmi les branches,
0 murmuree, 5 tue,
Porteuse d'eternel, lune, entrouvre les grilles
Et penche-toi pour nous qui n'avons plus de jour. (P, p. 194)
Without embarking on a complete explication, we may say that this
poem is about an experience of presence triggered off by the sight
of the moon shining through trees; about the ineffable nature of
the experience, with the suggestion that silence is its most valuable
quality; and about the possible, though not achieved, involvement
of poet and reader, now locked in a state of hopelessness, with the
possible non-temporal and non-spatial quality of the experience.
The wider context of the poem, however, is of paramount importance.
It is called 'Une Pierre', and it takes its place with other poems
of the same title in a volume called Pierre ecrite, a name in which
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is encapsulated the identification of substance and poetic articulacy
which Bonnefoy wishes to assert. He enacts this assertion by building
up, through all the poems called 'Une Pierre', an image of the whole
of phenomenal reality seen both as substance and as articulacy - a
series of approaches to presence which together make up an overall
poetic exploration of what presence might be. In reading the book
as a whole, we may hope to participate in this exploration, which is
grounded in the single, particular image of stone: and this, I think,
is what Bonnefoy means when he talks of poetry evoking substance
'comme un dieu, actif, doue de pouvoirs'. He does not mean that the
word pierre by itself can somehow make the reader feel all the sensuous
properties of stone, for language cannot work in quite this way, or
at least, not in this way as expressed in such simplistic terms.
Still less does he consider that an enumeration of the aspects of
any particular stone can evoke it, immediately, for the reader. There
is nevertheless something incantatory in Bonnefoy's repeated use of
the title 'Une Pierre', for there is nothing in the precise imagery
of these poems which could be said to explore stone (as Ponge's 'galet'
certainly does). Bather, they depend on the title - which, because
it is a title, has affinities with a proper name rather than with a
description - to evoke in some sense not simply substance in the
abstract but a particular substance.
The above is a very general exposition of what the relationship between
poetry and presence may involve. We may now attempt further clarification
through an examination of what Bonnefoy means by 'les mots profonds'.
In 'La Poesie frangaise et le principe d'identite'he writes:
Une premiere remarque semblera peut-etre evidente: c'est que
tous les mots d'une langue ne se pr§tent pas au meme degre &
1'intention poetique.
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Le vent, la pierre, le feu, ou les 'mazagrans' &e Rimbaud, les
'wagons' et le 'gaz' de Baudelaire et n'importe quel nom des
realites les plus quotidiennes peuvent s'emplir de lumiere: il
aura suffi que nous ayons tant soit peu vecu avec ces realites
notre attachement I, la terre. (i , p. 253)
If we take it that the assigned proper name depends for its force,
at least in part, on the relationship it implies between its user and
its referent, this emphasis on the involvement of the poet with the
reality he seeks to evoke provides support for the theory that Bonnefoy
wants words in poetry to have a force similar to that of proper names:
for assigned proper names, as we have seen, have an almost infinite
number of connotations, and might therefore be said to 's'emplir de
lumiere'. But a problem is raised by the way in which Bonnefoy makes
his point. It is not clear whether a relatively small number of words
('vent', 'pierre', 'feu' ...) are to be considered as possessing in¬
trinsically greater poetic possibilities than the other words of the
language - as the change of example from 'cheval' to 'feu' I have
mentioned would imply or whether, on the other hand, any word
(faazagran', 'wagon', 'gaz', "chaleil', 'mascaret', 'safre' ... these
last three from Pierre ecrite and Bans le lieurre du seuil) can be
invested with this 'lumiere' when it is used by a poet of the stature
of Baudelaire, Rimbaud or Bonnefoy. It is a pity that in this context
Bonnefoy appears to draw a fairly rigid distinction between words
denoting essences and words denoting aspects, but fails to develop
this distinction.
The problem, however, can probably be resolved if we say that 'les
mots profonds' have more connotations than other words, because of
their reference to a wide range of human experience, but that the
fundamental words in an individual poet's vocabulary have just as
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deep referential power within the poet's own experience. Bonnefoy
(x)has indicated in conversation v that he now considers his emphasis
in this part of the essay to have been misplaced: while 'les mots
profonds' do have a special status, the poet himself must take the
ultimate responsibility for ordering a hierarchy in his own poetic
world, and for communicating this hierarchy to the reader. This is
true, in the case of the individual poet, for 'les mots profonds' no
less than for what we might call 'les mots denotant l'aspect', for
the potential suitability of 'les mots profonds' for poetic usage
makes them all the more liable to misuse in over-facile rhetoric:
s'il y a done dans les mots que nous employons cette
virtualite de presence, ce grand espoir, - il en decoulera
qu'on parlera sous ce signe, comme enivres, sans avoir
critique, comme il se doit, notre pratique des choses. Or,
nommer l'arbre trop aisement, e'est risquer de rester captif
d'une image pauvre de l'arbre . . . Et voici que la Presence
. . . n'est plus qu'un decor, dont le Je aussi est absent,
et bientSt une convention et le reformement d'une rhetorique.
(I2, pp. 269-70)
The poet runs just as many risks in using 'les mots profonds' as he
does in using 'les mots denotant l'aspect', though in this latter
case the danger is not that of rhetoric, but of the words themselves
having connotations which are too narrow in scope to evoke anything
more than aspects:
ces mots /brique, silicate, grimacer, ricanery7 prennent trop
clairement par le dehors l'acte humain, ne font que le decrire,
n'ont pour signifie qu'un aspect, difficilement perpetuable dans
1'interiorisation que la poesie se donne pour tache d'effectuer
. . . si je veux sauver le mot siroter, par exemple, j'aurai a
peiner longtemps sous le vent de 1'exteriorite: tandis que
boire, qui exprime un acte essentiel, ne pourra que garder,au
plus desabuse d'une vie, sa capacite d'absolu. (I , p. 254)
(3) Nice, 14 May 1975
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Bonnefoy would now consider, I think, that he places too great an
emphasis, in this essay, on the difference "between the two kinds of
words he talks of (perhaps because of the distinction he goes on to
draw between French and English, which I shall deal with presently),
and not enough emphasis on the poet's function of validating the
vocabulary, whether 'essential' or 'aspectual', that he uses: 'de
nombreux mots qui semblent dire 1'aspect pourront etre repris,
rachetes par le souci poetiaue: on aura decouvert qu'ils peuvent
nommer quelque chose qui"est", au-delk de cette enveloppe' (I , p. 254)•
Bonnefoy would probably consider it, in fact, the poet's duty to
'racheter' such aspectual words as are especially relevant to his
own experience. Indeed, such cases can be found in Bonnefoy's own
work, as I have noted above.
At the same time, however, a poet should never seek artificially to
extend his vocabulary outside the words which 'peuvent nommer notre
presence au monde', merely out of a concern for the picturesque: a
poet may quite genuinely write within a very restricted range of
validated vocabulary. In my interview with Bonnefoy, he remarked
(I think I quote exactly), 'II y a des poetes qui vivent entre un
arbre, le soleil, la mer'. This would apply, for instance, to Racine,
and perhaps to a lesser extent to Valery or Bonnefoy himself. The
overall argument, accepted on its own terms, would certainly pre-empt
criticism of Bonnefoy's work on the grounds that it hones down experience
too far, leaving too few 'essences' to bear too great a weight of
poetic intensity.
In his point of view as given in 'La Poesie franpaise et le principe
d'identite', however, Bonnefoy does seem to attach too much importance
to words denoting essences, even if he admits the possibility of the
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redemption of aspectual words. His remarks imply that there is
something intrinsically preferable in 'essential' words, as when he
says of Rimbaud: 'Rimbaud boira, non sirotera. parce qu'etant poete
il demeure dans la gravite du destin' (i , p. 254). The remark as
it stands is simply untrue in relation to Rimbaud's work (though
there may be an ironic reference here to Rimbaud the man): Rimbaud
must have one of the largest effective vocabularies of any French
poet. Furthermore, the assertion contradicts Bonnefoy's reference
on the preceding page to 'les "mazagrans" de Rimbaud', which certainly
do not represent an 'essence' of the same type as 'le vent, la pierre,
le feu'. Bonnefoy may mean that such aspectual words, in Rimbaud's
work, take on the essential quality of words like 'boire', through
the force of Rimbaud's poetic genius, but this is not what he says.
Bonnefoy's rather exaggerated emphasis on 'les mots profonds' may,
indeed, come from a desire to defend his own poetic practice. More
importantly, however, it leads on to his notion of 'le principe
d'identite', as it applies in French. He suggests that one can dis¬
cover, in any given language, a certain ratio of essential words to
aspectual words: 'Be la proportion relative de la part d'exteriorite
en somme imposee par une langue /i.e. les mots denotant 1'aspect7 et
de l'interiorite que, malgre l'emploi dechu habituel, cette derniere
consent /I.e. les mots essentiels/, on pourra degager une sorte de
coefficient poetique qui a influence sHrement d'une fapon signifiante
le devenir de la poesie' (i2, p. 254)• This is an interesting suggestion,
but unfortunately Bonnefoy does not follow it up. Instead, he asserts
that French words are intrinsically more 'essential' than words of
other languages, and particularly than English words, and that there
is an immediate link between French words and the essences of the
things they name. With this non sequitur he leaves the question of
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'les mots profonds' and turns to the no less interesting question of
the relative suitability of French and English for poetic discourse.
That it is a non sequitur can be proved by the reductio ad absurdum
which would suggest, as content of a logical continuation, the question
of where, given that 'feu1 and 'fire' are presumably essential words,
and 'ricaner' and 'snigger' aspectual ones, one is to draw the line.
One might well have to admit an area where, for example, 'orage' would
be an essential word and 'storm' an aspectual one. Bonnefoy does not
discuss this problem. He implies, indeed, that practically all French
words are essential, or rather, that the essential words in French
must conslitute a much greater proportion of the language's intrinsic
poetic vocabulary than is the case in English. There seems to be a
confusion here between three ideas: that of the existence of entities
which one may take to be essential archetypes of human experience,
and which will therefore be designated by 'mots profonds' in any
language; that of the poet's own intensity of experience validating
all the words of his vocabulary; and that of the principe d'identite,
the peculiarly essentialist character of French as Bonnefoy sees it.
This confusion is regrettable, but this does not mean that the notion
of the principe d'identite is any the less interesting and important.
In French, Bonnefoy says:
/les mots/ connotent pour la plupart, non des aspects empirique-
ment definis, mais des entites qui ont I'air d'exister en soi,
comme supports d'attributs qu'auront a determiner et differencier
les diverses sortes de connaissances. A moins . . . que ces
attribute ne soient de ja reveles dans la notion de la
chose . . . /Pour le mot chat/ il y a un en-soi bien defini, une
autonomic, une permanence, du chat dans un reel de ce fait
intelligible, et intelligible sans trop de peine, (i , pp. 257-8)
The fact that an autonomous cat sounds rather ridiculous in English
- 75 -
may, indeed, prove Bonnefoy's point. But we must immediately dispel
a possible misapprehension about the principe d'identite. It does
not, in itself, carry any guarantee of metaphysical validity for
language: it is the simple assertion of a direct link between
language and reality, which may or may not, according to the uses
made of language, take on some degree of metaphysical validity. It
is with the variations in this validity that Bonnefoy is concerned:
-£e principe d 'identit£7 a d1l varier dans son apprehension des
essences, et changer de metaphysique, depuis les debuts du franpais'
(I2, p. 260).
IX Le principe d'identite in English and Erench
I will deal with these variations later. For the moment, I wish to
consider the difference, from the point of view of the principe
d'identite, between the English and French languages. On investigation,
I would suggest that the difference, though real, is one of degree
rather than of kind. The contrast between English and French has,
indeed, often been remarked on. We may quote Saint-John Perse,
reporting a conversation with Gide:
II voulut alors parler de litterature anglaise . . . Je lui
denonpai, pour ma part, l'opacite d'une langue aussi concrete,
la richesse excessive de son vocabulaire et sa complaisance
k vouloir reincarner la chose elle-meme, comme dans l'ecriture
ideographique, au lieu que le franpais, langue plus abstraite,
et qui cherchait & signifier bien plus qu'a figurer, n'engageait
le signe fiduciaire du mot que comme valeur d'echange monetaire.
L'anglais, pour moi, en etait encore au troc.^"^
Here the 'opacite' of English is obviously the same as that on which
Bonnefoy comments when talking of English words: 'Souvent aussi voisins
(l) Saint-John Perse, Oeuvres completes (Paris, 1972), p. 479«
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par la forme qu'ils le sont deja par le sens, sans visible derivation,
sans etymologie qu'on pourra juger signifiante, ils se pressent l'un
contre 1*autre en continuite opaque, comme les cristallisations d'une
superbe matiere - en fait, comme des eclats d'intelligibilite arraches
d'un reel deliberement aborde d'une maniere empirique' (i , p.255).
And it seems that the 'principe d'identite' which Bonnefoy sees in
French is something like Perse 1s 'signe fiduciaire du mot' - with the
important difference that Bonnefoy would immediately want to delve
deeper into the justification for the word's being accepted as
'fiduciaire', and to relate this to its 'indice metaphysique'. But
both Bonnefoy and Perse seem to imply a radical division between
English and French usage in this respect, whereas it might be more
prudent, while recognising the considerable difference in feel and
texture between the two languages, to limit oneself to the assertion
that English has only a tendency towards greater concreteness of usage.
In a series of images like Norman MacCaig's
A wildcat, furfire in a bracken bush,
Twitches his club-tail, rounds his amber eyes
(2)
At rockabye rabbits humped on the world, '
we see *un reel deliberement aborde d'une maniere empirique', in that
the effectiveness of the first image depends primarily on the fortuitous
phonetic coincidence of 'fur' and 'fire', which mirrors the visual
juxtaposition of the two notions forming the image's conceptual content:
but by throwing the emphasis on outward aspects of reality in this way,
because of their similarity on one level of conceptualisation, the poet
deliberately excludes, or at least plays down, any wider connotations
(2) Norman MacCaig, 'Mutual Life', in A Round of Applause (London,
1962), p. 42.
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of 'fire', and in particular any of its possible mythological or
religious connotations,- an echo of Blake's 'Tyger' could, for instance,
become important if the poem developed differently - and passes on to
another image - 'club-tail' - in which a very similar conceptualising
process is at work. The metaphysical content of the poem, and of many
other poems in English where the poet takes the sensual aspects of
reality as a starting-point, stands on a level quite separate from
the operation of the sensuous imagination in the substance of language,
which merely provides the building-blocks for that metaphysical content.
But although much poetry written in English operates in this way, it
would be unduly restrictive to suggest that this is the only, or even
the dominating, mode of English poetic discourse. We may take another
kind of poem - by Edwin Muir:
One foot in Eden still, I stand
And look across the other land.
The world's great day is growing late,
Yet strange these fields that we have planted
So long with crops of love and hate.
Time's handiworks by time are haunted,
And nothing now can separate
(3)
The corn and tares compactly grown. '
Here, there is little or no concern with the aspects of the immediate,
sensuously observed particular. Instead of being tied to the physical
existence of their referents - or, indeed, to their own physical
existence, as in the case of 'furfire' - the words seem to open out,
and make their poetic effect by other means: 'corn and tares' takes
its value from a precise biblical reference,(4) while 'the other land'
(3) Edwin Muir, 'One Foot in Eden', in Collected Poems (London, 1963),
p. 227.
(4) cf Matthew, ch.13, w. 24-30*
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•the world's great day' and 'time's handiworks' refer to wider a.nri
vaguer notions. The language, freed from the necessity of enacting
the sensuous particular, can suggest "broader horizons, which need not
necessarily be analysable in conceptual terms. In fact, Muir seems
here to be using words as 'signes fiduciaires' - though again, all
depends on the validity of the fiduciary guarantee, on the extent to
which, in the wider context of the poem, the whole of the poet's
work, and the social and religious perspective in which he is writing,
the words succeed in evoking a spiritual reality, which alone can
justify their use in this way.
In any case - to return to my immediate point - these two poems demon¬
strate the variety of poetic uses to which English can be put. They
do not, of course, represent an irreconcilable binary opposition: I
would rather suggest that the extent to which something like the
principe d'identite may be said to operate in English depends very
much on the individual poet, although English tends towards greater
concreteness of usage, as French tends towards greater abstraction.
France has few poets as solidly anchored in the concrete as Ted Hughes,
while Britain cannot claim any poet of essences as pure as Racine
(though no comparative value-judgement is implied by these examples).
The type of language-use exemplified by MacCaig's image is rarer in
French than it is in English, but we can find something very similar
(5)
in Ponge's juxtaposition 'le gui la glu',w/ and various types of
onomatopoeia (of which this example is at least partly an instance)
are fairly frequent in French - for example, Verlaine's 'Les samglots
longs / les violons / Be l'automne', Baudelaire's 'un coffretvenu
(5) Ponge, 'Le Gui', in Pieces (Paris, 1971), p. 59.
(6) Paul Yerlaine, 'Chanson d'automne', in Oeuvres poetiques, ed. Robichez
(Paris, 1969), P.59.
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de 1 • Orient / Dont la serrure grince et rechigne en criant',^^ or
Valery's 'Les oris aigus des filles chatouillees'.^
All this does not invalidate Bonnefoy's notion of the nrincipe
d'identite: it merely suggests that it may not he exclusively the
property of French, as he implies when he contrasts French and English
usage, and that conversely the poetic uses of French are not to he
exclusively explained hy reference to it. When he says, in talking
of Hamlet, 'Je conclurai en disant que le mot anglais est ouverture
(ou surface) et ie mot franpais fermeture (ou profonaeur)' (H, p. 239),
we may agree that the distinction is valid, hut over-crude as here
formulated. Indeed, depending on how we want to arrange our spatial
metaphors, we might interchange 'ouverture' and •fermeture' in this
context.
In spite of the criticisms one can make of the notion of le principe
d'identite (which concern mainly the way in which it is presented in
'La Poesie franpaise et le principe d'identite'), Bonnefoy's account
of the variations in its metaphysical validity will repay careful
study. This might hest he comhined, however, with consideration of
Bonnefoy's overall views on his great predecessors. Before passing
on to this, and thereafter attempting to draw general conclusions on
the whole range of Bonnefoy's poetic theory, we may further consider
one or two more theoretical aspects of the possibility of poetry
naming the ephemeral object.
(x) The poetic symbol; religious and metaphysical validation
Let us consider first the possibility of a specifically religious
(7) Baudelaire, 'Le Flacon', in Les Fleurs du mal, ed. Adam (Paris,
1961), p. 52.
(8) Paul Valery, 'Le Cimetiere marin', in Oeuvres, ed. Hytier (Paris,
1957), vol.1, p. 150.
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guarantee for the poetic word, by which I mean the possibility that
language, under the protection of a settled and generally-accepted
religious faith, should participate in, and articulate the existence
of, a world in some sense delivered by that faith from the hazards of
change and death. This, Bonnefoy admits, may have been possible in
the past. At the beginning of 'L'Acte et le lieu de la poesie' he
talks of the apparent power of the word to incarnate, even to replace,
its object, so that language becomes a true defence against death:
'Le mot est l'ame de ce qu'il nomme, nous semble-t-il, son Ame toujours
intacte. Et s'il dissipe dans son objet le temps, 1'espace, ces
categories de notre depossession, s'il 1'allege de sa matiere, c'est
sans porter atteinte S, son essence precieuse et pour le rendre S, notre
j 2
desir' (I , p. 105). The danger here is, of course, that of a flight
from reality; and Bonnefoy cannot accept any identification on these
terms of language with the essence of reality. Such an identification
is an illusion, as we see from the parenthesis 'nous semble-t-il', but
Bonnefoy admits its possible validity in an age of unquestioned religious
faith:
Bans le chateau de la poesie de 1'essence, quand l'infirmite s'y
avoue, c'est de fapon si archetypale, si pure qu'elle n'est plus
un desir qui accepte de se perdre, mais 1'dme qui se degage de
ses entraves terrestres et veut ainsi se sauver.
Cette poesie oublie la mort. Aussi dit-on volontiers que la
poesie est divine.
Et certes quand il y a des dieux et que l'homme croit "& ses dieux,
ce mouvement de 1'esprit ne va pas sans quelque bonheur. Ce que
nous aimions et qui meurt a sa place dans le sacre ... II est
aise d'etre poete parmi les dieux. Mais nous autres venons apres
les dieux. Nous n'avons plus le recours d'un ciel pour garantir
la transmutation poetique, et il faut bien que nous demandions
^ 2
quel est le serieux de celle-ci.(l , pp. 106-7)
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In Bonnefoy's view, any kind of stable, undifferentiated spiritual
guarantee is an escape from the world, from death and from reality
- at least in an age when, whatever individual religious positions
may be tenable, no single faith is accepted by the whole audience for
whom the poet is writing.
I will return later to the ways in which Bonnefoy considers that such
a guarantee may have been valid in other ages. Christianity in par¬
ticular, however, holds out the promise of something more relevant,
in Bonnefoy's view, than the notion of a world whose essences alone
have spiritual validity: the guarantee, through the transubstantiation
of the bread and the wine at the culminating point of the Mass, of a
precise moment of contact between human existence and the divine - a
guarantee, in fact, of the Here and How, as Bonnefoy uses these terms.
This is somewhat different from, and more comprehensible for modern
man than, the notion of a simple spiritual realm beyond and outside
the world of chance and death. One of the most important connotations
of the word 'presence' is, of course, the Real Presence of Christ at
the culminating moment of the Mass. But this belief, too, must be
generally accepted if it is to be in any simple way available for
artistic reference. Bonnefoy singles out the age of the Baroque as
the first in which such a general belief could not be taken for granted,
and in which artistic endeavour therefore addressed itself first and
foremost to the things of this world without being able to assume a
link between them and the divine:
Le baroque est un realisme passionnel. Le desir emporte,
deraisonnable, aveugle, que 1'existence terrestre accede aux
droits du divin, et ce n'est pas un hasard, sttrement, si cet
art a grandi quand on a commence 1, douter de la presence
reelle, quand on n'a plus compris ce pain et ce vin qui
- 82 -
sacralisaient toutes choses, et d'abord le lieu oil nous sommes
2
et notre instant, (i , p. 185)
There is a distinction here between 'toutes choses* and 'le lieu ou
nous sommes et notre instant'. While I do not wish to venture into
theological speculation, I would suggest that Christianity would in
fact see the two as being indistinguishable, the transubstantiation
of the bread and wine at a particular moment and place carrying an
automatically valid guarantee of the sacred nature of the whole of
phenomenal reality at all times. Bonnefoy's notion of a spiritually
validated Here and Now would, on the other hand, be primary, taking
upon itself the symbolic validation of the rest of reality - which
validation is thus necessarily precarious and uncertain. The dangers
and difficulties of such a procedure are obvious,and consideration of
them is relevant to many different spheres of modern art. It is in
his essay on Kafka, for instance, that Erich Heller remarks:
The predicament of the symbol in our age is caused by a split
between 'reality' and what it signifies. There is no more any
commonly accepted symbolic or transcendent order of things.
What the modern mind perceives as order is established through
the tidy relationship between things themselves. In one word:
the only conceivable order is positivist-scientific. If there
still is a - no doubt, diminishing - demand for the fuller
reality of the symbol, then it must be provided for by the un¬
solicited gifts of art. But in the sphere of art the symbolic
substance, dismissed from its disciplined commitments to 'reality',
dissolves into incoherence, ready to attach itself to any fragment
of experience, invading it with irresistible power, so that a
pair of boots, or a chair in the painter's attic, or a single
tree on a slope which the poet passes, or an obscure inscription
in a Venetian church, may suddenly become the precariously unstable
centre of an otherwise unfocused universe. Since 'the great words,
from the time when what really happened was still visible, are no
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longer for us' (as Rilke once put it in a Requiem for a young poet),
the 'little words' have to carry an excessive freight of symbolic
significance. No wonder that they are slow in delivering it.^^
The similarities here to the notion of 1'ephemere are striking. Bonnefoy,
however, is always careful to affirm contact with substance itself, rather
than the representation of this contact in art, as the only even remotely
possible absolute. Poetic creation cannot in itself provide a substitute
for reality, as seems to be implied for instance, by Rilke's
Are we, perhaps, here just for saying: House,
Bridge, Fountain, Gate, Jug, Fruit tree, Window, -
possibly: Pillar, Tower? . . . but for saying, remember,
oh, for such saying as never the things themselves
(2)
hoped so intensely to be. '
This point - that poetry must be a means, not an end - is central to
Bonnefoy's theory. Before considering this, however, we may look again
at his ambiguous attitude to the Christian revelation, as expressed in
a passage of 'L'Acte et le lieu de la poesie' where, in a slightly different
context to that quoted above, he accepts its validation of the Here and Now,
but sees even this guarantee, in the long term, as being banished to a
realm of distant, shadowy idealism:
La difficulte de la poesie moderne, c'est qu'elle a a se definir,
dans un meme instant, par le christianisme et contre lui. Car
1'invention baudelairienne . . . de tel etre ou de telle chose
est bien chretienne pour autant que Jesus a souffert sous Ponce
Pilate, dormant une dignite a un lieu et a une heure, une realite
a chaque etre. Mais le christianisme n'affirme qu'un court instant
1'existence singuliere. Chose creee, il la reconduit a Dieu dans
les voies de la Providence et voici ce qui est prive une fois
encore de sa valeur absolue. (i , pp. 119-20)
(1) Erich Heller, The Bisinherited Mind (London, 1961), p. I84.
(2) R. M. Rilke, Buino Elegies, trans. Leishman and Spender (London,
1948), p. 85.
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This is not to imply, of course, that poetic creation can he any more
successful than Christianity in grasping and expressing as an absolute,
outside time, 'ce qui est'. The mention of Baudelaire here is important,
however, for Bonnefoy sees Baudelaire as having achieved a 'vrai discours'
by which he can name the ephemeral object through himself partaking fully
of the experience of death, the essential corollary of substance. But
if Baudelaire succeeded in such a project, at the cost of almost super¬
human poetic effort, many other poets writing 'apres les dieux' have
failed. Indeed, the lack of any religious guarantee for the existence
of reality could provide an excuse for deserting reality altogether:
'Et s'il est vrai qu'aucun dieu ne sanctifie plus la chose creee, qu'elle
est pure matiere, pur hasard, pourquoi, bien sdr, ne pas chercher a la
fuir?' (I2, pp. 117-8).
Between these last two quotations, we may see the dilemma, in which
Bonnefoy sees the modern poet as standing: any religious guarantee of
phenomenal reality must turn to empty idealism, but any denial of a
religious guarantee for reality leads to a no less empty affirmation of
absurdity. There is every chance that reality will evade the poet's
vigilance. The possibilities for flight are endless. We will consider
some of them in dealing with Bonnefoy's criticism of other poets. But
all such possibilities must be avoided. No matter at what cost, the
attempt must be made to affirm substance and not some shadow of substance
or escape from it:
Ainsi la poesie revient-elle aujourd'hui a un realisme profond.
. . . Qpand il n'y a plus de desirs, d'errements ou de passions,
meme le vent et le feu ne sont plus reels, la demeure d'absence
est grandie aux proportions de ce monde. Et c'est la consequence
derniere de la Providence brisee, mais aussi la contradiction
dangereuse de l'atheisme, s'il est vrai qu'on n'aurait abattu la
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machinerie divine que pour ne plus vouloir que dans 1' evenement
2
ou les choses batte le sang subjectif. (i , p. 119)
The tightrope between a debased orthodoxy on the one hand, with its
manifold possibilities for empty rhetoric, and on the other hand a
simple atheistic positivism which denies reality any spiritual
dimension at all - far less any specifically religious dimension -,
is a difficult one to tread. The achievement of a 'realisme profond'
must come about through striving towards a kind of unattainable and,
in rational terms, nonsensical identity of metaphor in which, blindly
and with no true religious guarantee, words will somehow enact the
existence to things they name. This hope applies to art in general,
to painting no less than to poetry: 'Le romantisme tragique de la
separation d'avec la nature ou la societe, l'angelisme de la poesie
fin de siecle, le souci obsedant de l'ecriture ont fait ou font ou
feront la preuve de leur faiblesse: on representait au lieu d'etre,
alors qu'il faut, disons, §tre la pierre par le mot pierre, le gris
instaurateur par la couleur grise' (I , p. 291).
I must repeat that there is no simple relation of literal equivalence,
in Bonnefoy's theory, between word and object, but rather a trans¬
formation of both, so that both participate in the ineffable experience
of presence. Earlier in the short but dense essay on Gaston-Louis
Roux, from which I have just quoted, Bonnefoy talks of presence in
painting:
Yoici que deux donnees de la perception, en elles-memes in-
signifiantes, font h deux comme un bruissement, comme un ange;
cependant que la chose qui a pr§te ses aspects, offert ce jaune
et ce rouge, est effacee comme objet mais se reforms en tant
qu'ime, connue de l'interieur desormais par ce projet d'harmonie
qui etait en elle, et n'y etait que pour nous. Et c'est ainsi
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que notre horizon autant que la qualite se resserre, pour des
rencontres plus decisives, ou le hasard, ce 'creux neant'
deja tout sonore, pourra se faire musique. En verite, la
nuance exacte est comme le symbole ou la metaphore: non une
* 2
enonciation, mais un seuil. (i , pp. 289-90)
We are here reminded that presence is an experience of participation
in which the distinction between subject and object is abolished, and
that presence is ineffable; in ordinary discursive language it can
be expressed only as 'comme un bruissement, comme un ange'. As far
as it can be described, it can only be thought of as carrying the
suggestion of an absolute of 'rencontres plus decisives', and this
is true also of language in poetry seen in theoretical terms, 'le
symbole ou la metaphore'. Articulacy, we see again, must stop at
the 'seuil'. The importance of the abolition of the object as
separated object, and of the resurrection of its interior spiritual
reality, is reiterated in the statement made anonymously in the
publicity leaflet for h'Ephemere to which I have already referred:
'L'ephemere est ce qui demeure, d&s lors que sa figure visible est
sans cesse reeffacee.'In 'La Poesie franqaise et le principe
d'identite',too, Bonnefoy describes presence in terms of this liberation
of the invisible from the prison-house of outward, objective reality.
In the experience of unity, he says, love is 'prescience de 1'invisible':
*Cet invisible, ce n'est pas un nouvel aspect qui va se reveler sous
d'autres insuffisants; c'est plutSt que tous les aspects, coagulations
du visible, se sont dissous en tant que figures particulieres, sont
tombes comme les ecailles d'une rnue dans la connaissance, ont decouvert
le corps de 1'indissociable' (i , p. 248). Language, too, participates
in this liberation: 'L'invisible, il faut le dire A nouveau de ce point
(j) distributed with L'Ephem^re 1 (1966)
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de vue de la parole, ce n'est pas la disparition, mais la delivrance
du visible* (i2, p. 250).
Here again, one cannot avoid being reminded of Rilke; a case could
be made (•which would take too long to develop here, and would not be
immediately relevant to this study) that there are striking similarities
between the poetic and theoretical concerns of the two writers, although
the conclusions which one might reach about their poetic theories would
show a number of important differences. Although Bonnefoy never ex¬
plicitly mentions Eilke's work, what he has to say about *1 *invisible'
and its relationship to reality bears a strong resemblance to the well-
known image in a letter from Rilke to his Polish translator:
Therefore, not only must all that is here not be vilified or
degraded, but, just because of that very provisionality they
share with us, all these appearances and things /of Nature/
should be, in the most fervent sense, comprehended by us and
transformed. Transformed? Yes, for our task is to stamp this
provisional, perishing earth into ourselves so deeply, so pain¬
fully and passionately, that its being may rise again, 'invisibly*,
in us. Ve are the bees of the Invisible. Nous butinons
eperdument le miel du visible, pour 1'accumuler dans la grande
ruche d'or de 1 'Invisible.
This yearning is expressed again, in poetic terms, in the ninth Huino
Eleg!:
Earth, is it not just this that you want: to arise
invisibly in us? Is not your dream
to be one day invisible? Earth! invisible!
(5)
What is your urgent command, if not transformation?v '
It may be thought that the very intensity of Rilke's attachment to
reality as poetically transformed defeats its own purpose. There
(4) R. M. Rilke, letter to Witold von Hulewicz, 13 November 1925;
quoted in Ikd.no Elegies, trans. Leishman and Spender (London, 1948),
p. 157.
(5) ibid, p. 87
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certainly seems to be little in Rilke of Bonnefoy's necessarily
incidental, and yet central, concern with '1'ephemere'. For Rilke,
as we have seen, poetic creation must be an absolute, transcending
and transforming the things of the world. It must represent 'such
saying as never the things themselves / hoped so intensely to be'.^^
In Bonnefoy, however - and particularly in Bans le leurre du seuil -
we find a kind of naming of objects which comes close to achieving
his ambition to evoke their presence without explicitly raising either
the objects themselves, or the act of naming them itself, to the status
of an absolute, as in the series of affirmations at the beginning of
'L'Epars, 1'indivisible':
Par les flammes, partout,
Et les voix, chaque soir,
Du mariage du ciel et de la terre
(Tard, quand l'eponge pousse sur la table
Qui brille un peu
Les debris du pain et du vin.) (P, p. 315)
Here, the danger of overblown rhetoric inherent in the mention of 'le
mariage du ciel et de la terre' is avoided, and the phrase itself
magnificently justified, by the addition (significantly, in parentheses)
of an image which encapsulates almost casually the most incidental
of everyday realities and the most mysterious and universal of religious
symbols. What Bonnefoy is attempting is an integration of everyday
reality with the spiritual reality from which it has been separated
by the modern analytic consciousness. Only through such an integration,
for Bonnefoy, can art hope to evoke the plenitude of existence which is
available through human perception of the world but from which language
must ordinarily distance itself; and while at some stages in the search
(6) ibid, p. 85; see above, p. 83.
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for the expression of reality the poet mast talk of a Rilkean trans¬
formation of the visible and contingent into the invisible and eternal,
Bonnefoy always comes round in the end to seeing the visible and con¬
tingent (though not necessarily thought of in these terms) as primary,
and as the true site for "presence, from which presence spreads to
embrace the existence of the whole world.
XI Language as communication: verite de parole
There is always the danger, therefore, in the discussion in discursive
terms of questions such as that of the nature of presence, that we
formulate ideas at too remote a level of conceptual abstraction. Presence,
and in particular the participation of art in presence, cannot be talked
about simply in terms of the intricacies of dialectical definition -
concerns which may have become over-insistent preoccupations of Bonnefoy's
theory up to the mid-sixties. In his more recent criticism, he has laid
greater emphasis on the involvement of human experience in presence,
and this has led to an affirmation of the importance of 'parole' as a
relatively simple communicative medium. This notion may shed greater
light on the idea of language naming its object. The principal character¬
istic of the experience of presence is communication - between subject
and object, and between artist and audience, if presence is specifically
linked with artistic creation (though every experience of presence in¬
volves, in a sense, the creativity of its subject).
In his essay on Jouve, Bonnefoy points out how communication, in quite
a simple sense, can represent a validation of language:
Le plus simple dialogue entre deux personnes s'il est vrai,
c'est-a-dire anxieux de comprehension reciproque, eh bien,
ce rien est un fondement dans la solitude du monde, et a ce
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titre il vaut Men plus que ce que les mots de la poesie
retiennent, meme si c'est pour y preparer. . . La parole,
c'est l'avenir, c'est done plus que chacun de nous meme si,
etant 1'etre, elle est des k present tout entiere dans qui
parvient a s'y maintenir. Et aupres d'elle, Lien stir, toute
stabilite de "belle ecriture n'est que nuee. (HR, p. 238)
The insistence here is on language in a dynamic situation, whether
that situation be the striving for the expression of presence through
poetic utterance, or the search for comprehension in ordinary human
contexts: in comparison with this, the 'stabilite de belle ecriture',
the poem seen simply as an object, or writing seen simply as the
artistic fashioning of such an object, is of little consequence.
Bonnefoy's use of 'parole' in the above quotation might seem peril¬
ously close to the acceptance of a possible conventional religious
guarantee, were it not that the context of the quotation is his
careful definition of his position, as an atheist, in relation to
the Christian poetry of Jouve. It is nevertheless true that Bonnefoy
is willing to use the notion of the Word incarnate for his own purposes,
and in this case for the assertion of 'parole' as the ultimate sign of
human liberty: 'c'est vrai que la liberte humaine - la parole - tient
du miracle' (ER, p. 242).
This leads on to a distinction between 'langue' and 'parole' wMch
is not Saussure's distinction, but rather a distinction similar to
that between 'systeme' and 'idee', assuming that we take 'idee' in
its spiritually validated sense. 'Parole' may be said to be dependent
on the 'hasard' which 'au vrai lieu . . . perdra son caractkre d'enigme'
(I2, p. 128):
le fait de la langue . . . offre k chacun de nous la capacite
de prendre recul, et de se rebatir en image, de se cacher,
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autant que &e commencer le dialogue: . . . Ce pouvoir de nommer
. . . exteriorise autant qu'il designe, et donne done h. opter
. . . entre les acquisitions du concept, solidaire des constructions
de la forme dans 1'immobilite, la non-chaleur (mais aussi la beaute,
la cohesion) de la langue, - et l'ouvert, au dela, de la parole.
Car autant la langue est la faute, autant la parole est la delivrance
... ^i la distinction faite par Saussure . . . a eu le retentissement
que 1'on sait, e'est parce qu'elle rappelle et dissimule a la fois
la bifurcation apparue avec le premier parler, et reformee dans
chaque situation, devant chaque objet, par notre incessant libre-arbitre.
Cette liberte inqui^te . . . Beaucoup veulent se delivrer de la
responsabilite qu'elle implique, niveler langue et parole, - et
/Javec cette opposition toute conceptuelle chez Saussure la a j
grande occasion de traiter la parole comme un objet, de l'innerver
d'une langue, d'en nier 1'anteriorite par rapport a toute langue.
(ME, pp. 251-2)
I have quoted this at some length, because it seems to confirm what is
implicit in earlier essays: that the 'realisme profond' which Bonnefoy
is seeking must come from the participation of language - parole rather
than langue, if that distinction is to be maintained - in a special form
of experience, in which reality is fully apprehended in the context of
the observer's articulate involvement in it. Language, in this experience,
may take on the mode of being of the proper name, through man's relationship
with the objects to which it refers, no longer, however, seen as objects:
'il aura suffi que nous ayons tant soit peu vecu avec ces realites notre
attachement "k la terre' (i^, p. 253)•
Within this realism, however, questions still remain to be asked about
the specific place, and the pretentions, of poetry. For poetry itself
cannot replace religious certainty, even if it must become the central
concern of the unbelieving poet who is still torn by religious yearning:
'Que /ILa poesie/, en effet, represente pour nous, qui sommes "sans
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religion", quelque chose comme 1'ultime ressource, ne signifie nullement
qu'elle soit . . . notre supr§me valeur' (MR, p. 258). And if language
can he justified by its function as an agent for human communication,
it does not necessarily follow that poetry will participate in this
justification, particularly if poetry restricts itself to the 'stabilite
de belle ecriture', to its status as a separated object. Let us return
to Bonnefoy's more specifically philosophical quest of the late fifties.
After evoking, in the seventh section of 'L'Acte et le lieu de la poesie',
the Grail legends to suggest that contact with presence would depend on
the sudden formulation of the correct question, like that which would
have cured the Maimed King, and comparing this, in linguistic terms,
with the true naming of 'les objets les plus vifs de cette terre'
(i2, p. 125), Bonnefoy goes on to deny that language can have contact
with such a transcendent, extra-temporal and extra-spatial reality,
and to call into question the validity of poetry itself: 'La parole
est deja 1'oubli, il se peut bien qu'elle ait ete notre chute, la voici
en tout cas privee de la rencontre de l'etre, ne faut-il pas condamner,
une fois de plus, la pretention de la poesie?' (i , p. 124).
The answer must be that poetry should abandon any pretention to be an
end in itself: we must forget 'les prestiges de 1'oeuvre elaboree, prise
comme fin - l'eternel mallarmeisme' (MR, p. 255) and, if I may be forgiven
for once again mixing quotations from essays thirteen years apart, which
nevertheless seem to have some preoccupations in common, we must 'prendre
/la poesie/ seulement pour le moyen d'une approche, ce qui, dans nos
perspectives tronquees, n'est vraiment pas loin d'etre l'essentiel'
(I2, p. 124).
Bonnefoy goes on to develop, in the last two sections of 'L'Acte et le
lieu de la poesie', the notion that poetry is a discourse which accompanies
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presence, and forms part of it: and just as presence represents a
continual hesitation, or even struggle, between the essentialist and
the existentialist insights, the function of poetically validated
language is to make this struggle articulate: 'Je voudrais que la
poesie soit d'abord une incessante bataille, Tin theatre ou l'etre
et 1'essence, la forme et le non-formel se combattront durement'
(i , p. 124). This is, in fact,the context in which he sees the whole
of post-Renaissance art in action, a dynamic process in which any
formulated entity is called into question by its polar opposite:
'Du combat du mediat et de 1'immediat, du langage et de l'§tre, de la
civilisation et de 1'existence, le grand espace changeant invente
I, 1'oree des temps modernes est a la fois le theatre et la metaphore'
(i , p. 40)• This kind of dynamic poetic discourse is not, of course,
identical with ordinary language. It must evoke the inner existence
of the spiritual world of which it is a part, along with human conscious¬
ness and the generally-accepted world of phenomenal reality, all of which
together make up an approach to unity:
les mots peuvent §tre avant tout notre acte. Leur pouvoir-etre,
leur avenir infini d'associations pretendues verbales, dites
gratuites, nous retrouverons qu'il n'est que la metaphore de
notre rapport infini avec la moindre chose reelle, de la
nature subjective de toute chose profonde - et, dans un moment
d'irrealite, de libre decision quant h, la chose physique, nous
pourrons arracher ce qui est au sommeil de ses formes stables,
qui est le triomphe du neant. (i , pp. 124-5)
This kind of articulacy which Bonnefoy is talking of here depends on
a validity of experience which is itself very precarious: if Bonnefoy
evokes the possibility of poetic discourse in confident and positive
terms, he never forgets that the metaphysical foundations for this
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discourse, 1lfhypothese du sens', are the denial of all fixed certainties,
and the assertion of a kind of absolute subjectivity, the 'intelligible
sub.jectif' of which he talks later in the essay (i , p. 129). The poet
cannot take any validity of language for granted: the myths, or mythic
constructs, which will form his language must be ceaselessly re-created
out of their own impossibility, and represent simply a form of -unjustified,
but nevertheless necessarily asserted, hope: 'Et cette poesie qui ne
peut saisir la presence, dessaisie de tout autre bien sera du grand
acte clos la proximite angoissee, la theologie negative . . . /les mots/7"
apparaissent aux confins de la negativite du langage comme aes aages
parlant d'un dieu encore inconnu' (i , pp. 125-6).
This modest claim for a dynamic 'verite de parole', however, cannot stand
as definitive: for poetry is not in quite such an extreme situation as
this would suggest. The hope that poetry represents must, in the end,
outweigh the legions of conceptual certainty ranged against it, because
of its importance for the existence of reality itself. Articulacy is
essential to an experience of unity - as essential as its timeless
moment, the Now, or its spaceless location, the Here or the 'vrai lieu'
- because in this moment which, through the process of annihilation on
which it is founded, contains nothing, words are the only possible and
valid force capable of calling up the 'choses perdues': amant des
choses perdue^" peut rencontrer les mots. Eux aussi sont ce qui demeure
de ce qui a disparu. Tenons-les pour une trace du bien et non plus de
la quiddite' (i^, p. 127). But if this sounds suspiciously like the
identification of word and object under a simple religious guarantee
already rejected at the beginning of 'L'Acte et le lieu de la poesie',
there is an important difference. The hope which Bonnefoy talked of
for poetry at that point has indeed only been affirmed 'par quelque
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detour' (i , p. 105). For not only has the justification for poetry
been seen to be based on an absence of metaphysical foundation,
defined in very metaphysical terms, but also the value of poetry is
seen to depend on its function as a human activity, and as a guarantee
for a specifically human quality of life: 'comprenons que /les mote/
sont, comme le passe, notre epreuve, puisque eu egard a la repetition
qui va §tre ils nous demandent d'agir au lieu simplement de rever'
/ O
(I , p. 127). This demand for action leads to the invocation of all
human endeavours, of *le voyage, 1'amour, 1'architecture', as 'des
ceremonies pour accueillir la presence', and to a call to treat them
as such, 'a les ranimer jusque sur le seuil meme de ce pays plus
2 _
profond' (i , p. 127) - for the principle always remains that presence
and its site, the 'vrai lieu', are not logically attainable, however
necessary the logical effort to attain them may be. They can only be
granted by 'le hasard /qui, au vrai lieu/7 perdra son caractere d'enigme'
(I2, p. 128).
We may now be in a position to understand Bonnefoy's notion of poetry
as realism - but as some approximation to a *realisme initiatique'
2
(i , p. 150) which does not simply pay homage to the world of appearances,
2
but to the inner world, the 'intelligible sub.iectif' (i , p. 129). Poetry,
instead of acquiescing in the exile of man from reality, or setting itself
up as an absolute against reality, must become an agent, no matter how
unreliable, for true contact with reality: 'Ainsi de notre engagement
dans l'obscur possible terrestre, de notre rapport avec ce qui est, la
parole est-elle 1'intelligence' (i2, p. 129). It remains true, of course,
that this is never totally achieved: or rather, that one cannot object¬
ively claim that it is achieved, because it is, and must be, the
expression of an ineffable enigma:
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Et si opacite et transparence s'unissent, si un poete sait
ecrire Le pale hortensia s'unit au myrte vert, ne doutons
pas qu'il soit le plus pris qu'il se peut des portes qui
se derobent. be celui-la aussi on dira le plus que son
oeuvre est 'hermetique'. Car son seul objet ou seule
etoile est au-dela de toute signification dicible, bien que
sa recherche requi^re toute la richesse des mots.
La poesie se poursuit dans 1'espace de la parole, mais
chaque pas en est verifiable dans le monde reaffirme.
(I2, pp. 129-30)
This last assertion must appear questionable, since the world, it
might be said, can only be reaffirmed through the power of the poetic
word; and therefore the statement is a tautology. We must realise,
however, that presence, in Bonnefoy's theory, is an experience of
unity much more powerful than the sum of whatever elements conceptual
analysis may discern in it: it is beyond expression in poetry, but,
through poetry's acceptance of this impossibility, poetry may go
some way towards approaching presence. As in the passage I have
already quoted from Bonnefoy's essay on Jouve, poetry is the only
possible articulate approach, an 'uitime ressource', though not a
'supreme valeur': 'La poesie moderne est loin de sa demeure possible
... Mais la chance de la poesie "h venir, en tant au moins que bonheur
(et je puis bien, maintenant, consentir a ce bonheur), est qu'elle
est au point de connaltre, dans son durable exil, ce que signifie le
mot avoir (i, p. 185). Though the exile may be perpetual, there is
still some hope that poetry may participate in the experience of
total possession and communication which is presence (and Bonnefoy
changed the last phrase quoted above, in the 1970 and 1980 editions
of the essay, to ' . . . ce que peut ouvrir la presence' (HRB, p. 214,
I2, p. 131)). Einally, Bonnefoy insists on the 'given' nature of the
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successful poetic breakthrough, its independence from all attempts
at rationalisation: 'Etait-ce done si difficile? Ne suffisait-il
pas d'apercevoir, au flanc de quelque montagne, une vitre au soleil
du soir?' (i2, p. 131).
This final formulation is left as a question which would seem to
imply the answer that it would indeed be enough simply to glimpse
1'ephemere. apart from any attempt at philosophical definition.
This is the case, from a certain point of view: for the poet must,
in a sense, simply name the object of his poetic intention. At the
same time, it is clear that Bonnefoy does not consider that his
effort in formulating the ideas of 'L'Acte et le lieu de la poesie'
has gone for nothing. The fact that the question has to be put at
all, and the possibility of two different answers at least left open,
shows once again that Bonnefoy is caught between two extremes: the
mystical notion of the poet as seer, and the idea that the conditions
in which poetry is possible - or impossible - can, in fact be coherently
formulated. Polar oppositions of this type are an important feature
of Bonnefoy's thought, and not only on this level: another can be seen
in his endless oscillation between a basically essentialist and a
basically existentialist point of view, and in his equivocal use of
certain terms, such as 'reel', 'idee' or 'essence', which in some
contexts take on a metaphysical validity lacking in other contexts.
At the same time, Bonnefoy always strives towards a resolution of such
oppositions, and the presentation of a unified artistic insight. Thus
the 'espoir' which he holds out for poetry in 'L'Acte et le lieu de
la poesie' must emerge as something relatively simple only after a
prolonged and anguished working-out of its metaphysical implications:
and the validity of his assertion of 'espoir', no matter how simple
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he wants the assertion to be, depends entirely on the previous thorough
investigation of the possible nature of that hope, though once the hope
is achieved, however fleetingly, the intellectual scaffolding which
allowed its achievement becomes, in an important sense, irrelevant.
Here, indeed, we see the difference between Bonnefoy's thought and
Hegel's insistence on the 'actualisation' of an idea (see above, p.t^).
In his more recent criticism, Bonnefoy has largely abandoned the more
abstract superstructure of thought which characterised his writing in
the fifties and early sixties. My treatment of his thought is there¬
fore incomplete, but the essays I am principally considering are
valuable and coherent enough in their own right to be dealt with
separately. Bonnefoy's discussion of existence and essence in their
relationship to language, for instance, takes on a much less overtly
philosophical and much more humanistic colouring in his note to
L'Arri^re-nays:
Je cherche a definir la refraction ontologique: par quoi 1'unite,
cette lumiere, ayant h, nous atteindre a travers des mots aujourd'hui
exteriorises, devie dans leur epaisseur au point que son origine
apparait ailleurs qu'en 1'existence, sa substance autre que celle
des actes quotidiens, sa forme trouble, irreguliere, mouvante
- ce brisement, toutefois, etant notre imaginaire, ce glissement
sur des cretes au moins l'incitation au desir. (AP, back cover)
Here, Bonnefoy seems to be leaving behind his exploration in philo¬
sophical terms of the dilemma of unity and its possible poetic expression.
He instead integrates this expression into a theory of human imagination,
which allows him to move with greater freedom between abstract and
concrete concerns, and to make his writing - certainly in L'Arriere-pays
- an evocation of "presence rather than an endless - and by definition,
vain - search for the philosophical conditions of its manifestation.
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Detailed analysis of these more recent developments in Bonnefoy's
thought, which can now justly he termed 'pensee poetique' rather than
'pensee abstraite', would take me beyond the scope of this study-but
the earlier period of self-questioning can be seen as an essential
preliminary to the later achievement of synthesis.
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C. FRENCH POETS AND OTHERS
XII The medieval period: La Chanson de Roland
We may now go on to consider Bonnefoy's ideas on the principe
d'identite. with its varying degrees of metaphysical validity,
through the history of French poetry, and his judgements on the
relationships which the great French poets have succeeded, in
the context of their own historical periods, in establishing with
the elusive kernel of reality, be it essence or ephemere.
Bonnefoy's scattered remarks on the poetry of the medieval period
suggest, as we might expect, that the widely-accepted and stable
religious order of that age gives a full metaphysical guarantee
of the principe d'identite, leading to an extremely close contact
between language and reality. This is the period of 'les dieux',
when the word can in fact stand in place of the reality it names:
'Ainsi Dante qui l'a perdue va-t-il nommer Beatrice' (I , p. 105).
The religious symbol had its full enacting power: the bread of the
Mass, for instance, was the body of Christ, but also, and fully,
itself, 'une realite bien identifiee et stable, et non quelque
apparition obscure et changeante, indefiniment susceptible de
prendre forme nouvelle. II reste que ce pain, s'il a ainsi son
image claire et distincte, est done vecu en Dieu et sous le signe
de l'Un' (I , p. 260). Bonnefoy may thus be seen to be postulating,
for the Middle Ages, a kind of identity of metaphor which can, in¬
deed, be quite clearly seen, at least in certain poems of that
period. When Dante writes at the beginning of the Inferno,
Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita
Mi ritrovai per una selva oscura, (1)
(l) Dante Alighieri, Inferno I, 1-2, in Le Dpere di Dante Alighieri,
ed. Moore & Toynbee, 4th Edition, (Oxford, 1^24j, p. 1.
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he is talking about a real pilgrimage along a real path, which is
also the path of life - his own life, and human life in general: and
the 'selva oscura' could be the poet's personal vicissitudes, or the
social and political upheavals of his time, but is first and foremost
the physical reality of a dark wood. In other words, the distinction
between what in later poetry we would call literal and metaphorical
usage is not really operative, because the metaphysical order against
the background of which the poem is written is not something arbitrary
which has to be established by the poet himself, although it certainly
has to be reaffirmed by the poet. It is rather something which is
already present in the living consciousness of his age. However, the
principe d'identite, as it operates in French, implies an even closer
relationship than this between word and referent, and it is in his
remarks on the actual substance of the poetic language of the time
that Bonnefoy is at his most original and provocative. He sums up
his idea of the working of the principe d'identite in medieval liter¬
ature as follows: 'Je dirai done qu'en ces premiers temps de la poesie
en franpais, l'identite est a son degre le plus haut de saturation
substantielle, et que la poesie est, en sa difference, presque invis¬
ible, oeuvre avant tout de simplicite et de gravite' (i^, p. 262).
This might be taken as implying no greater identification between
word and referent than that to which I have drawn attention in Dante.
It is easy to confuse the degree of poetic identification inherent
in the outlook of a particular historical period with the principe
d'identite, which Bonnefoy claims is peculiarly applicable to French
- and indeed, Bonnefoy is sometimes guilty of this confusion. Here,
however, he makes quite clear the range of the principe d'identite
in the French medieval context:
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j'ai toujours eprouve les mots franpais dans leirr croissance
d'alors comme a demi transparents: tant la structure des
consonnes semble (heritee du latin qui fera figure de science)
garder l'empreinte attenuee d'un radical absolu, tandis que
les voyelles apparaissent I- travers elle, certaines comme les
ombres de 1'existence sensible, et d'autres - le e rnuet par
exemple - comme la lumi^re qui vient de l'Un. (i", p. 261)
This is perhaps Bonnefoy's most extreme assertion about the physical
substance of language: and while such remarks may be too wilfully
personal to be considered as coherent theoretical statements about,
far less analyses of, poetic language, they are interesting from
two points of view. Firstly, they may serve remind us that Bonnefoy's
concerns are not exclusively theoretical. As a practising poet, his
contact with language is inevitably closer than that of the average
theorist, and if he seldom discusses the precise words of poetry,
and never indulges in such a dubious exercise as an explication de
texte, this is simply because he refuses to treat the poem as 'un
objet ou des significations se structurent', since poetry must be
seen, in its essence, as participation in presence, 'une intention
de salut, qui est le seul souci du poeme' (I , p. 250). This is in
complete agreement with his overall theoretical viewpoint: any comment
on the substance of language has to be related directly to the connection
between language and 'l*existence sensible', or what he sometimes calls
«l«Un'.
The second point of interest in Bonnefoy's remarks on linguistic sub¬
stance is the extent to which they are relevant to his own poetic
practice. The mute e, which Bonnefoy calls elsewhere 'cette faille
entre les concepts, cette intuition de la substance, cette chance
extraordinaire du franpais' (i , p. 103), is an element in versification whicl
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can enact the notion of imperfection as the supreme poetic goal.
the end of 'L'Acte et le lieu de la poesie', Bonnefoy makes this
quite explicit:
he meme sera nie le bonheur facile des rythmes. La beaute
formelle est le songe au bord d'un monde ideal. Elle
s'est exprimee par les metres pairs, mais c'est la, dans
cette abstraction et dans cet oubli, que Rimbaud a porte
la blessure inguerissable du nombre impair. II a permis
une lutte et, au-dela, une entente, dont l'e muet est
2
la cheville secrete. (I , p. 125)
The advantage of the mute e, for a modern poet, lies in its ambiguity:
whereas classical prosody dictated precisely where the vowel must have
its full syllabic value, and where it should be elided, the modern
poet can take advantage of the relaxation of the old rules to set up
a counterpoint between normal speech-rhythm and an underlying regular
metre, mirroring imperfection and perfection, or reality and the ideal.
Bonnefoy's use of this technique of prosodic ambiguity has been demon¬
strated by two articles on his versification, examinations of Pierre
ecrite by Frederic Deloffre, and of Du mouvement et de 1'immobilite
de Douve by Richard Vernier.(3) rpv^ imperfection of Bonnefoy's own
prosody does not directly concern me here, and indeed the mute e is
only one of several techniques in this direction analysed by M. Deloffre
and M. Vernier. It may be interesting, however, to quote two more
passages which show Bonnefoy's awareness of prosodic imperfection as
an expression of the wider kind of imperfection which he considers
indispensable in poetry if it is to attain contact with accidental
and imperfect reality. Of Baudelaire he says:
(2) Frederic Deloffre, 'Versification traditiormelle et versification
liberee d'apr^s un recueil d'Yves Bonnefoy' in Le Vers francais
au vingtikme siecle, actes du colloque de Strasbourg (3-6 mai 1966),
ed. Parent (Paris, 1967)> PP« 43—55» with discussion, pp. 56-64.
(3) Richard Vernier, 'Prosodie et silence dans un recueil d'Yves
Bonnefoy', Studia Neophilologica 45 (1973)> PP» 288-97*
- 104 -
Au moins Baudelaire a-t-il essaye, par ces 'chevilles' qu'on
lui a tant reprochees (elles sont pourtant la seule reponse
valable & l'ancienne prosodie close), par ces coups sourds
contre la paroi de parole, par ce brisement de la perfection
formelle et la catastrophe de la Beaute qu'il propose - en
depit de soi, en depit de nous peut-§tre - I, la poesie a
venir, de suggerer le frSlement d'aile de 1'existence dans
* \ 2
les mots voues a 1'universel. (i , pp. 114-5)
And in talking of a suitable metre for the translation of Shakespeare,
he writes:
Le vers qui me parait le plus proche du pentametre elizabethain
n'a pas de nom et guere d'histoire, c'est le metre de onze pieds.
Quand on le coupe apres le sixieme, il commence comme une indication
de lfideal, mais c'est pour s'achever, avec ces cinq syllabes
qui ramassent et laicisent, comme un fait ouvert a l'avenir,
d'autres faits. Ainsi reel et sacre, par son office, se
dialectisent, comme ils le font dans les grandes decisions
d'existence, que veut evoquer le theatre, et notamment celui
de Shakespeare. Et quand ces decisions atteignent S, une veritable
intensite spirituelle, eh bienl le onze pieds peut se depasser
dans 1'alexandrin. (CTS, p. 350)
We may note again Bonnefoy's insistence on the metaphysical significance
of a detail of versification. And this is relevant to his own practice,
as M. Deloffre has shown in his remarks on the 'alexandrins dechus'
in Pierre ecrite - precisely, hendecasyllables with the caesura after
the sixth syllable, and decasyllables of the form 6/4.^^
We may now return to Bonnefoy's views on medieval literature. His
remarks on consonants and vowels are indeed relevant to his own
experience of that literature, but are too subjective and unsystematic
to contribute to our appreciation of it - although we must remember
(4) Deloffre, 'Versification traditionnelle . . .', pp. 52-3
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that he has no intention of formulating a prosodic system. In his
essay on the Chanson de Roland, on the other hand, we have a carefully
worked-out application of general ideas to a particular poem.
Bonnefoy approaches the Chanson de Roland on several levels. He sees
in it a complex dialectic of essence, valid or invalid, and existence:
and this is as visible in the linguistic substance of the poem as in
the way it treats its subject-matter. The decasyllable is itself an
enactment of eternity and temporality: 1auatre pieds comrne l'eternel,
six comme le temps' (HR, p. 180); 'ce vers decasyllabe si "objectif",
lui dont les quatre pieds initiaux engagent si fermement la conscience
dans la stabilite d'un savoir, cependant que sa deuxieme partie, dans
son rythme ternaire infus, consent au temps humain par un acte de
f 2
sympathie, mais pour le reprendre dans l'eternel' (I , p. 260). The
metre of the poem is thus taken to reflect its central conflict,
though we may again feel obliged to reserve judgement on the objective
value of Bonnefoy's impressionistic remarks on rhythm, which do not
square with his theory of the eleven-syllable line, as quoted above
(p.104 )• The central conflict in the Chanson de Roland to which
Bonnefoy refers is between the double stability, or immobility, of
Charlemagne's forces and of the Saracens, and the dynamic elements
represented by Ganelon's treachery and Roland's redemptory sacrifice.
This is further mirrored, on yet another level, by Charlemagne being
seen as 'les mots', language which, whatever its original spiritual
validity, turns to rhetoric when its user's vigilance is relaxed, and
by Roland being seen as the ephemeral 'parole qui se consume pour
delivrer' (HR, p. 179).
Bonnefoy therefore sees, in the Chanson de Roland, an almost exact
parallel to his own poetic theory. Presence, considered as stability,
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is continually" haunted by the possibility of mauvaise presence, a
kind of evil which takes over the good from the inside, 'quelque
chose qui peut grandir en nous' (HE, P. 174), converting the substance
of the good into something horribly alien, all the more so because
of its close resemblance to the good which it betrays: 'sans que
rien ait change, tout pourra perdre son prix' (HR, p. 174)• The
agent for this betrayal is Ganelon, who enters into negotiations
with the Saracens: and in this dialogue, the linguistic integrity of
Charlemagne is lost, because Charlemagne represents language as it
is, open to the corruption of involvement with the Saracens, 'le
mauvais infini, celui du monde des apparences, des entassements de
l'objet' (HE, p. 179).
Medieval literature, Bonnefoy believes, was consciously aware of
this danger - as in the Queste del Saint Graal where, as I have already
mentioned, 'un . . . souverain . . . est "mehaignie" sur sa terre
"gaste", ultime forme de la reification du reel' (HE, p. 177). And
this *reel . . . realise, abouti, celui que 1'esprit subit sans lui
demander du possible' (i , p. 121), as Bonnefoy puts it in his remarks
on the modern projection of this theme, T. S. Eliot's The Waste Land,
is reflected in, and indeed a function of, 'la vacance des mots'
(HE, p. 177)» language used either as empty conceptualisation or as
empty rhetoric, with no concern for the interior reality of the objects
to which it refers. The spell cast over the Wasteland can be broken
only by the correct question uttered by the searching hero, just as
Ganelon's treachery can be redeemed only by the individual sacrifice
of Eoland, who in this context becomes the poetic word in full parti¬
cipation in the experience of death: '/(Roland/ sait bien maintenant
que ce qui sauve de la mort, c'est 1'acceptation de la mort' (HE, p. 179).
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This poetic word must be an ephemere, an individual and transcendental
act of articulacy: Roland could not sound his horn earlier, because
this would simply have opposed two forms of rhetoric, but must instead
redeem the spiritual validity of Charlemagne's forces by his own
sacrificial acceptance of death.
But this is not the full significance of the Chanson de Roland, for
it is written against a background of faith, and the final victory of
Charlemagne's forces must depend on divine intervention. This suspension
of time - to allow a few more hours for Charlemagne's victory - is
nevertheless not absolute. One is reminded of Bonnefoy's criticism
of the Christian symbol, to the effect that it may sanctify the Here
and Now, but only for an instant, dissolving it thereafter into a
realm of separated idealism. Charlemagne retreats to Aix-la-Chapelle,
only to be called yet again to new conquests, for which his inner
strength will once again have to be renewed: 'L'Empereur pleure de
lassitude. Admirable et brutale fin, recommencement eternel' (NR, p. 181).
The spiritual validity of any enterprise, and especially of the enter¬
prise of creative language, can never be fully guaranteed: it must
always be re-established in the apocalyptic moment of the sacrifice
of a Roland. Bonnefoy even suggests that the Chanson de Roland could
be interpreted as a kind of hidden Christian allegory: he refers to
'Jesus, prefigure de Roland, . . . qui, par sa mort, institua une
communion' (NR, p. 179). Roland's sacrifice might indeed echo Christ's
redemption of humanity, and Ganelon's treachery might echo the treachery
of Judas. One might prefer to see in this, however, a reflection of
the universal Western modes of thought which have been shaped by
Christianity, rather than a direct and conscious reference to the
Christian revelation itself.
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Several questions must be asked about the validity of Bonnefoy's
critical approach in this essay. He reads La Chanson de Roland as,
among other things, a universal parable of the possibility of poetic
articulacy: and, indeed, the correspondences between his own poetic
theory and the interpretation he gives of La Chanson de Roland are
very striking. However, we may ask how relevant this interpretation
is to the observable facts of the poem's structure and moral intention.
The answer, from a scholarly point of view, would have to be that the
interpretation is, at best, idiosyncratic, and at worst, Idtally fanci¬
ful. The poem is a piece of fictionalised history. Its attraction
for its original audience lay in the way in which it told a story,
and any interpretation must first of all be based on a sound investi¬
gation of the text, of the conditions of its original (generally oral)
transmission, of its derivation from previous versions of the same
incidents, and of the attitudes and ideas (of feudal society, for in¬
stance) to be found in it. This type of approach, however, implies
a concern for the poem as separated object, and this, as we have seen,
is the reverse of Bonnefoy's approach. He is concerned above all with
the way in which the poem enacts presence, with its possible involve¬
ment in the poetic experience of the reader: and his essay is a kind
of narrative of his own poetic experience of the Chanson, whose validity
can only be judged by the extent to which it awakens echoes in his
reader's experience of the poem. Particularly relevant is the way
in which Bonnefoy sees the poem as language talking about itself, and
enacting its own poetic possibilities. Such an interpretation places
the poem precisely in the context of the principe d'identite 'a son
degre le plus haut de saturation substantielle' (i , p. 262). His
essay on the poem is a direct record of his experience of it, and to
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that extent an excellent example of the way in which his criticism
of individual works of art, and his overall view of the nature of art,
are combined in a continuing dialectic. In the course of such an
overall critical approach, he may commit himself to untenable positions
on points of detail: but an exaggerated amount of attention paid to
these points would seriously misrepresent their function, which is
not primarily that of comment on a detached object, but that of parti¬
cipation in an aesthetic over-view which takes account of, but is not
mechanically dependent on, the individual existence of works of art.
Ve may now consider the change in human consciousness which, according
to Bonnefoy, followed the medieval period. This involved the loss of
generally-accepted religious faith: as we have seen in the Baroque age
^ * * 2
•on a commence a douter de la presence reelle' (i , p. 185). The first
literary symptom of this was the change, well before the Baroque period,
from anonymous to personal poetry. Needless to say, many other explan¬
ations could be postulated for this, but Bonnefoy's idea is itself
interesting. When language is guaranteed by a generally-held faith,
the poet need not assert himself as an individual. It is only when
that guarantee is lost that any possible guarantee must come, at least
in part, from the individual poetic consciousness: 'Lorsque la poesie
se fait personnelle, c'est que l'individu a dft se degager pour son
propre compte d'un oubli collectif de l'gtre, qui n'est pas . . .
A— 2
commence ^aans la Chanson de Roland 7* ' (I , p. 260). And in his
essay on the Chanson, Bonnefoy repeats the assertion of the loss of
a collective consciousness of being - which he here associates with
the epic form - and its replacement by an order guaranteed only by
the individual poetic voice:
Et il n'y a plus de Roland. Tr^s vite la societe des hommes
va perdre les instruments spirituals - symboles, mythes:
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vocabulaire et syntaxe de la Presence - qui rendaient le heros
possible. Mais au-dell, de 1'epopee, aussi bien, s'est dej&
ebauchee la poesie personnelle. A travers mort et resurrection,
un Roland de nouvelle sorte - les grands poetes, Dante, Villon,
Shakespeare, puis Baudelaire et Rimbaud - y ranimera le langage.
(BR, p. 181)
The historical process is, of course, continuous. There is no sudden
qualitative transformation - and certainly Dante, as Bonnefoy himself
asserts elsewhere (see p. 100 above), could call upon a reserve of
spiritually valid language. We may however grant Bonnefoy's point
that the first sign of change was the replacement of anonymous
poetry by personal poetry.
Some reservations may be in order, however, when we turn to Bonnefoy's
account of the development of the principe d'identite. In the period
after the Chanson de Roland, he claims, this lost its metaphysical
guarantee because of the lack of religious literature in French, Latin
being the language of the Church: 'Perte, done, d'une energie creatrice,
puisque tous les esprits theologiens ou mystiques durent deserter le
franpais. Manque d'une croyance qui assurerait pour longtemps la valeur
sacree du feuillage et du rossignol. . . Tout cela ne pouvait que
rendre infiniment fragile, et privee en tout cas de preuves, cette
experience pourtant directe de l'absolu dans le mot franpais.' (l^>
pp. 262-3). We may question whether the change in the religious
content of language, to which Bonnefoy frequently refers elsewhere,
is the consequence of the absence of religious literature in the
vernacular, as this implies, rather than its cause. A detailed study
of literary history would be necessary in order to attempt to establish
or refute the theory, and this Bonnefoy does not undertake, because,
as we have already seen in many contexts, he is not concerned with
- Ill -
constructing a theory in the commonly-accepted sense of the term.
The further point he makes, however, is of interest - that the
French intellectual tradition stemming from the lack of vernacular
religious literature was such as to make the spiritual validity of
the principe d'identite even more precarious than it might he other¬
wise:
Ce principe d'identite qui fut si intensement vecu comme axe
de participation, comme evidence de d'etre, dans la poesie
medievale, ce principe ne vaut que par une intuition que rien
dans nos traditions et savoirs ne justifie ni ne rememore -
et il peut done a tout instant se vider de sa vertu substantielle,
et il le fit, en verite, et tres t6t, et pour un tres grand
nombre de gens. La France put devenir le pays de 1'evidence
courte et obstinee, du fbon sens', (i , p. 263)
This process is not traced in any historical detail: hut we may
assume that it was complete, even where literary language was con¬
cerned, hy the rationalist eighteenth century, and that writers in
previous periods carried a heavy weight of responsibility for the
validation of their own language, receiving little help from the
language as apprehended hy the consciousness of the age. The only
French poet of the period between the Middle Ages and the nineteenth
century whom Bonnefoy deals with in any detail is Racine. Ve may
now go on to examine his ideas on Racinian linguistic usage and the
ways in which he draws connections between Racine and later poets.
XIII Essence: Racine. Mallarme, Valery
Perhaps the most accurate, but paradoxical way of describing Bonnefoy's
attitude to Racine would be to say that Racine accepts the limits
of the principe d'identite mentioned above, ',/vid£7de sa vertu
substantielle', but somehow endows these very limits with spiritual
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validity. Bonnefoy's remarks on '1'evidence courte et obstinee,
/le7 "bon sens" ' continue: 'Le regard franpais put se complaire a un
certain tableau de peu d'ombres, aux objets evidents dans leurs
relations raisonnables, et aussi peu nombreux (relativement) qu'ils
^ o
sont bien dessines dans les contours qui les delimitent' (l"% p. 263).
Bonnefoy may well not have been thinking of Eacine when he wrote this
passage, but it corresponds remarkably well to his view of Racine 's
having reduced the world to a few very pure essences - with the
crucial reservation that, in Racine's case, the essences, and their
expression in language, have a valid mode of existence. Racine, says
Bonnefoy, 'conpoit 1'unite comme une sphere ideale, infiniment separee'
and, from the point of view of language, 'I'idee racinienne de la
parole est . . . de simplifier•la conscience, de nous attacher a
* 2
quelques pensees qui sont bien stir les plus graves' (i , p. 113)•
This idea of Racine as a dramatic poet dealing with Platonic essences
is reiterated in Bonnefoy's essay on 'Shakespeare et le poete franpais':
Racine n'accepte sur son theatre qu'un nombre tr&s restreint
de situations ou de sentiments. Et, les depouillant de tout
ce que 1'existence reelle peut leur ajouter d'elements hasardeux
ou accidentels, il semble les elever & la dignite de I'idee
platonicienne et vouloir reduire son theatre aux pures relations
qui unissent ou opposent les Idees. Le monde est remplace par
un monde plus resserre d'essences intelligibles. (H, pp. 237-8)
In considering Bonnefoy's view of Racine, we must lay equal stress on
the importance of 'essences' and that of 'intelligibles': for essences,
seen as something abstract, have no spiritual validity at all, as we
have already noted many times over - it is only when the poetic force
of a great writer gives them coherence that th^-become 'intelligibles'.
At the same time, although '1'equivoque profonde de I'idee platonicienne
est de prendre sur soi le plus vif, le plus pur de I'apparence sensible'
(H p. 238), Bonnefoy is at pains, in this essay on Shakespeare, to cite
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Racine as an almost purely essentialist writer - the Idea is still
'un lieu separe oil l'on peut oublier la diversite du reel et 1'existence
du temps, de la vie quotidienne, de la mort' (ibid.). Poetic articulacy,
in this case, implies the reader's being drawn into a 'participation
illusoire' in the sacred realm set up by the work of art.
In 'L'Acte et le lieu de la poesie', however, Bonnefoy sees Racine as
being a great writer almost in spite of his subscription to the validity
of Platonic essences, because he cannot help taking into account, in
however oblique a way, '1'existence du temps, de la vie quotidienne,
de la mort'. There is, in fact, under the play of essences, a hidden
contact with reality through the inescapable reality of death. Asserting
* * * 2
that 'la ceremonie de 1'obscur est la fatalite de toute oeuvre' (i , p. 110),
Bonnefoy compares the work of art to a temple: no matter how symetrically
imposing a formal structure it may present, it must always enshrine some
mysterious reality - 'au secret du temple, sur l'autel ou dans une crypte,
* * 2
1'imprevisible est present' (I , p. 110). This is the case even in
Racine's work, where death, the most intractable of awkward realities,
may seem to have been assimilated into the realm of essences: 'Ici la
mort n'est plus que la ponctuation des grands actes. . . Le heros
racinien meurt, semble-t-il, pour simplifier 1'univers, pour aggraver
1'etre, pour sacrifier k une conception aulique du sacre qui n'ordonne
qu'aussi peu que possible de figures dans 1'eclat glorieux du soleil'
p
(i , p. 111). We may note, incidentally, the allusive range of Bonnefoy's
criticism, for the 'conception aulique du sacre . . . dans 1'eclat
glorieux du soleil' is, of course, the valid political order embodied
in the court of the Sun King: the world of Racine's plays is a reflection
of the world in which he lived. Racine's desire for perfection, however,
is bound to be flawed, for death cannot possibly be thus assimilated.
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Death comes to dominate his world, because it cannot be fitted into
it as a simple element among others: 'de quelle affreuse importance
p
est cette mort si abstraite!' (i , p. 111). And with the reality of
death having to be faced in this context, the whole world of essences
is called into question and held in a precarious balance between
existence and non-existence: 'comme si ... la dimension temporelle
ne pouvait que trahir 1'existence d'une matiere ll, ou la poesie croit
rejoindre 1'inaccessible empyree. Dans la transparence du beau cristal
Racine aperpoit une ombre et ne parvient plus a ne pas la voir'
(l , p. 111). The shadow which lies over Racine's plays, the presence
of death, is nevertheless not death as it is experienced in reality,
as something inextricably bound up with reality. It is simply the
negative side of the world of essences which Racine evokes in his
writing: ,/Bac±ne/ conduit presque au jour de la parole ce qui serait
dans ce jour une lucidite sans egale, s'il n'etait vrai pourtant que
cette mort qu'il medite n'est formulable par lui que de fapon negative,
une inconsequence de 1'etre, une privation dissociee de son eternel
et profond objet, qui est 1'homme qui meurt sous notre ciel' (i , p. 112).
The immediate expression of death, the central concern of humanity,
not as the simple gateway to an immortal but remote realm, but as a
limiting barrier to all human enterprise, the final delimitation of
reality - and therefore, the definitive formulation of the attitude
of the modem consciousness, as such anonymous writing as La Chanson
de Roland had been of the medieval attitude, - would have to wait
till Baudelaire. Death within reality exists in Racine's work only
as a shadow. His work itself is 'ce moi vacant, la poesie classique
elle-meme, qui se connait presque mais sans agir' (i , p. 112): and
the failure which this phrase implies reminds us that poetry must
participate in a dynamic process which may approach presence. It
must be 'du grand acte clcs la proximite angoissee, la theologie
negative' (i2, p. 125).
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Bonnefoy sees in Bacine, then, an attempt to set up a realm of essences.
Although he does not explicitly connect this with the principe d'identite,
we may say that, while medieval literature can name the true existence
of things through reference to a spiritually-validated real world, the
principe d'identite. as it operates in Bacine's work, identifies words
no less closely with the essences the poet is dealing with. However,
although these essences have true "being as essences, and therefore the
principe d'identite can genuinely guarantee the words used to evoke
thgm, Bacine fails to integrate the post-medieval reality of death,
and with it phenomenal reality, into his poetic universe as anything
more than an uneasy spectre, and this may "be seen as a limitation on
his art. It is doubtless superfluous to point out that Bonnefoy is
seeking to situate Bacine within the philosophical framework of dialectic
between existence and essence which we find in his criticism of medieval
literature: my remarks on the validity, or otherwise, of his precise
interpretation of detail will apply equally to his ideas on Eacine.
It may now be useful, in dealing with what one might call the essential-
ist end of Bonnefoyls critical spectrum, to consider his views on
Mallarme and Valery, both of whom occupy situations within this general
area.
Bonnefoy's attitude to Mallarme is deeply ambiguous. At the beginning
of his essay on Jouve, he refers to 'l'art, les prestiges de l'oeuvre
elaboree, prise comme fin - I'eternel mallarmeisme'. He immediately
goes on to develop the idea: 'Faire oeuvre, perfectionner sa langue
particuli^re, la preferer, dissiper le moi quotidien dans cette
ecriture voulue, "mourir" comme le propose I'auteur de L'Action
restreinte, que c'est facile, en fin de compte, et d'autamt que
cette abolition n'a jamais lieu de la fapon absolue qu'a tentee, ce
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fut sa grandeur, Mallarme' (MR, P. 235)• -6-11 of Bonnefoy's remarks
on Mallarme aim at exploring the ways in which, in Bonnefoy's view,
Mallarme turned his hack on reality in an attempt to establish - or
to investigate the possibility of establishing - language itself as
an absolute; and Bonnefoy's criticisms of Mallarme's poetic project,
while amounting in the end to a rejection of its validity, neverthe¬
less always recognise its seriousness and its magnificence, the hope
that it might have represented for poetry. As Bonnefoy makes clear
in his 1976 essay on 'La Poetique de Mallarme' (though this is less
clear in his earlier treatment of Mallarme in 'L'Acte et le lieu de
la poesie' and 'La Poesie fran9aise et le principe d'identite' where,
as with other subjects he deals with in his earlier essays, he seems
more concerned with fitting Mallarme into a preconceived theoretical
mould than with concentrating on his individuality), Mallarme's
rejection of reality as a basis for his poetic endeavour was not
motivated by a distaste for reality as such, but by a realisation
of the incongruence of reality as a basis for poetic creation at all.
Referring to the 'frustrations' evident in Mallarme's work, Bonnefoy
imputes to Mallarme the yearning for simple contact with reality as
it is - 'que ce serait beau, la terre, comme facilement, simplement,
cela pourrait nous suffire." (MR, p. I83) - and goes on to remark:
Comme ^lallaxme/ 1'a dit, explicitement: 'La Mature a lieu,
on n'y ajoutera pas.' Ou encore: 'Rien ne transgresse les
figures du val, du pre, de 1'arbre.'
Mais autant Mallarme est ouvert a 1'experience des sens et
pret, nativement, a s'y etablir avec joie, autant il va
eprouver - et ce sera 1& sa premiere deception - qu'& peine
se risque-t-il parmi les choses comme elles sont leur qualite,
leur presence m§me, se dissipent. (MR, p. I84)
This imperfection of the real world, from the poet's point of view, is
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of course a function of its lack of any acknowledged spiritual
dimension. In response to this, Bonnefoy sees Mallarme as seeking
to throw the responsibility for the spiritual validation of the
world onto language itself: and in this process language must
aspire - inevitably, without success - to the status of an absolute,
and abandon the world altogether. This, Bonnefoy claims, is a de¬
parture from the less extreme view of language which writers had
previously adhered to: 'Be texte poetique a eu pour Mallarme le
caractere d'une evidence derniere, inentamable, done sacree, alors
que pour les poetes d'auparavant, il n'etait que la reponse diffuse
\ une presence eprouvee en son dehors' (MR, pp. 188-9). Again,
alluding in 'L'Acte et le lieu de la poesie' to Mallarme's famous
statementabout the poetic word which calls up the 'notion pure' of
its object, 'sans la gene d'un proche ou concret rappel', the word
which '/transpose/ un fait de nature en sa presque disparition
vibratoire', Bonnefoy remarks:
Mallarme ne veut plus sauver que I'amande m§me de 1'etre,
mais, puisque le mot parait ne faire qu'un avec elle, il
croit vraiment qu'il le peut. . . . /La parole essaiera/.,.,
de faire de ces essences qui n'etaient plus que les epaves
du grand navire 1'Idee enfin immanente, et du Livre le
lieu divin qui la retiendra parmi nous. La poesie doit
sauver 1'etre, I, lui ensuite de nous sauver. (i , p. 108)
The danger inherent in any such programme is obvious: poetic language
which has in effect cut itself off from reality must rely only on
itself for the assertion of whatever reality it claims to express,
and such reality may well simply turn out an abstraction, with even
(l) Stephane Mallarme, 'Crise de vers', in Oeuvres completes,
ed. Mondor and Jean-Aubry (Paris, 1945)» P- 368.
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less validity than the -unsatisfactory, spiritually deprived world
which the poet has rejected. This danger is expressed in general
terms at the end of 'La Poesie franpaise et le principe d'identite':
Or, nommer l'arbre trop aisement, c'est risquer de rester
captif d'une image pauvre de 1'arbre; ou en tout cas, abstraite,
et qui ne pourra grandir dans l'espace de I'absolu qu'& partir
d'un des aspects, seul retenu - par distraction - , de l'objet.
Et voici que la Presence n'est plus conpue que comme un
deploiement fabuleux de cet aspect, comme une profusion de ce
marbre. Elle n'est plus qu'un decor, dont le Je aussi est
absent, et bientot une convention et le reformement d'une
O
rhetorique. (i , pp. 269-70)
Bonnefoy goes on to make it clear that Mallarme is among the French
poets who may have failed in this way. Regretting that the French
language - unlike Romeo in Shakespeare's play - has no Mercutio to
remind the poet of the danger of abstract idealism and 'pour le
rappeler au devoir de "trivialite" ', he continues:
Dans notre langue c'est au poete seul qu'il revient de se
ressaisir dans cette beaute des mots ou il n'a mis bien des
fois que le fantSme des choses. Et notre poesie a aussi,
comme dimension de son histoire et de sa diversite, ces
egarements et ces retours. Les uns - les ressaisissements - ,
c'est le Cygne baudelairien, c'est 1'Eternite de Rimbaud.
Les autres, que 1'orgueil mene, c'est la tragedie de Racine,
la 'notion pure' de Mallarme. (i^, p. 270)
In his later essay on 'La Poetique de Mallarme', however, Bonnefoy
admits that in some of his work, particularly the Vers de circonstance,
Mallarme may have had a similar notion of 'trivialite' in mind, and
this is of course related to what I have called elsewhere '1'ephemere'.
But Mallarme, in Bonnefoy's view, always adheres too intensely to an
underlying 'notion pure' for this concern with the trivial to be taken
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as an acceptance of everyday reality as it is. Of the Vers de
circonstance, Bonnefoy says:
On peut beaucoup se tromper stir ces ecrits . . . Y discerner
tm renoncement a 1 'Idee, tine adhesion "k la finitu.de - une
incarnation meme, au moins par instants - alors qu'ils ne
veulent etre toujours que la recherche des notions pures,
d'autant plus vigilante et exacerbee que portee aux confins
du monde cru ennemi. (ME, p. 210)
Bonnefoy goes on to expand this idea:
La verite, c'est que Mallarme aurait bien voulu que la notion
ptire puisse garder, dans ses structurations intangibles, ces
aspects de notre existence qu'a institues notre finitude, et
qu'on aime d^s qu'on acquiesce aux imperfections de cette
derniere. . . . Et venir roder k ce seuil, c'est bien se
detoumer, en effet, du reve que 1'Idee soit accessible par
1'ecriture; mais nullement de l'Etre lui-meme, qui peut se
dire, a plus simples que Mallarme, dans 1'instant ou un
oiseau, quelque oiseau, s'envole brusquement d'une branche,
et reveler dans ce rien sa qualite d'origine et son pouvoir
de fonder le sens. (HR, p. 211)
What Bonnefoy sees as lacking in Mallarme's poetic approach to reality,
therefore, is the capacity to achieve a simple contact with reality
itself, avoiding the mediation of any aesthetic theory, whether through
the postulation of language as an absolute or otherwise. Such a simple
contact is, of course, what Bonnefoy himself is seeking, and he would
doubtless see himself as one of the 'plus simples que Mallarme' that
he mentions; and he sees the example of Mallarme, precisely because
of its uncompromising integrity, as in some ways dangerous for the
Erench poetic tradition. He considers that Mallarme's commitment to
language as an absolute is doomed to failure: 'Si nous ne voulons que
nous sauver du neant, ftlt-ce au prix de la possession, peut-etre les
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mots suffisent. Mallarme 1'a pense, ou plutSt il en a fait 1'hypothese.
Mais son honnetete sans limite a dementi son effort' (i2, p. 107).
The lengths to which Mallarme took his poetic project can, in Bonnefoy's
view , lead to a false aesthetic if his conclusions are simply accepted
by later writers who have not themselves gone through the painful
intellectual process which led to them:
En fait, on peut meme croire - certaines pages y portent, faut-il
dire le Coup de des? - qu'il a presque voulu fonder, a des
heures, sur ce neant en apparence final, percevant dans son
jeu d'ecume sous les etoiles, dans le rien qui s'ecrit et se
desecrit, au moins du temps qui passe, du reve qui se delivre,
voire une fete nouvelle pour une societe sans espoir. Laisser
les mots bouger dans les mots, d'une cristallisation a une
autre, comme ils le veulent & travers nous, comme autrefois
nous les empechions de faire. Et en ce sens ce dernier
metaphysicien aurait ouvert a ces poetiques de notre temps
qui font de 1'ecriture sa propre fin et l'unique espace, elles
n'ayant eu, en somme, qu'a accepter hardiment ce que lul ne
consentait qu'& regret, a savoir que la parole est sans referent
et notre existence sans gtre. (HR, pp. 206-7)
There is certainly a difference, of the most radical kind, between
Mallarme's own project and that of the adherents to '1'eternel
mallarmeisme', the imitators who copied Mallarme's example only on
the level of rhetoric. Mallarme demanded an absolute abolition: he
did not accept a simple aesthetic which would postulate the present¬
ation of Ideas, in the Platonic sense, through words, but insisted
on the word creating the spiritual reality of the Idea. In contrast
to Yalery, 'il savait que les Idees ne sont pas, ne sont pas encore,
et il demandait au "livre", par sa vertu liante et instauratrice, de
fonder un regne ou elles seraient. Admirable projet, tout de meme
si poetique, puisqu'il se propose un salutl' (i , p. 98). As we
have seen, however, Bonnefoy cannot accept any reliance on poetry
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itself as an absolute. The abolition from which Mallarme starts is
not that plunge into death as true apprehension of phenomenal reality
which Baudelaire, for instance, practised, and which Bonnefoy sees
as the only possible project for the modern poet. It is, instead,
the acceptance of death as destroyer of phenomenal reality, beyond
which destruction poetry may be written - but this poetry must forget
the human concerns of the world, and can therefore only end in sterility:
La poesie de Mallarme est 1'existence vaincue, elan par elan,
desir par desir. 'Heureusement, ecrit-il a Cazalis au debut de
son grand dessein, je suis parfaitement mort.' Yoici, certes,
1*antique idee baptismale, qu'il faut mourir a ce monde pour
renaltre plus haut, dans le sacre. II reste que Mallarme n'a
pu esperer prendre pied au seuil de l'etre qu'en faisant taire
en lui le desir qui s'etait leve le premier pour s'angoisser,
pour comprendre. Que vaut ce bien qui ne se donne qu'a celui
n
qui est dejk mort? (i , p. 109)
On the level of language, too, Mallarme's project tends towards an
impossible perfection. The apocalyptic Livre would, ideally - in
more than one sense of that word - , have abolished the world through
the raising of language itself into an incantatory absolute. This
implies the total rejection of normal discursive language, 'l'universel
(n)reportage'^ ' as Mallarme calls it, or, in Bonnefoy's terms, 'le
^ 2
discours, ce lieu verbal que Mallarme voulut fuir' (I , p. 31), and
its replacement by the kind of fractured syntax we find in many of
Mallarme's later poems (not to mention his prose), and ultimately by
a simple enactive declaration of language in its purest possible state
- a state which would be difficult to conceive of, and which Mallarme
was only groping towards at the end of his life. The note written to
his wife and daughter on the eve of his death urges them to burn his
(2) Mallarme, Oeuvres completes, p. 368.
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papers: 'Dites qu'on n'y distinguerait rien, c'est vrai du reste, et,
vous, mes pauvres prostrees, les seuls etres au monde capables S, ce
point de respecter toute une vie d'artiste sincere, croyez que ce
devait §tre tres beau'.wy
In 'La Poetique de Mallarme', in fact, Bonnefoy explicitly describes
the manner of Mallarme's death as a kind of echo of the possible
validity of his poetic projects:
on voit (/Mallarm^7 revenir, dans ses dernieres annees, aux
formes les plus extremes de ses tentatives passees, comme
pour une sorte de quitte ou double. . . il est revenu jusqu'a
1'obsession - Paul Yalery en temoigne - au texte inacheve
d'Eerodiade, le poeme ou 1'Idee s'est revelee la premiere
fois, et qu'il s'agit de finir. . . N'en doutons pas, le
spasme de la glotte qui recusa la parole de Mallarme, un soir
du debut de l'automne, ressemble vraiment trop k la decollation
du Baptiste, dont on sait le role dans le poeme, pour que ce
soit simple coSncidence. (HR, pp. 204-5)
Such an assertion may sound fanciful, and would of course be impossible
to prove or disprove, but it gives an indication of Bonnefoy's judge¬
ment of the undoubted integration of Mallarme's personal life in his
poetic project, just as Bonnefoy sees Baudelaire's life being inte¬
grated - though in a different and more poetically fruitful way - in
his poetic project.
The fact that Mallarme's unremitting quest may be said to have carried
his ideas to such extremes only goes to prove, if proof were needed,
that his project is impossible: the ultimate value of his work lies
in its very extremity, in the honesty with which he inexorably strove
towards an unattainable goal. And his ultimate failure proves - for,
on second thoughts, proof is needed - that the goal is indeed unobtain¬
able: 'Stephane Mallarme a demontre l'echec de l'ancien mouvement d'espoir.
(3) quoted in Henri Mondor, Yie de Mallarme (Paris, 194^)> P»
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Qu'on ne puisse echapper par la parole an neant qui mange les choses,
depuis le Coup de Pes qui a celebre cet irremediable, on ne peut plus
2
ne pas le savoir.' (i , p. 109).
In Mallarme, therefore, the principe d'identite does not, as in Racine,
link word and essence, for the word must create the essence. The word,
in fact, must enter into identity with itself, and only thereafter
into identity with the essence it has created. 'Je dis: une fleur!',
writes Mallarme,*et . . . musicalement se leve, idee meme et suave,
1'absente de tous bouquets'. Bonnefoy can be scathing about
Mallarme's enterprise, as in 'La Poesie franpaise et le principe
d'identite': 'On connait ces projets de Livres. lis ne sont qu'une
des fapons de rechercher la presence par le truchement de 1'aspect,
qui est pourtant le sel qui la dissocie' (l^» pp. 252-3). But this
is unfair. Mallarme's greatness lies precisely in the totally un¬
compromising way in which he carries through his project to the
limits of possibility. Reality, through no matter how ethereal an
essence, cannot be called into being by the poetic word, but the
mystery of language must include the distant possibility of some
such identification, and this is what Mallarme has heroically explored.
If Bonnefoy must finally reject Mallarme, it is not without having
fully learned the lesson which Mallarme taught. As we have seen,
Bonnefoy must make less absolute, but no less serious and, in their
own way, ambitious, claims for poetry: 'Je dis une fleur. et le son
# * 2
du mot, sa figure mysterieuse est le rappel de l'enigme' (i , p. 129).
The case of Valery, one of Mallarme's most illustrious disciples, is
quite different. Here, Bonnefoy's criticism sees yet another variation
of the complex dialectic of existence and essence, and of language's
(4) Mallarme, Oeuvres completes, p. 3^8
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relationship with that dialectic. It is, however, difficult to pin
down the precise nature of what Bonnefoy calls Valery's 'apostasy*.
In his interview with L'Express in 1959 he gave a clear, but over-
simplistic, account of the contrast between Mallarme and Valery:
chez Mallarme il y a, comme chez tous les grands pontes, le
tres vif sentiment de la tension qui existe entre 1'idee, au
sens presque platonicien du mot, et 1'existence immediate et
comme brute des 6tres. La poesie est 1'experience mSme de
cette tension, de cette dechirure irreductible entre 1'existence
concrete et le monde ideal et intemporel dans lequel on veut
essayer de vivre.
Mais Valery a nie le premier de ces deux termes. C'est une
interpretation facile de 1'enseignement de Mallarme.
We should not linger too long over a statement made, perhaps in haste,
during an interview: but it may be worth pointing out that, as we have
seen, Bonnefoy sees Mallarme as resolving the tension by abolishing
- after much anguish®, interior debate - immediate existence, whereas
Yalery is certainly aware of the differences between the "two worlds,
(6)
the 'maitresses de l'ime, Idees' and 'ma for£t sensuelle'. v 1
Bonnefoy is really reproaching Valery, it seems, for not appreciating
the importance of the 'dechirure irreductible' between the realms
of existence and Idea, and for treating the first simply as an
intellectual category different from, but on the same level as, the
second, instead of seeing them as polar extremes, irreconcilable
with each other except in the momentary, articulate mystery of
presence. Thus Yalery looks on the poem as a mechanism whose effect
can, to a considerable extent, be explained by rational analysis,
a notion which is, as we have seen, anathema to Bonnefoy: 'Je me
(5) L'Express, 17 December 1959.
(6) Paul Yalery, 'Aurore', in Oeuvres completes, vol.1, ed. Hytier
(Paris, 1957)> p. 112.
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mefie . . . de Valery qui, pour la paix de 1'esprit et pouvoir
outlier la conscience tragique grecque, se depense ^ chercher les
lois de fabrication d'un poeme' (I , p. 118).
Bonnefoy sees in Valery, in fact, an ultimately mechanistic point
of view - he calls him 'le nouveau philosophe des lumieres' (i^,
p. 101) - which represents a flight from reality, as against Racine
and Mallarme, who both follow through their poetic projects to honest,
if untenable, conclusions. He sees Valery as subscribing to a certain
apprehension of reality which, in the version of the essay on Valery
published in L'Improbable in 195^» is described as being better suited
to expression in Italian than in French, but which in the revised
edition of L'Improbable published in 1980 is contrasted rather with
a true poetic grasp of the world generally:
la poesie ressent comme une deception, un mensonge, un certain
sol, reel, ou imaginaire, la Mediterranee de l'esprit. Pays ou
la sensation est si facile, si elementaire, si pure, qu'elle
semble conduire au coeur des choses: a une mer etemelle, au
soleil, au vent. . . Ici venus, nous croyons toucher h,
1'intelligible, a peine disperse par une matiere, a la voie
d'un retour rapide vers la maison de l'Idee. Et telle est
bien 1'illusion que I'italien par exemple, dans ses mots
eviaents et clos, ne soupponne ni ne condamne - (I , p. 97)
Bonnefoy is hinting at the large claim that Valery was unaware of the
basic nature of poetic language, a claim which does not so much in¬
dicate an intolerable degree of arrogance on Bonnefoy's part, as
show the deep seriousness of Bonnefoy's views, and their importance
for his own vision, no matter how subjective it may be, of the nature
of poetic language, and particularly of the French language in its
poetic uses. The above quotation continues:
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- mais il y a un autre chemin. II y a cette chose extraordinaire:
aussi informe et noir qu'il puisse etre, un etre qui est ne,
que le temps emporte et qui va mourir. Un §tre dans ce lieu-ci. . .
* * * 2
Yalery a meconnu le mystere de la presence, (i , p. 97-98)
Ve may readily admit, however doubtful we may be about the special
suitability of the French language for the expression of this 'autre
chemin' (a doubt which appears to be shared by Bonnefoy, since he has
changed the emphasis of the essay on this point since its first
appearance), that there is here an unbridgeable gulf between Bonnefoy's
own, consistent vision of poetry mysteriously expressing the Here and
How, and the aesthetic of debased essentialism which he imputes to
Yalery, an aesthetic in which Yalery's eloquence is seen as having
only served a spiritually bankrupt, mechanistic relationship between
word and illusory essence. Whatever may be our reservations about
Bonnefoy's essay as criticism of Yalery, it is unquestionably one of
his most concise statements of his own aesthetic position. The ideas
of presence and mortality, together, are here seen to stand against
no matter how melodiously seductive an abstraction.
We may note, in Valery's description of his last visit to Mallarme,
something approaching the easy identification of sensation and ideal
for which Bonnefoy criticises him:
Nous sommes alles dans la campagne. . . L'air etait feu; la
splendeur absolue; le silence plein de vertiges et d'echanges;
la mort impossible ou indifferente; tout formidablement beau,
brdlant et dormant; et les images du sol tremblaient.
Au soleil, dans 1'immense forme du ciel pur, je r§vais d'une
enceinte incandescente ou rien de distinct ne subsiste, ou
rien ne dure, mais ou rien ne cesse; comme si la destruction
elle-m§me se detruislt S, peine accomplie. Je perdais le
sentiment de la difference de 1'etre et du non-etre. La
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musique parfois nous impose cette impression, qui est au-dela
de toutes les autres. La poesie, pensais-je, n'est-elle point
aussi le jeu supreme de la transmutation des idees? . . . ^)
This dream of immobility is obviously a poetic experience. It is
also, implicitly, haunted by the spectre of death: for Mallarme was
to die suddenly a few months later. Bat the delicate grace of Yalery's
acknowledgement of death (^uand vint l'automne, il n'etait plus' he
writes at the end of the essay) is inadequate to tjvg. reality, and we
are left with the evocation of what Bonnefoy calls 'un monde d'essences
ou rien ne nait ni ne meurt' (i , p. 99) -a world which, whatever its
superficial attraction, is not the real world but a world of dreams.
In such a world, poetry is only a game, albeit 'le jeu supreme de la
transmutation des idees'. And this, the outcome of Yalery's development
of 'l'eternel mallarmeisme', is a function which Bonnefoy cannot
acknowledge for poetry. If poetry cannot be raised to the status of
a self-sufficient absolute, as Mallarme craved, neither must it become
mere wordplay: 'La vraie malediction en ce monde est d'y etre reduit
au jeu. Le vers de Yalery, qui n'a d'Stre et de recours qu'en ses propres
regies, ce melange de divertissement et de savoir, cette partie d'echecs
ou l'on n'en finit pas de jouer au plus fin avec 1'idee ou l'echo,
* * 2
n'est que precarite et tristesse' (i , p. 102).
Bonnefoy does not dismiss out of hand all Yalery's work: in particular,
he admits that 'Le Cimetiere marin' is Yalery's finest poem, because
its play of essence and sensation could have led to a true apprehension
of death and reality: *Ici, dans le midi de 1'absence, sur cette rive
ou sensation pure et pure pensee renvoient sans fin l'une a 1'autre,
quelque chose d'informe aurait pu surgir. . . Mais . . . Yalery . . .
revient a l'eblouissement ou l'on s'aveugle, & la sensation comme un
(7) Valery, Oeuvres completes, vol.1, p. 633*
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^ 2
sommeil, a ce vent qui n'est pas le vent. . .' (I , pp. 102-5).
Valery always fails to appreciate or evoke true existence. The
principe d'identite is, indeed, at work in his writing: but the
connection it makes between word and essence is of no value because
essences have no contact with reality, and no attempt is made, through
language, to give them any such contact. In his final rejection of
Valery1s poetic enterprise, Bonnefoy returns to the spiritual validation
of substantive reality - in his view, the only valid concern for poetry:
'Bans sa langue sans e_ rnuet . . . cet intellect identifie la forme £.
l'epure, au geste maigre de la danseuse, a l'hypothese speculative,
sans avoir su qu'il n'y a de forme que pour la pierre, c'est-a-dire
+ 2
vofltee sur la rupture et la nuit* (i , p. 105).
We have seen how, in Bonnefoy's exploration of the writing of Bacine,
Mallarme and Valery, he rejects any identification of word with essence
- whether the validity of the connection depends basically on the
essence, as in Racine, on the word, as in Mallarme, or on neither,
as in Valery. These criticisms of his predecessors, and in particular
his criticisms of Valery, are not to be taken as mere iconoclasm, but
as parts of a continuing attempt to define the poetic modes possible
in French, and Bonnefoy's own relationship with these modes. We may
now go on to consider his criticism of the poets towards whom his
attitude is more positive - Baudelaire and Rimbaud.
XIV Existence: Baudelaire, Rimbaud
We may consider Bonnefoy's treatment of Baudelaire in two stages, by
exploring first of all the ways in which Baudelaire may be said to
have achieved a true realisation of death and with it, of substantive
existence, and secondly by dealing with the mode of discourse through
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which Baudelaire made this realisation articulate. Bonnefoy calls
this mode of discourse 'vrai discours' or 'verite de parole'.
It will "be evident, from my remarks on Bonnefoy's views of Racine,
Mallarme and Yalery, that he sees Baudelaire as having, in contrast
to these poets, succeeded in directing his attention to 1'ephemere,
'/le/ Eieu inconnu, et celui-ci cette passante, ce cygne, cette
feuille du lierre tachee de houe' (i^, p. 101), or, as he says else¬
where in his essay on Yalery, 'un etre qui est ne, que le temps
emporte et qui va mourir' (i , p. 98)• This concentration on
1'ephemere represents the refusal to restrict the poet's concern to
the expression of an impossible ideal, and the assertion of existence
- or rather, of an existence - instead of essence. Comparing Baudelaire
with Racine, Bonnefoy says: 'Simplement, auand /Racine/ conpoit 1'unite
comme une sphere ideale, infiniment separee, Baudelaire la porte - ou
la cherche - au coeur du pays sensible, hors de la conscience, hors
de soi' (I , p. 113). We must take careful note of the wording here.
Baudelaire is still searching for '1'unite' - but, as we have seen,
Bonnefoy does not consider this notion borrowed, more or less indirectly,
from Plotinus as an abstraction, but rather insists that it can only
be approached through the particular seen as particular. Furthermore,
any such particular must have an objective existence of its own before
it can attain the trans-objective existence revealed through participation
in presence: and this explains the importance of 1'ephemere being found
'hors de la conscience, hors de soi', for the parenthetical half-
substitution of 'cherche' for 'porte' - a typical example of Bonnefoy's
sleight-of-mind - suggests that the object of Baudelaire's attention
must exist in itself, and not primarily through any conceptualising
process initiated by the observer. We may note that, while Bonnefoy's
commitment to an existential interpretation of Baudelaire seems quite
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clear in this context, he expresses a rather more essentialist notion
- or, perhaps, the same notion seen from a more essentialist point of
view - in his essay on 'Shakespeare et le poete franpais ' , where he
is at pains to compare French poetry to a Platonic sphere, and English
to an Aristotelian mirror:
Si /Baudelaire/ s'interesse k tel cygne ou a telle femme, en
effet, et non plus au cygne en soi, a la femme en soi, a 1'idee
du cygne ou de la femme, ce n'est pas pour autant la nature
de ces etres qui l'interesse, c'est simplement ce myst^re
qu'une Idee se soit egaree au sein du monde sensible, qu'elle
puisse avoir accepte de subir la limitation et la mort, qu'elle
puisse etre, et avoir valeur absolue, dans ce monde des tenVbres
et du hasard. (H, p. 238)
The complexities of idealisation which Bonnefoy evokes here may seem
to give quite a different emphasis to his interpretation of Baudelaire's
poetic project and may usefully be contrasted with Mallarme's earnest
but unsuccessful early search for an Ideal subsisting within reality.
His reference to 'ce myst&re qu'une Idee se soit egaree au sein du
monde sensible, qu'elle puisse avoir accepte de subir la limitation
et la mort' may hint also at an analogy with the Christian doctrine
of the Incarnation, according to which the Word, the second person
of the divine Trinity, was made flesh in the person of Jesus Christ,
who therefore participates fully in both divine and human nature.
This reference is not, however, explicit - Bonnefoy asserts elsewhere,
indeed, that 'nulle foi n'est dite ou vraiment eprouvee par Baudelaire'
(i , p. 30) - the passage may be read in its context as coming
from Bonnefoy's own deep-seated concern with the notion of a valid
mode of existence for the Platonic ideal, and from his enthusiasm,
in this essay mainly devoted to English, French and the problem of
translation, for the idea of French as a Platonic language. His
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statements on Baudelaire in 'Les Fleurs du mal' and 'L'Acte et le
lieu de la poesie' constitute a more coherent interpretation of
Baudelaire's work.
The importance of particularity in Baudelaire's poetry is made mani¬
fest in the perspectives which the expression of particularity opens
up. Once the particular has been truly grasped in poetic terms, this
process, entailing an act of love, leads to the sanctification and
redemption of the whole phenomenal world, so that the poet's voice
has strength of an entirely different order from the picturesque
realism which merely offers a plethora of aspects without illuminating
the true meaning of any of them:
Voici, d'ailleurs, autour de cette femme blessee ^Andromaque/
et dans la sympathie qu'elle eveille, que le monde, au lieu de
s'annuler comme jadis, ou de proliferer vainement comme dans
la poesie pittoresque, ouvre la perspective de tous les etres
perdus, les captifs, les vaincus, ecrit Baudelaire . . . /Ze
cygne7 est 1'ici et le maintenant. cette limite . . . Car cet
acte attendu de la poesie, et enfin accompli par le poete des
2
Fleurs du Mai, est d'abord un acte d'amour. (I , pp. 113-4)
The philosophical background to this assertion is Hegelian: I have already
made clear how ambiguous in Bonnefoy's usage, are the terms 'ici' and
'maintenant'. The emphasis in this passage, however, is placed not on
the philosophical reference (whose implications can lead only to a denial
of the power of language) but on the power of the poetic act to set up
a positive and completely un-philosophical refutation of these impli¬
cations. Here, this poetic power is seen as an expression of love,
and in Baudelaire's case, as in the case of any great poet, the love
of mortal reality, giving a true and immediate apprehension of sub¬
stance, must imply a concomitant apprehension of death: 'Ainsi,
dormant la valeur supreme a ce qui n'est que mortel, dressant les
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§tres dans 1'horizon de la mort et par la mort, je puis bien dire,
je crois, que Baudelaire invente la mort, ayant compris qu'elle
n'est pas cette simple negation de l'Idee au'aimait en secret Racine,
mais un aspect profond de la presence des §tres, en un sens leur
seule realite' (i^, p. 114).
We may try now to define more closely in what sense Bonnefoy considers
that Baudelaire •invents' death. In the first place, Baudelaire was
the first French poet to realise fully the place of death in the
modern consciousness, and to attempt to express this in his writing.
Baudelaire's involvement with death, however, goes deeper than that:
for a mere metaphysical commitment to a certain idea of death would
not of itself be sufficient to guarantee the artistic expression to¬
wards which Baudelaire is striving. The poet must accept death, and
in a real sense participate in its physical reality: 'Je tiens /que
Baudelaire/ a choisi de mourir - d'appeler la mort dans son corps et
de vivre sous sa menace - pour mieux saisir dans sa poesie la nuee
aperpue aux limites de la parole' (i , p. 115)• I &o not claim that
I fully understand this notion. It is perhaps beyond rational compre¬
hension, as it is beyond rational, discursive expression, except
through 'vrai discours', to which I shall return in a moment. But
Baudelaire's periodic obsession with the physical aspects of death
- to which one might perhaps assimilate the obsession with physical
disintegration to be found in some of Bonnefoy's own poetry, especially
for instance in the first section ('Theatre') of Du Mouvement et de
1'iTnmobilite de Douve - and Baudelaire's own consciously anguished
life, as Bonnefoy mahes clear in the later part of his essay on 'Les
Fleurs du mal', are by no means simply symptoms of the morbidity of
a world-weary decadent. They represent, rather, an integration with
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the world: for, in the modern age, death seems to he the only
true transcendental experience, the only valid contact with the usually
inaccessible and inexpressible Here and How, and in a sense the only
point at which man can truly experience reality directly, rather than
some idea or shadow of reality, whether attained through art or other¬
wise. In the lowest depths of contact with death, Baudelaire, in
Bonnefoy's view, sees hope, precisely because of this contact:
Bans TJn voyage "k Cythfere. dans La Charogne ou TJne martyre,
il est stir qu'l, propos des choses les plus horribles, des
plus cruels manquements de 1'etre dans 1'existence, ce
poete fait montre d'une ardente joie sans sadisme, non
exclusive de la pitie la plus grave - de l'energie d'un
commencement. . . Baudelaire . . . semble entrevoir une
lueur et identifier S, un Bien, malgre sa precarite pro-
2
fonde, 1'objet mortel. (i , p. 115-6)
But how, we may ask, can the poet express the experience of death in
truly valid poetic language? - for it would appear that the notion
of expressing physical existence in the moment of death, the Here and
How, could lead only to silence or - perhaps the other side of the
same coin - to a blind invocation in which the word (or the Word)
would bring about an apocalypse: something perilously close, in fact,
to Mallarme's Livre whose possibility, as we have seen, Bonnefoy
explicitly rejects. But here, Bonnefoy claims, lies Baudelaire's
true achievement. Having fully accepted, and participated in, the
reality of death, he can talk from the centre of death itself, and
not in the language of remote, separated description, but through a
spiritually validated 'verite de parole', or 'vrai discours': 'Mort,
deja mort, deja celui qui est mort dans un ici et un maintenant,
Baudelaire n'a plus besoin de decrire un ici et un maintenant. II
est en eux, et sa parole les porte' (I , p. 115). This is, of course,
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an echo of the quotation from Hegel which Bonnefoy uses as an epigraph
for Du. Mouvement et de l'immobilite de Douve and it is interesting
that he associates it here with the other Hegelian notion he most
frequently evokes, that of the Here and Now. The passage therefore
suggests, if it does not explicitly state, that the death through
which Baudelaire can become articulate is at the same time the life
of the spirit which exists within death itself. Bonnefoy does state
this explicitly elsewhere, in connection with poetic articulacy, when
he says 'La verite de parole . . . est la vie de 1'esprit, et non plus
^ 2
decrite mais en acte' (i , p. 29). If the symbol for this life of the
spirit must be something fleeting, 1'ephem^re. the poet, working within
'verite de parole' or 'vrai discours', can at least talk about 1'ephemere
in coherent language, rather than try to conjure it up through some form
of incoherent invocation.
It may be worth noting in passing that the notion of the validation of
a writer's work through the commitment in some sense of his whole being
rather than simply through his devotion to literature as one activity
among others, which Bonnefoy sees in different ways in Baudelaire and
Mallarme, may be seen in a wider context as one of the main ways in
which the modern artist may achieve integrity in a world without accepted
spiritual values. Erich Heller, for instance, draws attention to Kafka's
denial that he was 'interested in literature': 'I have no literary interest,
but am made of literature, I am nothing else and cannot be anything else.'^"^
Through the idea of 'vrai discours', Bonnefoy seeks to explain why Baudelaire,
while expressing a completely new mode of poetic experience, is not one
of French poetry's technical innovators: 'Pour l'essentiel de leur forme,
(l) Kafka, letter to Felice Bauer, 14 August 1913• Quoted in Erich
Heller, Kafka (London, 1974)> P» 62.
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Les Fleurs du mal appartiennent au discours. . . Qu'a invente
Baudelaire, dans l'art, qui le distingue de Hugo? . . . Telle est
1'enigme de Baudelaire. Le discours, ce lieu verbal que Mallarme
voulut fuir, ce lieu trop frequente de notre tradition poetique,
reste le sien' (i2, p. 5l)» Here 'discours', taken at its face
value, bears much the same stigma as 'concept', or, in 'Les tombeaux
de Eavenne', 'ornement'. But just as 'ornement' can be redeemed,
and participate fully in presence through its identification with
the substance of stone, so can 'discours' be redeemed if it comes
from a poet who has identified himself with death:
/Ze discours7 est lie au concept, qui cherche dans 1'essence
des choses qu'elles soient stables et s&res, et purifiees du
neant . . . le discours est menteur parce qu'il 8te du monde
une chose: la mort, et qu'ainsi il annule tout. . .
S'il n'y a pas de poesie sans discours - et Mallarme lui-meme
l'avoue - comment, done, en sauver la verite, la grandeur
sinon par un appel a la mort? Par 1'exigence t§tue que la
mort soit dite; ou mieux encore, qu'elle parle? Mais pour
cela il faut d'abord denoncer joies ou souffranees reconnues.
Puis, que celui qui parle s'identifie & la mort.
Baudelaire a fait ce pas improbable, (i2, pp. 51-2)
Baudelaire's avoidance of the facile rhetoric normally imposed by
discursive language does not, in other words, lead him into a refined
and purified form of language whose only coherent development must
lead to silence. Instead, he can use discourse, but, because of his
personal identification with death, the discourse itself is transfigured.
Thus, miraculously, the metaphysical validity of the principe d'identite
is not compromised by the poet's articulacy. Bonnefoy develops a
similar idea much later, in his essay on Jouve, of whom he says: 'le
premier ou presque apres Baudelaire et Rimbaud . . . il a su, il a dft,
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parler, dans une societe d'esprits trop subtils que l'art, les
prestiges de l'oeuvre elaboree, prise comme fin - I'eternel mallarneisme
- intimident' (HR, p. 235)• Later,Bonnefoy talks of the possibility
that poetry should 'rompre avec le silence, en bref, approcher,
grace & des mots dftment verifies, et pourtant ordinaires, quotidiens,
de la presence d'autrui, refuser et non plus vouloir les ambiguStes,
affirmer le simple: c'est tout de meme bien plus, cela resonne plus
haut que la creation de quelque nouvel univers' (l\ER, p. 236).
¥e may note that Bonnefoy's later theory, representing a simplification
of his earlier entanglement with the labyrinthine ambiguities of
existence and essence, finds here a more satisfactory formulation of
the possibility of, and necessity for, coherent poetic discourse than
is found in the idea of the poet's identification with death, as ex¬
pressed in'Les Bleurs du mal' and 'L'Acte et le lieu de la poesie'.
At the same time, as I have pointed out earlier, it was probably
necessary for Bonnefoy to work his way through the difficulties of
his earlier criticism before he could attain the relative directness
of assertion of, for example, his essay on Jouve. This directness,
concealing as it does a long process of intellectual self-questioning*
makes possible a critical language much more adequate to its object
than the earlier criticism which it transcends; and from this point
of view Bonnefoy's later work - certainly in L'Arriere-pays, Le Ifiiage
rouge and Bans le leurre du seuil - represents less than ever a rigid
division between creative writing and criticism, these being simply
different facets of a homogeneous literary enterprise. In his recent
work, in fact, Bonnefoy may himself be said to have attained a kind
of 'vrai discours' in which many of the dualities which, though always
fiercely struggled against, lay behind his earlier writings, have been
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reconciled, and what he calls in one of the poems of Pierre ecrite
'le sens mysterieux de ce qui n'est que simple' (P, p. 211) can be
validly expressed.
Such speculations are not strictly relevant to this study, which
relates principally to Bonnefoy's criticism up till 1967. They may,
however, serve, in the context of our consideration of his view of
Baudelaire to clarify what Bonnefoy means by the idea of 'vrai discours'
arising from Baudelaire's identification with death - an idea whose
apparent mysticism, as formulated in the essay called 'Les Pleurs du
mal', may in fact derive too directly from an attempt to fit too neatly
into a conceptual dialectic of existence and essence the insight set
out by Hegel which, Bonnefoy elsewhere insists, is, taken on its own,
the reverse of conceptual.
We may now go on to consider Bonnefoy's view of Rimbaud, which is less
clear-cut than his view of Baudelaire, perhaps because he is less ex¬
clusively concerned with situating Rimbaud within the development,
as he sees it, of the French poetic tradition. His book on Rimbaud
par lui-meme seeks primarily to consider Rimbaud's poetic output in
relation to his personal experience, and provides an interpretation
which explains Rimbaud's abandonment of poetry through the notion
that poetry was only one,though certainly one of the most important,
of the means by which he sought to transform life - the others being
such agents for the exploration and distortion of conscious experience
as alcohol, drugs, sexual dissipation and alchemy.
Although the biographical element is predominant in Bonnefoy's treat¬
ment of Rimbaud - and indeed Rimbaud is probably farther than any of
the other poets Bonnefoy deals with from being in any sense a seeker
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after a purely literary absolute - it is clear that Rimbaud represents
yet another attempt on the part of the modern consciousness to'^ebauche^7
1'acte vraiment moderne, qui est de vouloir fonder une vie "divine"
sans Dieu' (Rbd, p. 114). But this project which, as we have seen,
involves some contact with, and expression of, ^experience of "presence,
normally in the guise of l'ephemere, requires also an act of love on
the part of whoever undertakes it: and this is the point at which,
according to Bonnefoy, biographical considerations particularly affect
Rimbaud's case. Rimbaud was deprived of love as a child, and this con¬
tributed to the particular form of his inability fully to grasp reality,
and at the same time death: 'Rimbaud etait moins savant que Baudelaire,
moins chimiste, je veux dire moins pres du reel et de savoir le jauger
dans sa transparence profonde, parce qu'on l'avait au coeur de 1'enfance
* # * 2
depossede de 1'amour' (i , p. 117). The fault in this case lay with
Rimbaud's mother:
Rimbaud n'a jamais recherche 1'amour qu'en pressentant son echec.
II y a enfin, quand l'on a faim et soif, quelqu'un qui vous chasse.
Telle est la fin d'une reverie, dans un poeme des Illuminations
dont le titre est d'ailleurs Enfance. Elle semble temoigner d'une
violence subie, d'une frustration jamais oubliee - et ce sont
celles, je crois, que Mine Rimbaud a infligees h, son fils. Elle
l'a chasse, par le peu d'amour, du pays ou vivre. (Rbd, pp. 14-15)
This interpretation of Rimbaud's life leads on to the suggestion that
the regeneration, or rediscovery, of love as a valid 'ephemeral' ex¬
perience lay at the centre of his poetic quest, but that this quest
could never be successful: 'Le genie de Rimbaud, cette energie, cette
hate, aura ete avant tout - je l'ai suggere - d'essayer d'accomplir
la reinvention du pouvoir d'aimer avant que, terriblement vite, il
ne soit pour toujours trop tard' (Rbd, p. 166). The emphasis on a
fairly detailed kind of biographical criticism may seem surprising
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in a critic like Bonnefoy who is normally concerned, admittedly in a
rather circumlocutory and reluctant way, with philosophical problems.
We have seen, however, that in the cases of Mallarme and Baudelaire
Bonnefoy emphasises the importance of their different personal modes
of commitment to art: and Bonnefoy's claim that the artist must he
concerned with reality, however tortuous may he the approaches to
reality forced on him hy the modern consciousness, implies that
biographical details of an artist*s life may he of crucial importance
for the work he produces. Given that presence is hoth an experience
of reality and an act of love (among other things), it follows that
Rimbaud's inability to accept the experience of love is an obstacle
to his poetic project; and inasmuch as that poetic project must,
like all others which come 'apres les dieux* (i , p. 107)» seek to
attain a true relationship both with reality and with death, that
other element in the experience of presence, Rimbaud was deprived
of that also: 'Qui est prive, comme Rimbaud, de 1'amour est aussi
prive de la mort' (Rbd, p. 121). To return to the question of the
poet's contact with the real world, in the comparison Bonnefoy draws
between Rimbaud and Saint-John Perse as poetic evokers of 'le souvenir chaleur
put de leurs premieres annees' (l^,p.22l), he contrasts Perse's success in
maintaining contact with the immediacy and joyfulness of a child's
experience of the presence, in the full sense of the word, of the
natural world, with Rimbaud's failure: '^Bimbaud/ n'a pas su vivre
au gre de cette nature, dont pourtant il se souvenait . . . il ne
reussit pas a l'evoquer dans ce qu'elle a d'heureux et de simple,
tatonnant presque toujours en depa ou au-dela de cette presence proche,
intensementpressentie, mais qui ne cessait de se derober' (MR, p. 222).
We must not conclude from this, however, that Bonnefoy considers
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Rimbaud's poetic project to have produced only negative results.
On the contrary, his failure, if we have any right to call it that,
is immensely valuable in that, like Mallarme's failure in a different
and perhaps less poetically central domain - that of the exploration
of the pure possibilities of language - it demonstrates convincingly,
through the very intensity with which the project is undertaken,
the inevitable limits of any poetic enterprise. Rimbaud himself
realised this when he abandoned literature, even if this solution
can only be justified, again, by the intensity and extreme seriousness
of his attempt to transform life. This confirms Bonnefoy's repeated
assertion of the principle that poetry and the poetic quest, of
themselves, can never constitute an absolute: 'Rous devons /a Rimbaud7
de savoir, de savoir vraiment que la poesie doit etre un moyen et
non une fin, nous lui devons I'immensite de 1'exigence possible,
cette revendication, cette soif qui d'ailleurs ont tant effraye'
(I2, p. 117).
A project for the transformation of life itself, and particularly
one which aims to use poetry as a means for this transformation,
must develop a deeply ambiguous attitude towards the perennial pro¬
blems of existence and essence. Although these poles can never be
fully reconciled, and certainly never reconciled by a process of
conceptualisation, the poetic consciousness engaged in such a project
must strive towards some unsatisfactory double formulation. Rimbaud's
ultimate failure to grasp existence in its only truly poetic form,
1'ephemere - whether or not this failure can be satisfactorily ex¬
plained by reference to the poet's having been deprived of love -
nevertheless implies a thorough and anguished exploration of what
Bonnefoy elsewhere calls 'les surgissements et mutations du regard
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premier sur la salamandre' (i , p. 263). Bonnefoy attempts a des¬
cription of this, for Rimbaud's case, in his essay on Rimbaud
Perse:
En verite, l'oeuvre de Rimbaud a trait admirablement a
1'existence, si par ce mot 1'on peut suggerer l'eternel
porte—a-faux de la loi dans le monde des appetits, de la
valeur dans celui du fait. Elle est aussi une experience
de l'etre, puisque 1'homme exile au pays du bien et du ma.l
a pour fatalite de faire de sa personne, unicite de fait,
dimension autre que le devenir naturel, le miroir ou l'appel
d'une transcendance, et done de designer celle-ci, a travers
la trame du visible. Mais rien ne ressemble moins que ces
grands poemes l'objet qu'ils ont tant cherche, tant aime et
jamais saisi, sauf tres furtivement dans Larme ou dans Michel
et Christine, quand la venue de l'orage en bouleverse 1'aspect:
l'univers naturel, cette profusion et ce flux dont les
t!
religions archaiques avaient su ebaucher le livre sacre.
(MR, p. 223)
In Bonnefoy's view, therefore, Rimbaud's poetry reflects existence
only through a kind of essence. But, as Bonnefoy points out in 'La
Poesie franpaise et le principe d'identite', Rimbaud was nevertheless
aware of existence itself in the form of 1'ephemera as given, random
and insignificant reality, however great his difficulties in finding
poetic expression for that awareness. Prom the encounter with such
ephemeres as Rimbaud lists in 'Alchimie du verbe' can come 'le
surgissement d'une presence, soit faste, soit malefique, avec en tout
cas "1'epouvante" que fait naltre dans la conscience la proximite du
sacre' (I2, p. 264). This contact with reality is poetic experience
at its most intense, though perhaps also at its most fragmented and
inexplicable, without any veil of conceptualisation to mask its
power: 'En somme, le texte mediocre ou 1'image pauvre ont joue le
meme r61e que 1'objet soudain vu, avant que sa signification ne
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l'occulte, ou des que celle-ci, decomposee, le deserte: et pour un
adolescent, perdu ici ou la dans le desert du concept, c'est toute
l'identite exterieure, a son plus vide, qui brusquement se transmute
(I2, pp. 264-5).
Here we catch a glimpse, once again, of the ambiguous quality of the
princine d'identite: I'identite conceptuelle', as Bonnefoy calls it
a little later, may suddenly be transformed into 'l'identite absolue'
under the pressure of poetic experience. Although Bonnefoy says little
here about Rimbaud's language as such, he describes his poetic experience
sufficiently completely to make it clear that this experience is of
a kind intrinsically capable of poetic expression, even if the poet,
being deprived of love, is prevented from ever in fact expressing
fully and simply his vision of natural unity. In any case, the intensity
and seriousness of his enterprise, both on the level of poetry and on
that of human experience, and his rejection of any insufficient real¬
isation of that enterprise - even if this means rejecting poetry itself
- put him, among modern French poets, on a level with Baudelaire and
with no other. 'What Bonnefoy says about Rimbaud may sometimes appear
awkward and occasionally self-contradictory - perhaps because his main
essay on Rimbaud, Rimbaud par lui-meme, was written for a more popular
market than most of his other criticism, and probably to a pre-set
formula to fit the series in which it takes its place - but this in
itself is an indication of how uncomfortably Rimbaud's work fits into
the categories set out - whether deliberately or not - by Bonnefoy's
early criticism, and to that extent of the uniqueness of his vision
and the genuineness of its poetic realisation.
The moderns: Perse, du Bouchet and others
We have already seen how unequivocal is Bonnefoy's rejection of Valery.
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While it would be an exaggeration to say that his doubts extend to
most poetry since Eimbaud, it is nevertheless true that Bonnefoy, for
one reason or another, has not considered the work of his contemporaries
and immediate predecessors in anything like the same detail, or within
the same terms of reference, as he has dealt with the work of earlier
poets. His reticence may stem from a certain unwillingness to define
his poetic stance too precisely in direct comparison with his contemp¬
oraries: and this is not a simple recoil from possibly disagreeable
confrontation, but rather a reflection of his distrust of conceptual
discussion, which in this case could too easily degenerate into the
personalised polemics of literary politics, as a vehicle for saying
anything truly meaningful about poetry. It should be clear from what
has gone before that Bonnefoy's theory of poetry is in no possible
sense an ideology, and that any attempt to make it into one would
inevitably betray its central focus. Doubtless, there are contemporary
and recently deceased poets of whose work Bonnefoy disapproves just
as strongly as he disapproves of Valery's, and others whom he admires
greatly: but his response to direct questions on recent poets who have
influenced him tends to be expressed in general terms, as in his
interview with Georges Piroue:
- J'aime Sceve et Eacine; Baudelaire, Mallarme.
- Et plus pres de nous?
- Tous ceux qui s'efforcent de donner a la langue poetique franpaise
une obscurite essentielle, appelee de toujours par sa nettete.
II y a une vocation poussinienne de notre langue, et sa rigueur
peut la mener loin, pour peu qu'on ait le courage d'aimer cette
nuit qui est dans le jour.^"^
This remark is interesting in itself, but still avoids naming any
particular contemporaries. To my suggestion that L'Eqhemere (of which
(l) 'Yves Bonnefoy ou l'acte de degager la presence dans 1'absence',
Mercure de Prance 533 (June 1958), p. 5^6.
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Bonnefoy was an editor throughout its period of publication from 1966
to 1972) might have been intended in some sense as a reply to a certain
prevailing literary and critical orthodoxy, represented par excellence
by Tel Quel (published since i960) and the Tel Quel group of writers,
Bonnefoy replied by denying any intention that L'Ephemere should be
a polemical instrument (which indeed it is not), but preferred to call
(2)
it 'un document d'existence'.v This would seem to confirm his
general attitude of reluctance to enunciate a poetic programme in
conceptual terms, and his preference for more indirect methods of
indicating the ways in which he considers French poetry should develop;
these methods of course include critical studies of, and references to,
the works of earlier poets.
He has, however, indicated a general opinion in 'L'Acte et le lieu de
la poesie':
il n'est pas vrai que la poesie qui a succede a Rimbaud et
Baudelaire ait compris leur probleme ou perpetue leur esprit.
Tout s'est passe, au contraire, comme si elle avait eu peur;
. . . il y aura chez les plus brillants poetes de notre epoque
a la fois un pessimisme et un scepticisme, et le desir d'une
discipline pour se retraire de ce qui est. La demeure si
vaine, l'abandonnee de Baudelaire, est habitee \ nouveau.
Mais ce n'est plus cette fois, c'est moins que jamais pour y
SG
sauver 1'existence, c'est pour sauver d'elle dans un acte de
pure forme, secretement immobile, ce que je veux nommer la
2
mauvaise mort. (i , pp. 117-8)
The 'mauvaise mort' to which Bonnefoy refers here is any kind of
approach to reality which tries to account for death, modern man's
central preoccupation, by bypassing it, or by accepting any ready-made
explanation for it short of seeing it, as Bonnefoy does, as the
inevitable and omnipresent corollary of existence itself. The way
(2) in conversation, Nice, 14 May 1975«
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in which this 'mauvaise mort' is to be found in Valery - who, along
with Claudel 'cadenasse dans l'orthodoxie avec la liste des choses'
(i , p. 118), is the only poet whom Bonnefoy refers to by name in
this context - is made clear in the essay on Valery himself, when
Bonnefoy says: 'Mais Valery n'a pas su qu'on avait invente la mort.
. . . II se complait dans un monde d'essences ou rien ne nait ni ne
meurt, ou les choses durent sans accident, quitte a ne pas vraiment
* \ * 2
etre, de simples peintures legeres sur 1'opacite d'une nuit' (I , p. 99)«
And this, as we have seen, is analogous to the faulty view of poetic
language to which, in Bonnefoy's opinion, Valery subscribes.
Bonnefoy's opinion of surrealism, referred to in 'L'Acte et le lieu
de la poesie' only as '1'impossible desir surrealiste . . . d'une
invention collective' (i , p. 118), is developed further in a short
essay contributed to Yale French Studies in 1964. Se pays tribute
to the visionary nature of the surrealist image which, in Eluard at
least, seeks 'to give renewed life in /The/ spirit to the profound
unity of the world ... To recreate and multiply the ties existing
among things in order that this unity will again become universally
conceivable. [The surreal then becomes nothing other than the real
seen in the perspective of the One'. ^ But Eluard's vision (which
as described here is simply another version of what Bonnefoy sees as
the modern poetic quest par excellence) is only one facet of surrealism:
the other main aspect of the movement, the realisation of which,
Bonnefoy states, led to his own separation from it, was a taste for
nihilism and the abandonment of any notion of transcendence. 'To the
virtual presences of full existence traced in the warlike works of
(3) 'The Peeling of Transcendency', Yale French Studies. 31 (May 19^4)>
p. 135. I have not been able to trace any published French original
of this article: the translation is anonymous.
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the group was opposed the thick and heavy actuality of a had presence:
a world stripped of sense, abandoned to demons whose appearance was
foreign to all our wishes, a world inhabited by nothingness alone.
A later and different formulation of Bonnefoy's criticism of surrealism,
expressed in more personal and positive terms but nevertheless still
focussing on the failure of surrealism in Bonnefoy's view, to grasp
the unity of the world as against some form of dichotomy induced by
an unnecessarily dualistic form of perception, is contained in his
interview with John E. Jackson in L'Arc:
Je dirais maintenant qu'il n'y a pas du reel et du surreel, l'un
que structure et surestime la science, et 1'autre qui la deborde
de ses caracteres irrationnels, perceptibles par l'oeil sauvage
- cela revient k mepriser la table sur laquelle j'ecris, la
pierre informe dans les ravins, au profit du menure-lyre - mais
de la presence, parfois, face aux signifies transitoires de la
pensee conceptuelle
In Bonnefoy's view of surrealism - its great aspiration but its ultimate
failure - we may see how narrow, yet real, is the gap, for the modern
atheistic consciousness, between presence and mauvaise presence. An
orthodox religious consciousness would also, of course, in Bonnefoy's
opinion, fall into mauvaise presence, but in a rather different way,
through its language losing its original spiritual validity and de¬
generating into rhetoric. It is therefore not surprising that Bonnefoy's
positive judgements on the achievements of other modern poets should
be few and far between. In fact, his main essays in this domain published
up till 1967 consist of that on Gilbert Lely in L'Improbable ('La Cent
vingt et unieme journee'), which is concerned with Lely's work on Sade,
and relationship to Sade's ideas, rather than with his poetry; of the
(4) ibid., p. 156.
(5) L'Arc 66 (1976), p.87.
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essay on Seferis in TJn Reve fait a lyiantoue ('Dans la lumiere d'octobre'),
which is a personal tribute rather than a critical essay; of an essay
of 1962 on Andre du Bouchet, which has not been reprinted; and of the
essay on Perse ('L'Illumination et l'eloge') which I have already
quoted in connection with Rimbaud, and which was republished in Le
Euage rouge. The later essays on Jouve, Paul Celan and Georges Henein
republished in Le Euage rouge, and that on Jaccottet,^^ were written
after 19&7 and therefore fall outside the main scope of this study,
though, as I have mentioned in connection with Baudelaire, that on
Jouve at least - along with the other essays collected in Le Phage rouge
- provides an interesting indication of development in Bonnefoy's
critical modes of thought, which I will deal with in a little more
detail later.
It may, however, be worth considering briefly at this point Bonnefoy's
views on Perse and du Bouchet. In his essay entitled 'L'Illumination
et l'eloge', Bonnefoy contrasts Rimbaud's loss of a true consciousness
of the primal unity of childhood experience with Perse's retention of
that consciousness. This means that Perse's poetry can grasp directly
the immediate existence of reality which Rimbaud's always misses:
'c'est soudain comme si l'apparence meme des choses, si profondement
troublee chez Rimbaud, prenait forme avec nettete sur l'ecran de
1'intuition poetique. . . Les mots n'enferment plus l'objet dans la
fonction d'une chose, ils laissent le flux profond en soulever la
figure exactement definie, comme si lui et nous n'etions plus ensemble
qu'un vaste corps respirant' (ER, p. 224). Through language linked
in this way to simple reality, we can attain the experience of unity
which constitutes presence. Perse, in Bonnefoy's view, is xhe most
profound realist in modern French poetry, because of his instinctive
(6) Revue de belles-lettres. Lausanne, 97* 3-4 (1973)> PP* 107-9*
- 148 -
attachment to the whole of reality: the linguistic experience which,
at a shallower level, might lead to the fragmentation of reality into
its mere conceptual aspects, here allows the poet to concentrate his
attention on the immense variety of things which, though considered
as particulars, nevertheless constitute the unity of Perse's 'toutes
choses suffisantes' which Bonnefoy contrasts with Rimbaud's 'nous ne
sommes pas au monde' (MR, p. 227). The quotation from Perse comes
from 'Ecrit sur la porte', the first poem of Eloges^) that from
Rimbaud from 'Delires I' of line Saison en enfer.(^) It may be worth
pointing out the (presumably intentional) echo of the quotation from
Perse in Bonnefoy's own invocation of 'toutes choses simples/Retablies/
Ici et la, sur leurs/Piliers de feu' from Bans le leurre du seuil
(P, p. 278): Bonnefoy, significantly, sees the simple plenitude of
reality as something which must be 'retabli' and which can only be
grasped after a process of intellectual enquiry has been gone through
and discarded, rather than as something with which immediate contact
can be achieved.
Where then, we may ask, are we to situate Perse in the dialectic of
existence and essence which Bonnefoy sees as the context of most modem
poetry? The surprising answer is: nowhere. It seems, indeed, that
Bonnefoy sees Perse's poetic achievement as standing outside the
concerns of poetic modernity, untouched by the philosophical context
in which he places the work of the other poets or, on a religious level,
by the temptations of Christianity and atheistic mysticism, participating,
inasmuch as it has any philosophical background at all, in '1'intuition
"chinoise" d'un infini anime, odorant, gorge de realite comme une mer
poissonneuse', and benefiting from 'le mysterieux privilege d'un autre
(7) Saint-John Perse, Eloges (Paris, i960), p. 12*
(8) Rimbaud, Oeuvres, ed. Bernard (Paris, i960), p. 224.
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enseignement que celui, dualiste, revolutionnaire, blesse, qui enclSt
notre poesie dans ses echecs et sa foi' (HR, p. 228). We may therefore
conclude that Bonnefoy, while fully appreciating Perse's poetic stature,
sees him as having happily avoided, almost by accident, the poetic
problems to which more or less satisfactory solutions can be found
in the works of Eacine, Baudelaire, Mallarme and Eimbaud, and which
Bonnefoy considers to be the central problems facing the modern poet.
This might explain, too, why, in spite of Bonnefoy's admiration for
Perse, he makes no mention of him in his general essays on poetry,
but deals with his work only in this single essay whose main thrust
is the comparison with Eimbaud. The implication of this rather per¬
functory treatment of Perse would, in fact, seem to be that the modern
French poet must participate in a conscious and anguished exploration
of the dialectic of existence and essence: a poet who bypasses that
dialectic, no matter how magnificent his achievement, is to be con¬
sidered as being outside the mainstream of French poetic development.
We may take this as indicating a limitation in Bonnefoy's critical
approach, another complementary facet of which can be seen in his
treatment of the quite different case of Andre du Bouchet. Bonnefoy
sees in du Bouchet's work an attempt to grasp 1'ephemere through a
reduction of experience to a few pure essences which sum up and replace
'la dispersion et 1'opacite du reel'.^^ The apparent coldness and
impersonality of du Bouchet's poetry are essential to a poetic vision
which, in contrast to Eluard's 'vie immediate', seeks to redeem reality
through a true grasp of what lies behind reality: ' "Ta tete se r.etourne, -
le nouvel amourI" ecrit Eimbaud dans les Illuminations. Andre du
Bouchet a fait sienne l'idee de cette phrase admirable, "tournant la
tete" vers le non-vu, le non-compris, le non-su pour fonder un nouveau
(9) 'La Poesie d'Andre du Bouchet', Critique 18 (April 1962), p. 296.
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savoir sur la presence sauvee.'The asceticism of this concern
with, so to speak, the reverse side of reality is reflected in du
Bouchet's bleak and windswept typographical arrangements: 'la typo¬
graphic de ces derniers livres a pour fonction d'attenuer les
pouvoirs ordinaires du langage, qui ne sont qu'illusion pour qui
recherche la poesie.'^ ^
Bonnefoy is careful, however, not to claim that in his search for
poetic purity du Bouchet has abandoned all contact with reality. On
the contrary, 'il aime le pain et le vin de 1'antique intuition
rituelle et toutes choses reelles. Je veux dire: dans leur substance,
loin de la jouissance moderne des qualites et des debilitants
* (12)esthetismes.'^ On the evidence of this essay, du Bouchet emerges
as the poet of l'ephemere par excellence. We may, however, wonder
whether his poetry does not fit - or whether Bonnefoy does not fit
his poetry - rather too easily into these categories: for the possi-
(15)
bility of the true expression of 'le bref instant d'une foudre'v
is rather more problematical than this essay implies, as indeed
Bonnefoy consistently makes clear elsewhere. His assertion of du
Bouchet's achieved contact with 'toutes choses reelles' does not sit
very happily with his description in the rest of the essay of du
Bouchet's delimitation of reality.
We may perhaps see in the essay on du Bouchet an example of the ex¬
position of a poet's intention rather than the criticism of his
actual achievement. In Bonnefoy's development of the idea of 'vrai
discours' in relation to Baudelaire, in his more recent praise of
Jouve '/qui/ a su, /qui/ a dtt, parler' (KR, p. 255), and indeed in his
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own poetic practice, he recognises that there is a certain contact
with the living foundations of ordinary experience and ordinary dis¬
course which the poet must retain, however debased he may consider
the medium of language as such. If Bonnefoy's reference to du
Bouchet's use of 'le non-vu, le non-compris, le non-su' recalls his
invocation in other contexts, perhaps, as I have suggested earlier
(PP-B7-8), in echo of Rilke, of '1'invisible', we must remember that
'1'invisible . . . n'est pas la disparition, mais la delivrance du
visible' ('I , p. 250), and that an over-ascetic concern for a
Mallarmean 'notion pure' may lead the poet to lose contact with that
reality which, in Bonnefoy's aesthetic, it is his function to communi¬
cate, however roundabout the means of any true communication must be.
I would suggest, therefore, that Bonnefoy assimilates du Bouchet
rather too easily into certain pre-established categories. He may
indeed be dissatisfied with the essay, since he has not reprinted it.
In any case, it adds little to what we have already discovered of
his overall aesthetic. Before summing up what one may call, for
want of a better term, his poetic theory, we may find it worth while
to consider his views on Shakespeare, on translation and on literary
criticism, a somewhat mixed bag of subjects bound together by their
common origin in Bonnefoy's experience as a translator from English
into French. This may add something to our understanding of his
literary theory, and of his remarks on the differences between the
French and English languages on which I have already commented.
XVT Shakespeare and the possibility of translation
We may first of all consider Bonnefoy's approach to a single play
of Shakespeare's - Julius Caesar. In his essay entitled 'Be la Rome
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troublee a la conscience elisabethaine' published in the Cahiers
Renaud-Barrault in 1960^^ Bonnefoy rejects the idea that Julius
Caesar is primarily a political play, concerned either with the historical
concepts of tyranny and republicanism in Rome itself, or with the
discussion of the nature of power in more general terms, informed
consciously or unconsciously by the Elizabethan world-view. Bonnefoy
sees Julius Caesar rather as a confrontation between two philosophical
notions of order, which bear a strange resemblance to presence and
mauvaise presence, and, later in the play, as the redemption of the
less valid of the two through the transformation and self-sacrifice
of Brutus, which thus - not unlike Roland in Bonnefoy's interpretation
of the Chanson - becomes within the play a kind of redemptory absolute
akin, in poetic terms, to the experience of 1'ephemere.
This, however, is not a completely adequate formulation of Bonnefoy's
view of the play: for the order represented by Caesar himself, which
at the beginning of the play at least is more metaphysically valid
than the challenge made to it by Brutus, is nevertheless fragile,
failing as it does to take account cf the dark forces which exist along¬
side it. Coming as a mysterious, non-conceptual threat, (compare,
from 'Les Tombeaux de Ravenne', Bonnefoy's questions *Y a-t-il un
concept d'un pas venant dans la nuit, d'un cri, de l'eboulement d'une
pierre dans les broussailles? Be 1'impression que fait une maison
Q
vide?' (i , p. 13) ) 'la voix sacree du devin decentre brusquement le
reel', and, like any representative of a kind of stability which
cannot allow for change, Caesar 's'est identifie avec l'ordre, mais
la tenebre est en lui'(RTCE, p.7)« This 'tenebre' is symbolised on
stage, on a personal level by Caesar's epilepsy, and on the public
(l) Cahiers Renaud-Barrault 30 (i960), pp. 3-16.
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level by the storm. Brutus's challenge to the order represented by
Caesar, however, is not that of the existence of individual humanity,
which might come to redeem a metaphysically bankrupt stability. It
is itself rather an idealised form of order, which would purge the
order it challenges of any non-rational elements, and which is there¬
fore even further removed from reality than what Caesar represents.
It is 'une vision de l'ordre, identifie a la republique, et refusant
d'appeler reel ce qui est en dehors de cette loi' (RTCE, p. 8).
Both Caesar and, to a greater extent, Brutus, are therefore unaware
of the dark forces surrounding them - Tle neant' which is at the
same time substantive existence, beyond the grasp either of any
imposed order or of any abstract idea. The murder of Caesar liberates
these forces of chaos, for the destruction of a possibly valid order
cannot be succeeded by the true establishment of an order which, in
its conception (or conceptualisation), is a pure abstraction: 'la
violence abstraite de Brutus est le dangereux essai de fonder, par un
coup d'etat aussi bien metaphysique que politique, le regne de
1'intelligible sur ce qui est' (RTCE, p. 10). And the murder itself,
the revelation of the existence of death outside any notion of order,
makes the murderers, despite themselves, into 'les pretres d'un
epouvantable sacre' (RTCE, p. 11).
From this point onwards the balance of the play changes. The chaos
in which the action takes place favours the emergence of Antony, and
his victory over the 'rationalist' Brutus:
Ainsi Antoine, un debauch!, aux plaisirs bas, aux compagnons
obscurs, l'homme de tous les desordres, de la ruse, mais sans
doute aussi de 1' amour,comprend immediatement la nouvelle
necessite, naturelle et non plus civique, et avec une vraie
ardeur, confirmant la parent! de la sophistique et de l'etre,
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il met sa parole au service de la destruction qu'il avait
predite. (RTCE, p. 11)
We may note the mention of love, and remember its importance as an
element in presence; for Antony here is seen as a kind of agent for
presence within the chaos of existence itself. But the true message
of the play, in Bonnefoy's view, does not lie in this victory of
Antony, considered outside any notion of order, "but in the trans¬
formation wrought in Brutus at the end of the play. In this trans¬
formation Caesar's ghost, bringing as it does the echo of a previously-
established true order which Brutus has destroyed, forces Brutus into
a realisation of existence, and simultaneously into a realisation of
the necessity for personal sacrifice as the only possible guarantee
for personal existence. Existence is redeemed through essence, rather
than essence being redeemed through Antony's simple affirmation of
existence. Thus Brutus becomes the true tragic hero: and one is
reminded of Roland (although Roland's sacrifice redeems the more valid,
rather than the less valid, of the two conceptions of order at work
in the Chanson). 'Et, de fait, la fin de Jules Cesar est la derniere
et la plus profonde des mutations operees par le meurtre de Cesar:
l'eveil metaphysique d'une §me, la conversion de Brutus' (RTCE, p. 14)•
At the end of the play, Brutus stands as pre-eminently an individual
- a kind of ephemere bearing witness to existence, and to 'la solitude
de 1'homme dans la misere et la nuit' (RTCE, p. 15).
Bonnefoy's expression of this is not, in fact, very clear, and we may
consider his interpretation of Brutus's function in the play as rather
mysterious. He illuminates it, however, by adding at the end of the
essay a striking comparison between the character of Brutus and
Shakespeare's own poetic and dramatic development. Brutus undergoes
a transformation similar to that which led Shakespeare to write the
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play itself. The passage must "be quoted at length:
Comme ^Brutus/7 a I'acte premier, Shakespeare a peut-etre voulu
lutter, par un projet rationnel, contre un trouble a demi
conscient. Comme lui, peut-etre fut-il l'homme fascine par
une presence obscure et qui croit la conjurer a jamais dans
I'acte fatal qui va le placer au contraire en son pouvoir.
Au meurtre de Cesar pour Brutus correspond chez Shakespeare
1'entreprise et le devenir de la tragedie qui l'evoque. Et
Brutus et Shakespeare se voient tous deux condamnes au savoir
de la precarite, de la finitude et de la mort. (RTCE, p. 15)
Julius Caesar therefore becomes, in Bonnefoy's view, an allegory,
and at the same time an exemplar, of the creative process at work.
Shakespeare, like Brutus, must go beyond the mere apprehension of
existence represented by Antony, and endow such an apprehension with
the kind of individual humanity which alone can lead to artistic
communication: 'Antoine "connait" l'etre, nous 1'avons vu, et a sa
fapon il est dans la verite. Mais en ne lui opposant pas la pretention
d'§tre une personne, qui ait en soi autonomie et valeur, il n'humanise
pas cette verite, il ne la transcrit pas dans notre langage et ainsi
elle lui echappe' (RTCE, p. 16).
It would be difficult, particularly for a pragmatic British mind, to
assent to everything Bonnefoy says about Julius Caesar: and perhaps
Bonnefoy too has doubts, for he has not reprinted the essay. I have
dealt with it in some detail, however, because it shows Bonnefoy's
critical judgement working in a more concrete context than usual,
with specific reference to a particular play, and because it clearly
represents a critical approach which is a meditation on art in
general through the critic's creative experience of an individual
work, rather than the treatment of a work of art as simply an object
for analysis. We may also note in this essay an early formulation
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of the idea of the work of art as human communication, transcending
the intricacies of the problems of existence and essence - an idea
which, as we have seen, Bonnefoy develops later, particularly in his
essay on Jouve.
Apart from this essay on Julius Caesar, Bonnefoy's writings on
Shakespeare are concerned principally with the problems of translation.
This leads him to formulate, in slightly different terms from those
he uses in fLa Poesie franpaise et le principe d'identite', the
differences between French and English as vehicles for poetry. The
problems of translation, moreover, are closely linked to the problems
of poetry in general. Our consideration of Bonnefoy's views on
Shakespeare will therefore be unable to avoid touching on much wider
subjects.
Bonnefoy sums up his view of Shakespeare by saying, ' je ne vois pas
d'opposition, dans son theatre, entre l'universel et le singulier'
(H, p. 235). He considers that we cannot answer the question of
whether, say, Macbeth or Othello are archetypes or uniquely individual
characters, because 'Shakespeare s'attache aux actes de 1'homme qui
ne sont jamais "singuliers" puisqu'ils participent des categories
universelles de la conscience qui les prepare, mais qui n'atteignent
jamais - meme pas chez Brutus ou Jules Cesar - la plenitude et la
nettete de l'universel, ayant a composer avec 1'irreductible hasard'
(H, pp. 235-6). In Shakespeare, we find 'une observation empirique
de 1'existence de 1'homme, sans prejuge litteraire ou philosophique'
(H, p. 236).
Bonnefoy goes on to consider how this empiricism is particularly suited
to expression in English, and I will return to this. But it may first
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"be worth considering what mode of existence he attributes to Shakespeare's
characters. In the essay on 'Shakespeare et le poete franqais', from
which I have just quoted, they are seen as a unique blend of the par¬
ticular and the universal. We have seen, however, that in his essay
on Julius Caesar Bonnefoy sees the characters - or at least, Brutus
and Antony - as representative of different moments of the poetic
sensibility. This notion is developed somewhat in another essay,
(2)'Comment traduire Shakespeare'^ ' (whose title, uncharacteristically,
carries no subtly ironical question mark). Here, in an essay mainly
concerned with translation, we find some interesting insights into
the nature of Shakespeare's drama, itself. Bonnefoy rejects prose as
a medium for the translation of poetry, because poetry is not an object
divisible into 'form' and 'content', or the simple expression of object¬
ive experience, but rather 'un des actes par quoi une conscience peut
essayer de se desentraver des motivations profanes qui la fragmentent,
pour s'etablir dans ce reseau de significations et de chiffres qui
assurent notre unite. Elle est constitution d'un sacre - et c'est le
vers qui permet cela' (CTS, p. 544)- Shakespeare's characters are
truly poetic in the sense that they arise from elements in the poetic
consciousness which the poet has to live through and overcome:
r (5)
Shakespeare - et je me propose d'y'revenir dans une autre etude
- est un poete exemplaire en ce sens qu'il a imagine ses
principaux personnages non par 1'observation mais par la
projection de soi et le risque: il a vecu chacun d'eux comme
(2) Etudes anglaises 17 (l964)> PP* 541-551*
(3) I have traced no further essay on this subject published since
'Comment traduire Shakespeare'. Bonnefoy's only published work
on Shakespeare since then has been 'La Traduction de Shakespeare'
(Revue d'esthetique 21 (1968), pp. 94-6), which is in fact^only
a resume of a lecture given to the Societe franqaise d'esthetique
on 19 February 1966. In this he does not appear to have added
anything of consequence to what he had already written in the
two essays published with Hamlet, and in 'La Poesie franqaise
et le principe d'identite'.
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la metaphore autonome, vivante, d'une partie de ce qu'il
etait lui-meme en puissance, et, expulsant de soi Othello,
Lear on Macbeth, tous figures de donte on de possession,
c'est-a-dire de donte encore et par consequent de neant,
il s'est gueri de ses tendances mauvaises. Cet immense
theatre n'est que celni d'un Je aux prises avec tons ses
autres. (CTS, pp. 544-5)
This would seem to imply that Shakespeare's work is nothing but an
expression of his own universal imagination, which is true in a sense,
but which misrepresents the very universality of Shakespeare's mind
by suggesting that his characters lack the kind of objective existence
which can find an echo in the human experience of the spectator. At
the end of the essay, however, Bonnefoy modifies his formulation,
claiming that Shakespeare's characters do have a certain autonomous
existence in the theatre, and that it is as a dramatist and as a poet,
through both elements in his artistic make-up, that he achieves a
true representation of universality within particularity. Bonnefoy's
main argument at this point stems from his assertion of the impossibility
of perfect translation - an assertion which, typically, is not based
on the empirical examination of specific linguistic examples, and
the conclusion that they cannot be satisfactorily translated because
of differing connotations, or because of differing social, artistic
or literary contexts. Such a demonstration would imply the treatment
of language as an object of scientific dissection, a process whose
usefulness in this area, and also, as we have abundantly seen, in
the area of the analysis of poetry, Bonnefoy questions. Instead, he
considers that the central difficulty of translation lies in the im¬
possibility, for the translator, of re-living the experience which
gave rise to the original work - indeed, of which the original work,
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in its own linguistic formulation, was a part. He claims, however,
that the specifically dramatic context of Shakespeare's poetry does
leave certain possibilities open to the translator:
Meme si la traduction poetique n'a pas . . . de fondement
assure, il reste qu'une donnee particuliere de la poesie de
Shakespeare vient attenuer le dilemme, et c'est que cette
poesie a pris forme theatrale, c'est-a-dire a mediatise son
intention toujours profondement personnelle dans des figures
reconnaissables par la conscience commune. . . Plorizel,
par exemple, . . . est . . . une figure autonome, incarnant
un des grands moments de 1'experience de tous les hommes,
- c'est une parole, par consequent, que je puis moi aussi
comprendre, et recreer poetiquement. (CTS, p. 551)
We may see, therefore, that Bonnefoy sees universality and particularity
merging on two levels in Shakespeare: firstly, the characters themselves
represent archetypes, but at the same time individuals; secondly, though
the characters are creations coming from Shakespeare's individual poetic
sensibility, they are nevertheless relevant, through their functions
as objective dramatic entities, to universal human experience. These
two levels - which differ in that on one the characters are considered
from the outside, almost as objects of analysis, whereas on the other
they are considered in the context of observer and creator both parti¬
cipating in their existence, an essential preliminary to any reciprocal
manifestation of presence - may nevertheless serve to illuminate each
other, and to explain why Shakespeare's work can be considered as 'la
diversification aux dimensions presque de l'univers . . . d'une conscience
lyrique' (CTS, p. 545).
A further element in Bonnefoy's criticism of Shakespeare is his consid¬
eration of the specific poetic quality of the English language, as
Shakespeare uses it. Defending Shakespeare against Voltaire's charges
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of irregularity and obscurity, Bonnefoy claims that 'Shakespeare est
a la fois desireux d'interioriser le reel (comme La Tempete va etre
si pres d'y reussir) et de sauver la richesse d'une langue qui a des
mots si nombxeux pour dire 1'aspect des choses' (i , p. 256). Here
we see that English, as used by Shakespeare, is not in fact such an
exclusively aspectual language as Bonnefoy sometimes implies elsewhere.
It can also express a deep level of ontological validity through the
aspects themselves which it most immediately grasps, rather than
through the essences to which French must primarily direct its attention.
This, as we have seen, is not unlike the poetic function which Bonnefoy,
through the idea of what I have called 1'ephemere, would like French
to accomplish by even more indirect paths: and this itself is relevant
to his theory of translation as applied to Shakespeare. But the question
of the double nature of English in this respect is worth pursuing a
little further. Talking of Bonne, whose linguistic usage he sees as
equivalent to Shakespeare's, Bonnefoy says:
On le voit s'attacher - scandale pour Eacine, mais presque autant
pour Rimbaud - \ 1'anecdote, cette vision 'exterieure' du fait
humain. Mais c'est pour decouvrir - ironie secrete de la Presence
- que c'est dans notre reaction a 1'inessentiel que notre essence
se manifeste. C'est aussi dans 1'etre qu'il faut by indirections
find directions out, par des voies detournees decouvrir la voie
. . . (I2, p. 257)
This capacity for indirect contact with the essence of things through
their aspects is not, however, the only way in which Bonne's - or
Shakespearefe - English can mediate between the everyday and the sublime.
The grammar of the language itself, Bonnefoy points out, implies an
acceptance of the everyday - 'les substantifs s'effacent devant la chose
qui apparait a nos yeux tout a decouvert, jetee dans son devenir. Les
adjectifs invariables saisissent la qualite comme le ferait un photographe,
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sans poser, comme 1'accord franpais de 1'adjectif et du nom, le
probleme metaphysique du rapport de la qualite et de la substance'
(H, p. 236). The Latin elements in the vocabulary of English, however,
allow direct contact with a more distant realm of being. Discussing
Cleopatra's 'I have / Immortal longings in me',^ which he calls a
'moment absolu de la poesie', Bonnefoy says: 'D'une part 1'anglais
peut saisir le plus concret, le plus immediat, le plus instinctif
de l'acte de l'etre; de 1'autre il garde la ressource - par immortal,
par ce mot qui est pure idee - de decouvrir au coeur meme de cet elan
l'intemporel et l'universel qui sont nos plus pures aspirations'
(H, p. 237).
I have pointed out earlier that Bonnefoy's idea of the nrincine
d'identite as a peculiarly French phenomenon tends to over-simplify
his discussion of English as a language for poetry - and indeed his
discussion of French as well, as when he claims that Baudelaire is
not concerned with capturing existence as such, but with meditating
on 'ce mystere qu'une Idee se soit egaree au sein du monde sensible'
(H, p. 238). Another example of this is his qualification of the
statement about English quoted above, when he says:
L'anglais s'est propose pour fin 1'aspect tangible des choses.
. . . Et si ses mots d'origine latine troublent un peu cette
decision philosophique, . . . ils permettent simplement de
mieux exprimer, par exemple, ces moments de notre existence
dh. 1'ideal nous conduit. . . la langue anglaise nous dit que
1'immortalite, que cette Idee, en un sens existe bien, qu'il
est veridique et noble d'en parler; mais qu'elle n'est que
notre pulsion, notre creation volontaire. (H, pp. 236-7)
This kind of statement seems to be based on too hasty a presupposition
(4) Shakespeare, Antony and Cleopatra, ed. M E. Ridley (The Arden
Shakespeare, 1954)» "7: ii: 279-80.
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about the intrinsic nature of individual languages, when, as I have
already pointed out (see above, pp. 78-9 ) the comparison that
Bonnefoy is at pains to make in his essay on 'Shakespeare et le poete
franpais', of English with a mirror and of French with a sphere, holds
good only for the poetic tendencies of the two languages. Certainly,
in the case of Cleopatra's 'immortal longings', it would be unduly
restrictive to deny 'immortal' its full connotations of idealism,
although we must recognise that the poetic force of the phrase comes
from this idealism's close association with the concrete and human
immediacy of 'longings'.
Bonnefoy, in fact, may be inclined to see too great a qualitative
difference between English and French - perhaps under the influence
of his experience of translating Shakespeare, or of translations into
(5)
English of his own works. Be has saidv ' that such translations of
his poetry prompted the remarks on French and English in *La Poesie
franpaise et le principe d'identite': and it is understandable that
the impossible quest for exact verbal equivalents between the two
languages should support his theories on the irreconcilable nature
of their underlying ways of grasping reality. It is certainly true
that French can give poetic force to abstractions in a way that
English cannot. Talking of Bacine, whose use of French shows this
feature in the clearest possible way, Bonnefoy remarks: 'Imagine-t-on
ce qu'il resterait en anglais, ou dans beaucoup d'autres langues,
du Sortezl crie par Roxane dans Bajazet? Cette parole redoutee,
par laquelle elle acheve de se separer du monde sensible, cette
parole metaphysique serait en grand risque de devenir un vulgaire
"coup de theatre" ' (H, pp. 241-2). On the other hand, even when
(5) In conversation, Nice, 14 May 1975.
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Racine names the humblest of objects, the abstraction inherent in
French prevents them from compromising the elevated tone of his
verse. I am indebted to Bonnefoy for this example from Berenice:
Vous seul, seigneur, vous seul, une echelle a la main,
Vous portates la mort jusque sur leurs murailles.^
A literal translation into English would mate the first line sound
ridiculous, and the second stilted and over-literary, because English
must present the concrete object with an immediacy lacking in French,
while the abstract conception cannot automatically find a place even
within poetic discourse in English - although in this particular case
the problem is distorted, since seventeenth-century English poetic
diction could tolerate such abstract personifications more easily
than modern poetic diction.
In the case, however, of a common French word like 'boire',Bonnefoy
claims that we are dealing with a 'mot profond' 'qui exprime un acte
essentiel, /et qui/ ne pourra que garder, au plus desabuse d'une vie,
^ 2
sa capacite d'absolu' (i , p. 254)• 'Boire' is an image of consider¬
able importance in Bonnefoy's work, as may be seen, for instance,
in the image of acceptance in 'Deux Couleurs' (Dans le leurre du
seuil): 'Bois, me dis-tu pourtant, / Au sens qui reve.// Bois, je
suis l'eau, br&lee,/ . . . Bois, en reflet.// . . . J'ai confiance,
je bois:'(P. p. 257). The difficulty of translation into English
is summed up in Bonnefoy's remark in conversation that with the word
'drink', 'on voit deja le verre'. We may see the justice of this
in, for instance, Anthony Rudolf's translation of 'buvant le noir'
in the second poem of 'Be Dialogue d'angoisse et de desir' as
(6) Racine. Berenice. Act 1 scene 3. in Theatre comnlet, ed. Rat,
(Paris, I960), p. 306.
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•drinking blackness'. '
In translation from English to French, conversely, some degree of
particularity may be lost. We may cast a glance at Bonnefoy's own
translation of Hamlet. In his first speech Polonius says:
The friends thou hast, and their adoption tried,
Grapple them to thy soul with hoops of steel,
But do not dull thy palm with entertainment
Cs)Of each new-hatch'd, unfledged comrade. '
Bonnefoy renders this as:
Les amis que tu as, une fois eprouves,
Enclos-les dans ton ame avec des barres de fer,
Mais n'use pas tes mains a bien accueillir
Le premier blanc-bec un peu matamore. (H, p. 39)
Here Bonnefoy has lost the precision of 'new-hatch'd, unfledged' in
the more straightforward 'blanc-bec'. But this is not any more of
a weakening of Shakespeare's effect than is necessary, given the
power inherent in English of metaphor-formation by syntactic contraction,
while French usually has to express metaphor through the linking devices
of ordinary grammar. I do not propose here to deal at length with
the discussion between Bonnefoy and Christian Pons on this point of
(9)the translation of Shakespeare. J Bonnefoy succeeds in demonstrating
clearly that Pons *£ project for teasing out and making explicit the
(7) Bonnefoy, Selected Poems, trans. Anthony Rudolf (London, 1968),
p. 113.
(8) Shakespeare, Hamlet, ed. Dowden (The Arden Shakespeare, 1899)>
I: iii: 62-5.
(9) Christian Pons, 'Les traductions de Hamlet par des ecrivains
franpais', Shakespeare en France (special number of Etudes
anglaises) (i960), pp. 116-29.
Bonnefoy, 'Transposer ou traduire Hamlet', Preuves 134 (April 1962),
pp. 3I-4. Reprinted in H, pp. 247-56.
Christian Pons, 'Transposition et traduction: & propos du Hamlet
d'Yves Bonnefoy', Etudes anglaises 17 (1964)> PP« 556-4°•
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tangled connotations of Shakespeare's imagery represents a misunder¬
standing of the poetic and dramatic effect of the verse. The discussion
is, moreover, irrelevant to Bonnefoy's central concerns as a translator
and as a theorist of translation, which are to bridge the gap (whether
we consider it to be quantitative or qualitative) between the meta¬
physical viewpoints inherent in French and English as poetic languages.
In this context, some loss of the complexity of Shakespeare's richly
clotted imagery is inevitable.
What is more interesting, in the example I give above, is that Bonnefoy
has chosen, even within the images he transposes into French, to
render aspectual words by more essential ones. Thus, 'grapple' becomes
'enclos', 'hoops of steel' become 'barres de fer', and 'palm' becomes
'mains'. Here, Bonnefoy is practising what he preaches in 'La Poesie
franpaise et le principe d'identite': he obviously considers that (say)
'agripper', 'cerceaux d'acier' and 'paume' would give an effect of
triviality in French. And we must certainly admit that such a multi¬
plicity of concrete detail would make the translation seem merely fussy,
rather than rich in connotations.
My reservations about Bonnefoy's rigid distinction between French and
English, then, apply principally to his theoretical over-view of these
languages as vehicles for poetry. It is undeniable that the translator
must be painfully aware, in practice, of how wide is the gap between
them. Bonnefoy claims, however, that the modern French poetic sensi¬
bility may be able, by a rather circuitous route, to identify with
the sensibility underlying Shakespeare's poetry. This claim, made
explicitly in the last section of 'Shakespeare et le poete franpais',
relates to the possibility of the modern French poet achieving contact
with, and expression of, what I have called 1'ephemere.
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Given the inevitable differences between languages, Bonnefoy considers
that the art of translation should be an attempt to re-think the text
to be translated in the translator's own linguistic and philosophical
idiom, which may entail a rethinking of that idiom itself: 'toute
vraie traduction se doit d'etre, au-dela de la fidelite au detail,
une reflexion metaphysique, meditation d'une pensee sur une pensee
differente, essai d'exprimer le vrai de cette pensee dans sa perspective
propre, finalement interrogation sur soi' (H, p. 242). Such a process
will obviously have a greater chance of success if the two idioms are
already close to each other. 'Traduisez votre proche!' Bonnefoy
advises at the beginning of 'Comment traduire Shakespeare' (CTS, p. 341).
Bather surprisingly at first sight, Bonnefoy considers that Shakespeare's
idiom is close to that of the modern French poet. Beaffirming that
'le mot franpais, dans son emploi classique, ne posait son objet que
pour exclure le monde et la diversite des existences reelles' (H, p. 243)>
and that even Baudelaire (at least for the purposes of the essay on
'Shakespeare et le poete franpais') represents an expression of immed¬
iate reality only through its identification with a kind of ideal,
Bonnefoy adds that more recent French poetry, in contrast, 'considere
que 1'objet reel, separe de nous, infiniment autre, peut etre dans
1'instant notre accks k l'etre, notre salut - pour peu bien sftr que
nous allions jusqu'^. lui en dechirant le voile des definitions
essentielles, des concepts' (H, p. 243). This might indeed stand as
a definition of l'ephemere, the Here and Now suddenly affirmed, outside
the normal continuities of time and space, as an incidental detail,
through which the whole phenomenal world and the articulacy which is
trying to name it may perhaps mysteriously be redeemed. On the level
of language itself, of course, the search for the expression of
1'ephemere is very far from being equivalent, except in a very
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indirect way, to the easy availability of phenomenal reality for
expression in English. But on a more metaphysical level, Bonnefoy
suggests that the presence of 1'eohemere in the modern French poetic
consciousness is analogous to the all-pervading presence of the
particularbut mysterious spiritual dimension of the witches in
Macbeth, of the ghost in Ham! et or of the hope of redemption in
The Winter's Tale.
Here, then, is the possible point of contact: both modern French
poetry and that of Shakespeare feel the presence of a mysterious
reality beyond their divergent metaphysical presuppositions:
C'est par leur intuition la plus profonde, la plus elementaire,
autrement dit, que le realisme de Shakespeare et l'idealisme
renverse de la poesie franpaise recente peuvent desormais
communiquer. L'un decrit ce que 1'autre demande k vivre.
Et ce qui est dit directement par Shakespeare, pourra peut-etre
etre suggere, indirectement, dans un langage ajoutant S, la
fidelite au contenu explicite de chaque oeuvre, une epreuve
constante de tous ses moyens poetiques par le sentiment de
1'ob.jet nrofond. (H, p. 244)
Bonnefoy's criticism of Shakespeare, and his remarks on translation,
thus coalesce into a restatement of his ideas on the possibility of
poetic discourse in the French language of today.
Having now looked at much of Bonnefoy's own literary criticism, it
may now be worth considering his view of literary criticism itself.
This follows naturally from what I have been discussing, since
Bonnefoy's principal statement of his ideas on literary criticism
takes the form of a comparison of French criticism with English.
(10) For convenience of vocabulary, I take 'English' critics and
criticism to refer to critics writing, and criticism written,
in English, whatever its country of origin. This appears to be
what Bonnefoy means by 'anglo-saxon'.
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XVTI Literary criticism, English and French
In a note to 'Shakespeare et le poete fra^ais', Bonnefoy remarks:
la poesie anglaise 'signifie' beaucoup plus que la poesie
franpaise. L'une, dont les mots ne pretendent pas §tre
Idee, principe et origine du monde, aura a dire celui-ci,
a le transformer en signification, en formule. L'autre ne
fait que presenter 1'Idee dans son evidence muette au-dell.
de tout concept. Le cette opposition on pourrait deduire
egalement les profondes divergences des critiques litteraires
anglo-saxonne et franpaise. (H, p. 239)
One may once again question Bonnefoy's implication here that a
linguistically-determined difference between the English and French
casts of mind should qualitatively control not only the kind of
poetry written in each language, but also the kind of criticism.
What began as an analysis of the differing poetic potentials of the
two languages seems to expand and cover an alarmingly large field
of rather vague speculation. Bonnefoy has been taken to task for
this, in empirical British fashion, by Professor Alan Boase in an
articlein which he points out that the New Criticism may direct
its attention to literary texts without becoming obsessed with the
mere minutiae of explication, while critics writing in French may
be concerned with the delicate nuances of poetic sensibility without
necessarily forgetting entirely the poems to which that sensibility
has given birth. In his reply to this criticism, Bonnefoy makes it
clear in what sense the differences between the two critical approaches
are fundamental, and finally, in his view, irreconcilable:
(l) A. Boase, 'Critiques franpais, critiques anglais, ce qui les
divise. Reponse a Yves Bonnefoy' Cahiers de 1'Association
internationale des etudes franpaises 16 (March 1964),
pp. 157-65.
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Je vais prendre un exemple sous-jacent Si tout ce que j'ai
essaye de dire. II s'agit d'une comparaison: <ians 1'Eglise
orthodoxe grecque, au moment du mystere, le Christ est
present; tous les assistants sont incorpores dans la presence
divine. Dans l'acte litteraire, il y a une presence qui se
donne ou ne se donne pas. La poesie est fondamentalement
un acte & comparer au grand moment d'une liturgie ou d'un
rituel. II y a inadequation fondamentale du poeme avec le
sens prete au poeme. Toute la critique anglaise s'eloigne
de la conception theologique, qui reste cependant sous-jacente
chez certains Franpais, alors qu'il y a agressivite contre
cette conception theologique chez les Anglais. D'un cdte,
la categorie de la signification, de 1'autre la 'reorientation'
de la conscience vers une presence vecue. . .
Le malentendu entre certains critiques anglais et franpais
s'est curieusement reaffirme. L'option fondamentale entre
l'etre et les §tres, entre la presence et le sens, n'a pas
• (2)ete comprise.
The comparison Bonnefoy makes here, in oral discussion, is more explicit
than any he might "be expected to make in a carefully thought-out essay,
and could perhaps for that very reason "be misleading. Not surprisingly,
he had to make clear later in the discussion that he himself subscribes
to no religious belief. Furthermore, he does not here draw the con¬
sistent distinction I have commented on earlier between signification
and sens: instead, he contrasts both signification and sens with
presence. Nevertheless, the comparison supports his apparent rejection
of any form (and not simply the English form) of analytical criticism
in *La Poesie franpaise et le principe d'identite', where he says that
'/la poesie n'esj^ nullement ... la fabrication d'un objet ou des
significations se structurent . . . Cet objet existe, bien stir, mais
il est la depouille et non 1'Sme ni le dessein du poeme; . . . et plus
(2) 'Resume des discussions', ibid., pp. 290-91.
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on en voudra analyser les finesses, les ambiguites expressives, plus
on risquera d'outlier une intention de salut, qui est le seul souci
du poeme.' (i^, p. 250).
This is consistent with Bonnefoy*s overall aesthetic, as we have seen.
One is led, therefore, to ask what valid task Bonnefoy would assign
to the critic, who must comment on works of art in language which is
inevitably conceptual and which must therefore, it seems, betray the
essence of the works of art which it is trying to elucidate. Any
other function for critical writing would seem to condemn the critic
to produce mere pseudo-literature himself: and as Professor Boase
points out, the critic need not try to avoid using conceptual language,
for 'la critique d'art, la critique musicale ne sont pas invalidees
(5)
par le fait qu'elles ne consistent ni en peinture ni en musique'.
After a certain amount of equivocation, in which he seems to suggest
that textual analysis is appropriate to English poetry but inappropriate
to French, and admits that English critics, in spite of their concern
with the elucidation of meaning, still show 'un sentiment aigu, genereux
de la realite poetique' (CAS, p. 70), Bonnefoy makes his own position
clear by saying, 'il me semble qu'une critique de la poesie qui se
fonde sur la signification laisse echapper son objet. Elle se laisse
enclore, en effet, dans une sorte de cercle dont l'origine est cette
conception du positivisme logique: que l'on peut separer dans le
discours la fonction de connaissance (cognitive function) et la
fonction "emotive".' (CAS, p. 70).
I have already commented on Bonnefoy's frequent slightly idiosyncratic
use of the word 'signification', or more often 'significations', since
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the idea itself implies a fragmentation of the work of art with which
it is concerned. He goes on to describe the consequences, in his
view, of the cognitive and emotive functions in discourse being
separated:
En un mot, ce qu'il y a de ruineux dans cette critique, c'est
que le langage symbolique de la science ... a reussi a
s'identifier avec ce que Cassirer appelait le p61e objectif
dans le langage: alors que la poesie aussi dit le vrai, dit
ce qui est, et a valeur, a sa maniere et dans son champ propre,
de verite objective - son objet specifique etant l'individu,
c'est-a-dire l'infini. Au regard de cette verite de la poesie
qui est (pour peu qu'on ne l'aborde pas avec les categories
logiques) toute simple, les significations les plus complexes
ne sont peut-etre que des fantomes. (CAS, p. 71)
Here Bonnefoy is becoming confused: for he talks of the 'langage
symbolique de la science' identifying itself with the 'p61e objectif'
in language, and then develops his argument as if he had said that
this symbolic language of science had identified itself with the whole
of language. And this would indeed be 'ruireux'. But the idea of an
objective pole in language (if we are using words precisely) implies
a subjective pole which is not only its polar opposite, but is also
essential to the subjective pole's own existence as such: and if the
language and thought-processes of literary criticism must incline
towards the objective pole, they need not therefore be interpreted
as conspiring to prevent the language and thought-processes of liter¬
ature from inclining towards the subjective pole. This implies that
analytical criticism is seeking in some sense to replace the literature
it discusses. This does indeed seem to be Bonnefoy's opinion when he
says of American criticism that 'l'idee que la signification non
comprise puisse subsister dans une oeuvre semble etre ressentie alors
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comme un scandale, une atteinte a la securite morale collective'
(CAS, p. 70), or when he talks of 'fantomes'. From the point of view
of the poem itself, of course, analysis can produce only 'fantomes':
but no competent critic will claim that his analysis should do any¬
thing but lead the reader to a richer experience of the poem, for
which such abstractions, properly assimilated, may well be useful.
The only critics who would make larger claims for the analytical
method are not English at all, but the enthusiasts, if any still
exist, for what Professor Boase calls 'le fetiche pedagogique de
(4)
1'explication franpaise'.
We may thus defend English criticism against Bonnefoy's strictures.
But the fact that a French sensibility should find such strictures
necessary may itself serve to confirm, up to a point, Bonnefoy's
theory of the differences between the linguistically- determined
French and English views of the world. Bonnefoy, it seems to me, is
here interpreting the English mind's living and valid concern for
the aspects of reality as such - on which he comments so perceptively
elsewhere - as nothing more than the dessicated, over-analytical
approach of the explication de texte. And this (from an English point
of view) slightly false perspective is also to be seen in Bonnefoy's
use of the word 'trivialite' (which has if anything even stronger
pejorative connotations in French than in English) in his discussion
of English poetry, and especially of Shakespeare: 'D'une part la
poesie anglaise s'engage dans le monde du relatif, de la signification,
de la trivialite (le mot est intraduisible), de 1'existence de tous
les jours, d'une fapon presque impensable en franpais dans la poesie
la plus"haute"' (i2, p. 257). Though we may accept the general point
(4) Boase, 'Critiques franpais, critiques anglais. . .', p. 165.
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Bonnefoy is making, it is difficult to imagine an English critic
describing the manifold complexity of, say, Shakespeare's imagery
as 'trivial'.
We may push this point a little further. If a linguistic grasp of
the concrete must be seen by the French sensibility as (and indeed
must actually be, in the French language) something more trivial,
more paltry and - ironically - farther from any true apprehension of
reality than the equivalent grasp in English, the converse is also
true: a linguistic grasp of the abstract must be seen by the English
sensibility as more remote and theoretical than it is felt to be by
the French. I do not wish to digress too far at this point: one
might, however, point to examples of abstract words which have a
definite secondary concrete meaning, as in 'dependre un tableau du
mur', or which may half-assume a concrete reference in certain circum¬
stances, as in 'il a decouvert sa calvitie', or which may appear
(though perhaps only to the translator) to have the ghost of a
concrete reference lurking behind them as when one is dissatisfied
with translating 'position' by its direct equivalent, since the
French word seems to imply distantly something being, or having been,
concretely placed.
If we find in Bonnefoy's attitude to English criticism, then, a
certain lack of comprehension stemming from his French presuppositions,
we would do well to consider carefully how far anglophone presuppositions
may colour our attitude to the French critical positions which he defends.
Here we may quote the distinction he makes between English and French
poetry, from the critical point of view:
Bare ruined choirs where late the sweet birds sang, pour reprendre
une fois de plus le vers fameux de Shakespeare, est un complexe
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&e significations; on pent s'engager loin dans leur
enchevetrement sans pour autant s'eloigner de la qualite
poetique. Tout au contraire, chez Rimbaud, Mais que salubre
est le vent I dont la beaute est si haute, si pleinement
magique, signifie extremement peu. (CAS, p. 70)
One could easily enough claim that the basic poetic quality of
Shakespeare's line lies in something beyond the most sensitive
tracing-out of its network of associations, or that other poets in
English operate in a much less obviously intricate way (see my
discussion above (pp. 76-8) of the difference between Norman MacCaig
and Edwin Muir, or consider the admirably poetic 'simplicity' of a
line like Wordsworth's 'The things which I have seen I now can see
no more' , or that not all French poets share Rimbaud's brand
of meaningless or magical beauty. Any of these approaches would
however miss the point: for Bonnefoy is associating with the French
poetic sensibility a kind of criticism, typified by such diverse
figures as Marcel Raymond, Albert Beguin, Georges Poulet, Jean-Pierre
Richard and Maurice Blanchot, in which the critic directs his attention
to 'la zone crepusculaire du langage, ou la verite est contact plus
que formule' (CAS, p. 73). It is therefore feeling which is being
considered as primary in the poetic process: and feeling must reach
expression through (in Bonnefoy's words, referring to Beguin) 'la
fluidite du signe, les metamorphoses incessantes de son contenu, la
valeur essentielle de l'analogie qui deborde toute signification finie
dans une experience intime de l'etre' (CAS, p. 72).
This is an admirable summary, expressed in French terms, of the nature
of poetic language. The English approach, however, is all too liable
(5) Wordsworth, 'Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections
of Early Childhood', Poetical Works, ed. Hutchinson and de
Selincourt (London, 1950)> P« 4&0.
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to condemn criticism based on such an assumption as imprecise, or
subject to the 'intentional fallacy', or both. This is indeed the
risk taken by such 'French' criticism: that the critic should involve
himself in a wordy second-hand attempt to describe the feeling which
has already been conveyed in the poem. This is the opposite fault
to English over-attention to the poem's verbal details. We should
not, however, categorise critics' tendencies to false judgement
simply by their nationalities. In Professor Boase's criticism of
Blanchot, it is Blanchot who seems to me to have the clearer idea
of what the dangers for the French type of criticism are, and
Professor Boase who asserts too easily the possibility of direct
expression of discursive concepts in a poem:
du Toast Punibre de Mallarme ^Blanchot/ maintient qu'il
'existe' en tant que poeme independamment du contraste entre
l'idee chretienne de la survie personnelle (que Mallarme y
rejette) et la survie du poete dans sa poesie (qu'il y affirme
si triomphalement), contraste qui donne sa structure au poeme.
Blanchot va jusqu'a dire: 'Si l'on y cherche illicitement un
sens transmissible a la prose (pourquoi illicitement?) on y
neut reconnaitre la glorification de 1'existence qui n'a -pas
craint son neant (d'accord! mais ce n'est qu'un element du
poeme.'). Mais est-ce (demande-t-il) cette metauhysique, cette
allusion a un probleme general qui nous decouvre la verite
du poeme? Maturellement non.'
Professor Boase does not agree with Blanchot on this point - he adds
'Je reponds: Si, tout de memeJ' - and he is troubled by the expression
'verite du poeme'. But it seems clear that the dangers Blanchot is
sketching out in the passage quoted differ from the dangers of the
kind of analysis criticised by Bonnefoy only in the extent to which
the critical method directs itself towards the text of a poem, rather
(6) Boase, 'Critiques franpais, critiques anglais. . .', p. 163.
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than towards the feeling or thought (for thought can he a component
of effective poetic feeling) behind it. Both approaches nrust produce
something which is basically irrelevant to the poem itself; and the
danger of both lies in the extent to which they may be tempted to
substitute what they produce (which, by definition, is manipulable
in terms of conceptual discourse) for the poem (which is not). One
might go further, and say that the undoubted usefulness of each
method varies directly with the extent of the critic's awareness of
the dangers inherent in it.
We may postulate, then, as the ultimate object of criticism, something
to be labelled 'la verite du poeme' or, perhaps, the existential
reality of the poem, which is neither the object on the printed page,
nor the poet's intention, but rather the poem in action and as exper¬
ience, which must be considered as something abstract enough to avoid
being identified with its effect on the consciousness of the poet or
of any individual reader, but at the same time concrete enough to
have a unique and individual mode of being. This existential reality
of the poem is ineffable (or rather, it can only be expressed, uniquely,
by the poem itself): and any critical approach must be aware of this,
and of its own limitations. In the frame of reference Bonnefoy is
using, two approaches, identified with the English and French languages
and modes of thought, are suggested. English criticism will tend to
approach the poem through the text, seen as an object, and will there¬
fore run the risk of identifying the poem's reality with the network
of meanings analysis may abstract from it: French criticism will
try to recapture the poetic impulse, and will risk identifying the
poem's reality with whatever discursive concepts may be considered
to have been present in the poet's mind at the moment of composition.
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Ironically, as I have suggested, a French type of analysis (the
explication de texte) represents the worst extreme ox the "basically
English danger of over-conceptualisation from textual study, perhaps
because of the difficulty the French language experiences in dealing
with concrete details considered simply as themselves.
We have moved some distance from the simple consideration of Bonnefoy's
attitude to criticism. I hope, however, that the issues raised have
been relevant enough to Bonnefoy's ideas on poetry itself for this
digression to be justified. Before going on to a general summary
of Bonnefoy's poetic theory, we may sum up this section by quoting
from the end of his essay on English and French criticism:
L'oeuvre est le combat d'une signification qui tend I. s'installer
dans la nettete du signe, a prendre appui sur les caractferes
les plus objectifs de celui-ci - et d'une intuition qui va
au-dell, de tous les meanings et oblige le signe S, cesser d'etre
une chose. Et, en somme, la critique franjaise et la critique
anglo-saxonne s'en tiennent chacune a l'une des composantes




XVIII The development of Bonnefoy's theory; sign and substance
As a conclusion to this investigation of what by a convenient
shorthand one may call Bonnefoy's 'poetic theory', which lias con¬
cerned itself with the philosophical background to the theory,
with its more abstract features such as the concepts (considered
as concepts, and therefore incompletely) of 'le principe d'identite'
and 'verite de parole', and with its working-out through Bonnefoy's
consideration of the poets to whose work he has turned his attention,
I wish to summarise the ways in which language, according to Bonnefoy,
may constitute an artistic medium. This will involve some recapit¬
ulation of what has been said before in the consideration of this
or that aspect of Bonnefoy's theory, and some further treatment of
his more recent work which, strictly speaking, falls outside the
chronological limit I have set myself: I hope that the elements of
recapitulation, in a more general context, will clarify, rather
than merely repeat, the points already made. I also wish to consider
briefly the ways in which Bonnefoy sees the poet's use of language
as being analogous, and indeed in some sense identical, to the
visual artist's use of his materials, since, although it is beyond
my present scope to deal systematically with Bonnefoy's art criticism,
the omission of any reference to the visual arts would give a very
one-sided view of the processes of thought which, for instance, led
Bonnefoy to give Le Nuage rouge, much of which is concerned with
painting, the subtitle 'essais sur la poetique'.
This summing-up will also include a consideration of two areas which
would repay further investigation, but which are not part of my main
subject here - the ways in which Bonnefoy's own poetry mirrors the
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development of his theory of poetic language, and the possibility of
his critical writings being considered as elements of an interpretation
of the historical development of art. Bonnefoy has expressly denied
that any such interpretation forms a background to his thought:^ but
while the explicit formulation of a history of human artistic creativity
and, beyond that, of the human spirit itself, would indeed represent
the kind of ponderous, over-ambitious and over-conceptual enterprise
that Bonnefoy sees, for instance, in Hegel's system, some of his own
remarks could justify our seeking in his theory at least fragments -
whose fragmentary nature constitutes their only validity - of such a
conception, as applied in particular to the baroque period.
We may first establish clearly what Bonnefoy's view of poetic language
is not, taking as starting-point a passage in his essay on the seven¬
teenth-century Japanese poet Basho added after its original appearance
in the 1972 festschrift for Georges Poulet, Mouvements premiers:
Nous avons pris 1'habitude, Occidentaux que nous sommes, de
ne rapporter chaque realite a son nom que par la voie d'un
concept, qui la confond alors avec les autres 'semblables'.
Et soit nous privilegions cette langue de la signification
infinie, et sa generalite nous annule, mais pauvrement, sans
lumiere; est bien eteinte en nous 1'etincelante nuee. Soit
nous rgvons encore "k quelque absolu pour nous-memes, mais il
nous faut alors faire du sujet que nous demeurons ainsi une
transcendance, par opposition aux autres choses ou etres qui
sont mo ins ou qui ne sont pas. (NR., pp. 540-41)
Discussion of this passage could lead in several directions. The
emphasis on the involvement of the artist's personality in his creation
of the work of art, mentioned in the last sentence quoted, is a
relatively recent concern of Bonnefoy's, to which I will return. We
may first of all note, however, that the passage sums up what Bonnefoy
(l) in conversation, Nice, 14 May 1975«
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sees as the Scylla and Charybdis between which the modern poet must
steer a course: on the one hand the dead language of conceptualisation,
and on the other any kind of privileged transcendentalism. I have
described the course which Bonnefoy strives for, and sees some modern
French poets as having attained, as 'verite de parole' (see section XI
above). We may now take a closer look, however, at the habit of thought
which consists 'de ne rapporter chaque realite a son nom que par la voie
d'un concept, qui la confond alors avec les autres "semblables"'. This
confirms, I think, what I have tried to demonstrate in my remarks on
proper names (see section VII above): that Bonnefoy distrusts the process
by which language groups a series of phenomena into a category, say
'horse', thus denying to words in their normal usage the proper name's
unique individual capacity for evoking '1'existence effective, ici,
devant moi' (i , p. 245) of the object to which it refers. The criticism,
however, of a view of language which postulates the necessary intervention
of a conceptual process (in Bonnefoy's sense of the word 'concept', that
is, a shallow intellectualisation of reality) between a word and the
object of its reference, also picks up implicitly the criticism which
Bonnefoy makes explicit elsewhere of the approach to the kind of
analysis of language which is common - indeed almost universal - in
the twentieth century and which is exemplified by the work of Ferdinand
de Saussure.
We have already seen (pi90-91 above) how Bonnefoy refers to Saussure's
distinction between 'langue' and 'parole', only to assert the primacy
of 'parole', the individual speech-act seen as communication, over
'langue' considered as a system, which must be seen as something
abstract. In 'La Poesie franpaise et le principe d'identite', he
compares his own approach to language with Saussure's theory of the
double-faced linguistic sign which 'unit non une chose et un nom, mais
- 181 -
un concept et une image acoustique' ^ J - terms which Saussure later
, (x)
identifies with 'signifie' and 'signifiant1:w/
II m'importe, en effet, de hien marquer que cette approche
differe, et de fagon radicale, de ce qui passe ordinairement
pour la seule saisie du signe qu'il soit possible de concevoir.
. . . Saussure et ceux qui 1'ont suivi ont montre que le
signe est determine par une structure, ainsi ont-ils ajoute
une dimension nouvelle a la signification et, partant, a la
connaissance des oeuvres. Mais la fonction qu'ils reconnaissent
au mot est toujours de simplement signifier, et leur richesse
meme devient des lors un danger pour la reflexion sur la poesie.
(I2, PP. 244-45)
The reference to 'Saussure et ceux qui l'ont suivi' is vague enough
to show that Bonnefoy is not concerned with entering into a polemic
against the doctrine of any particular individual. His quarrel is
with the whole idea of an analytical approach to language, which he
sees as particularly irrelevant to a discussion of the language of
poetry. He expresses his reservations through relatively rare ref¬
erences of the type I have quoted, and through such quietly indirect
hints as his ironical use of 'traits distinctifs', a technical term
of phonological analysis, in his description of the observer's first
contact with the salamander - which is, of course, to be overtaken
and transcended by his later experience of the salamander's presence;
'je regarde la salamandre, je reconnais ses traits distinctifs, comme
l'on dit, - je vois aussi ce cou etroit, cette face grise, ce coeur
qui bat doucement' (i , p. 246 - my emphasis). It may also be worth
noting that in both the cases I have quoted - the distinction between
'langue' and 'parole' and the notion of the primarily referential
(rather, say than evocatory) properties of the linguistic sign - Eonnefoy
(2) Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de linguistique generate (3rd edition,
Paris, 1965), p. 98.
(3) ibid., p. 99.
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rejects the principle of Saussure's analytical approach to language.
He does not follow the analytical method in order to dispute its
results; on the contrary, as in the case I am about to examine, he
admits that these may he valid, once the principle of analysis is
accepted at all.
If, then, one goes on to ask what view of language Bonnefoy sets
against an analytical approach, it has to he admitted that this is
never spelt out in clear terms, perhaps because a direct statement
of a position specifically opposed to analysis, aimed at refuting
the analytical position, would itself have to he couched theoretically,
and would therefore have to accept the modes of thought of the
analytical view-point itself. Bonnefoy does, however, suggest an
answer in 'La Poesie franpaise et le principe a'identite'; and although
this is not (as it could not he) a fully satisfactory formulation,
it is interesting in the context of the overall development of his
thinking. He admits, first of all, that the analytical approach may
he justifiable in its own domain, hut asserts that that domain is
not relevant to poetry:
Et cela semhle evident. Que serait-ce que 'le cheval', sinon un
concept? Hn cheval, oui, devant moi, et 'le cheval' comme sa
notion, quelle que soit la fapon dont cette notion se determine.
- J'admets que ce point de vue permet de decrire correctement
la fapon dont la langue est disposable pour la plupart des
usages. Mais justement la poesie n'est pas un 'emploi' de la
langue. Peut-etre une folie dans la langue. Mais qu'on ne
peut comprendre en ce cas que par ses yeux de folie - que par
sa fapon elle d'entendre et prendre les mots, (i , pp. 245-6)
It is perhaps a pity that Bonnefoy does not take further this argument
stemming from his partial acceptance of analysis as a valid approach
to language. It might he demonstrated that the features of language
which are prominent in poetry - those features which, in Bonnefoy's
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terms, allow ordinary language to approach the evocatory power of
the proper name - are in fact to he found, to a greater or lesser
degree, in almost all uses of language (most noticeably perhaps in
•rhetorical' uses such as the language of direct or implied political
persuasion); and in no case can the effect of language easily he
split hy analysis into separate 'denotative' and 'connotative'
functional elements. An analysis of denotation, which must he seen
as primary in any theory of words as referents, can therefore fully
account neither for the effects of language in poetry nor for a
much wider range of linguistic effects.
Bonnefoy however does not attempt to construct an argument in this
profoundly conceptual area. The price of his refusal to do so is
that in this context he comes close to saying that poetry has nothing
to do with the primary function of language as a system of references,
and therefore to seem to fall almost hy default into a theory of
poetry which seriously diminishes the importance and relevance of
poetry itself. In other contexts, hy contrast, Bonnefoy opposes the
world of analysis, ruled hy the concept, to that of poetic experience
(whether this is seen as 'presence', '1'ephemere' or '1'arri^re-pays')
and asserts his passionate rejection of the former while accepting
and seeking to express, hy however roundabout a route, the latter.
He is generally at pains to deny any implication that the analytic
approach can lead to an understanding of, or participation in, reality:
whereas in 'La Poesie franpaise et le principe d'identite', with his
reference to poetry 'qu'on ne peut comprendre en ce cas que par ses
yeux de folie', he implicitly seems to allow the analytic approach
that contact with reality which he denies it elsewhere.
Be that as it may - and the whole untypical passage may indeed he
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tinged with irony - even in this context in 'La Poesie franpaise et
le principe d'identite' the apparent primacy of analysis is over¬
turned when Bonnefoy goes on to evoke the notion of presence. He
talks of the first stage in the perception of the salamander, which
I have called 'simple classification', as categorising its objects
'comme ferait le mot de la prose' (i , p. 246); and this must in¬
evitably lead, in the analytical efforts of mauvaise presence, to
a realisation of '1'angoissante tautologie des langues' (I , p. 247).
The only way to escape from this tautology is to admit the relevance
of analysis in its own domain, but to assert that presence can only
spring from quite a different domain which, through the observer's
participation in the experience of presence, takes over the domain
of analysis and transfigures it also. Presence - and the use of
language in poetry which may possibly express presence, despite
'1'angoissante tautologie des langues', in which phrase one senses
an implicit comparison with 'parole' as true poetic articulacy -
cannot therefore be rationalised, but must simply be asserted as an
existential fact. Bonnefoy goes on to say of the salamander:
Disons - car il faut sauver aussi la parole, et du desir
fatal de tout definir - que son essence s'est repandue dans
1'essence des autres etres, comme le flux d'une analogie par
laquelle je perpois tout dans la continuite et la suffisance
d'un lieu, et dans la transparence de 1'unite. Le mur est
justifie, et 1'S.tre, et l'olivier dehors et la terre. Et
moi, redevenu tout cela, reveille a ma profonde saveur - car
cet espace se vodte en moi comme l'interieur de mon existence
- je suis passe de la perception maudite k 1'amour, qui est
prescience de 1'invisible, (i^, p. 248)
This passage,then, after starting out with what might have become
a theoretical discussion of Saussure's analysis of the way in which
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language refers, with perhaps some consideration of the differences
between poetry and prose, becomes a description of mystical experience;
and the embryo discussion is simply brushed aside, its terms of refer¬
ence implicitly rejected, and the whole section rounded off with a
quotation from St. John of the Cross. It is of course quite legitimate
for a poet to explore his poetic experience in this way, and to seek
to describe in discursive language the route by which, in this case,
he reaches a perception very similar to Blake's:
To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Blower,
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour.^^
What is curious in Bonnefoy's case is not the fact of his describing
mystical experience, but the starting-point of his description in
a reference to the kind of analysis which one might expect him to
ignore as completely irrelevant. The apparent contradiction, however,
is fundamental to Bonnefoy's thought, the development of which can
indeed be seen as a series of attempts to reconcile the two poles
which might be called 'analysis' and, perhaps, 'non-analytical
apprehension'. Though the passage which I have just discussed may
be one of the less successful of these attempts, it shows particul¬
arly clearly what Bonnefoy calls elsewhere'mon besoin maladroit
d'une pensee coherente' (AP, p. 131).
Indeed, although Bonnefoy's awareness of two diverging approaches
to reality has not changed since his earliest published writings,
his perception of the contrast between them has varied. In L'Acte
et le lieu de la poesie' he sees the analytical consciousness as a
(4) William Blake, 'Auguries of Innocence', Poetry and Prose of
William Blake, ed. Keynes (4th edition, London, 1967), p. 118.
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kind of nothingness which may suddenly be transformed into an aware¬
ness of the fullness of being, but the nature of this turning-point
is not explored; it is expressed chiefly in terms of literary or
mythological references. It could, of course, be argued that this
is the only possible way to express such a notion, but its expression
nevertheless seems somewhat precious and over-literary. There is
enough analysis to whet the reader's appetite, but not enough to give
real insight into how the change described might come about. Bonnefoy
describes the starting-point for 'le pas baudelairien de 1'amour des
choses mortelles':
Ici tout avenir et tout projet se dissipent. Le neant consume
1'objet, nous sommes pris dans le vent de cette flamme sans
ombre. Et nulle foi ne nous soutient plus, nulle formule, nul
mythe, le plus intense regard s'acheve desespere. Restons
pourtant devant cet horizon sans figure, vide de soi. Tenons,
si je puis dire, le pas gagne. Car il est vrai que deja un
changement se proauit. L'astre morne de ce qui est, 1'elementaire
Janus, tournant avec lenteur - mais dans 1'instant - sur lui-meme,
nous decouvre son autre face. Un possible apparait sur la ruine
de tout possible, (i , pp. 121-2)
In the later formulation of the contrast in 'La Poesie franqaise et
le principe d'identite' Bonnefoy, as we have seen, goes further towards
a definition of the analytical process, splitting it into the two modes
of perception I have called 'simple classification' and 'mauvaise
presence', clarifies the notion of non-analytical apprehension (through
presence) by an appeal to common human experience in the example of
the salamander (though of course the fact that the animal is a salamander
gives the experience a mythic dimension in itself), and seeks to show
clearly how language is involved in these various apprehensions of
reality. The essay, however, lays itself open to criticism on several
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points of detail (some of which have already been remarked on, one of
its faults being the number of purely conceptual arguments which the
thesis-writer can find to quarrel with), and generally gives the
impression of Bonnefoy struggling to achieve a kind of clarity which
is irrelevant to his intentions.
The development, in 'La Poesie franpaise et le principe d'identite',
of the example of the salamander is however an early indication of
the broadening of Bonnefoy's preoccupations beyond what might appear,
in the earlier essays, to be too great a degree of concentration on
purely aesthetic questions. His more recent concern with the value
of ordinary human experience, and with language as an agent for its
communication, provides a means by which the painful dualism of
analysis and non-analytical apprehension may be, if not solved, at
least side-stepped in a way which allows his theory to leave behind
its earlier unsuccessful striving for precision (which must inevit¬
ably become over-involved in conceptual thought) and instead to play
its full part in that very broadening of his preoccupations.
Bonnefoy, of course, has always been concerned with the importance of
everyday experience, through the notion, explored earlier, of l'ephemere;
but in his early writings the affirmation of this depended on a process
of aesthetic theorising, culminating in the description of an experience
which, however insignificant it seemed, still represented some kind of
privileged moment of artistic perception, consciously evoked as such.
We have seen, however (pp.89ff.above ), how, in his essay on Jouve,
Bonnefoy treats the whole of everyday human experience and its expression
in language as privileged insofar as it establishes human communication.
In the long and often difficult final section of 'Baudelaire contre
Rubens', published in Le Nuage rouge (a very significant expansion of
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the version published, in L'E-phemere no.9 in 1969)» Bonnefoy develops
this idea by contrasting the creative involvement of the artist in
life both with the empty pretensions of the work of art seen from
outside simply as an object, and with the mechanical deadness of the
world of merely routine action. He first of all states the extreme
position, which will be modified later, that the work of art, once
completed and therefore cut off from the living artistic experience
from which it arises, must become something static and lifeless.
The image used is remarkable:
II est vrai que ce que l'ecriture a touche n'est bient8t plus,
pour le Midas qui s'y livre, qu'un dehors transforms, reforme,
finalement aboli par le travail sans fin d'une cristallisation
implacable. Aussi 'subjectif', aussi imprevisible et violent,
aussi riche de contradictions et d'apports soit-il dans son
rapport d'individu a autrui, l'auteur de ce qui se veut parole
ne peut aboutir qu'a un texte, ou le moi essentialise, reduit
aux dimensions de 1'Intelligible, est comme une monnaie qu'on
a retiree de I'echange, bien qu'elle reste comme jamais exposee
a tous les regards. (MR, p. 64)
This currency is valueless because it is no longer available, as the
most banal of ordinary language can be, for the purposes of living
communication. It constitutes only 'des pages qui ne feront que
s'obstiner dans leur dire, quels que soient les arguments que le
lecteur leur opposera' (MR, p. 64).
This, however, as Bonnefoy recognises, is an unduly pessimistic and
theoretical formulation. The reader does, after all, make contact
with the work of art, even if contact is not established directly
with the artistic impulse which created it, but can only be mediated
through the imperfect image of that impulse provided by the text:
•tant d'oeuvres, quand je cherchais pour ma part non certes le
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divertissement mais I, me trouver, pour sortir d'une solitude, m'ont
ete un secours, le seul a portee, et appreciable! Platon pour
preparer au Christ, oui, peut-etre: Shakespeare, en tout cas, et
Rimbaud, et Baudelaire tout le premier, pour ouvrir a 1'experience
de l'etre^HR, p. 65).
It might be objected that here Bonnefoy is taking a very long route
to arrive at quite a simple statement: that we do gain illumination
from works of art, even if the experience of that illumination is
not the same (and how could it be?) as the experience which gave rise
to the works of art themselves. But Bonnefoy's earlier criticism
had continually emphasised the distance between artistic experience
and the work of art itself, seen as a possible object of analysis
(which he considered the only, or at least the predominant, way in
which the modern Western consciousness could see it). Against this
background, it is not surprising that the discovery of the possible
communicative powers which even a static text possesses should be
unexpected. Bonnefoy, in fact, is here moving towards a redefinition
of the idea of the relationship between art and life which underlay
his earlier work. Having established the perhaps obvious point that
literature cannot be simply dismissed because it does not afford
perfect communication of artistic experience between writer and
reader, he goes on to admit that the world of action, for its part,
is not always experienced in its full potential existential richness;
it may indeed represent an empty stasis, just as the literary text
may do so:
Que des hommes 'agissent', dans le champ apparemment ouvert
du possible, et combien de fois c'est sous l1empire de
references figees a des valeurs jamais remises en cause -
structures intelligibles qu'on peut tenir de ce fait pour
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autant des refuges que des moyens, autant 1'occasion d'un
reve, •double', celui-ci, de bonne conscience, qu'une prise
effective sur le probleme a resoudre! Gestes-signes, par
quoi l'§tre pretendu agissant en fait se donne figure,
alienant avec un morne plaisir son libre arbitre dans
l'ecriture, se faisant langue, c'est-a-dire forme, solitude,
silence, quand il aurait pu et meme dtL se risquer dans un
debut de parole . . . (NR, pp. 65-6)
The assertion, made explicit only at this relatively late point in
Bonnefoy's work, that •life' and 'art' cannot be as easily opposed
as seems to be assumed in his earlier essays, represents a significant
re-ordering of his ideas. He thus succeeds in breaking out of the
strained, and ultimately fruitless, confrontation which so far I
have presented in terms of 'existence' and 'essence'. This does
not imply any simplification of his ideas on the intellectual level.
On the contrary, the argument to be found in 'Baudelaire contre
Rubens' and in the other essays collected in Le Nuage rouge is as
complex as any in his earlier work. Its greater variety, however,
provides a commentary on, and is an integral part of, the broadening
of his artistic range which has taken place since the publication
of Pierre ecrite and Un Reve fait a Mantoue (which themselves re¬
presented a considerable development beyond his work published in
the 1950s).
Bonnefoy takes as starting-point for his new exploration of the
relationship between life and art the contemplation of the Belgian
baroque pulpits on which Baudelaire had commented in Pauvre Belgique:
Bans ce second moment de la pulsation la chaire, qui est
1'image de l'oeuvre - non, sa vie meme - , se propose a
mon souvenir, se maintient devant moi pour un avenir,
comme le 'positif' lumineux, et possible, deja reel, deja
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partout ebauche, deja parfois rayonnant, de l'ecriture que
notre temps de la loi, dans sa crispation, ne connalt que
tyramnique ou souffrante. Quelle metamorphose, sans que
rien pourtant ait change, - et quel changement en moi-memel
Avant, eh Men j'aurais demande, comme Baudelaire, comme
Pascal, qu'entre ecriture et presence, vertige et vie, on
choisisse, quitte dans mon propre destin a ne pas me resigner
a le faire. Mais maintenant . . .
Maintenant, oui, je sens se former en moi une nouvelle
evidence. (MR, p. 70)
We have, indeed, seen Bonnefoy in many contexts insisting on the
irreconcilable duality of life and art, 'quitte . . . a ne pas
resigner a ^/choisiry7'. The actual nature of the 'nouvelle
evidence' which he mentions, however, is more difficult to pin down.
Its first characteristic, perhaps, is that it can only be expressed
in personal terms, through the human experience of Bonnefoy the man,
rather than simply through the ideas (no matter how concrete) of
Bonnefoy the tMnker, or even through the images of Bonnefoy the
poet (insofar as these incarnations can, in fact, be considered as
separate). This is shown in the growing importance of explicit
autobiography in Bonnefoy's work, through his accounts of Ms cMld-
hood experiences, of travel and of his artistic development, in
L'Arriere-pays, through the autobiograpMcal elements (whether they
refer to dreams, visions or reality) in the stories and prose-poems of
Rue Traversiere, and through the recognisable anchoring of Bans le
leurre du seuil in personal experience (as, for instance in the
passage on the death of Boris de Schloezer (P, p. 234))> as well as
in imagery more distantly connected with the poet's experience, and
in myth.
In'Baudelaire contre Rubens' Bonnefoy goes on to describe the
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'nouvelle evidence' with which he has made contact:
Comment definir cette conviction, cet acquiescement? J'ai
eu longtemps moi aussi 1'experience du doute, du vertige,
- le reve, la crispation, le refus ont longtemps pris le
pas en moi sur la confiance qui cherchait forme, et en un
sens ils sont toujours la: le tableau du grand horizon,
avec ses montagnes, ses routes, ses villes inouies inconnues,
a toujours les m§mes nuees, qui offusquent le soleil, le
tonnerre gronde, passent rapidement des ondees. Mais aux
'theologies negatives' que me mettaient en esprit jadis
ces etendues difficiles, se mele a chaque remission plus
intense une lumiere d'en dessous, d'au-dessus, de toutes
parts, comme si 1'astre masque n'etait pas ou plus la seule
source, comme si avait soif de repondre en moi, a cette
ardeur dechiree, 1'afflux d'une autre origine . . . Paysages
mysterieux, comme lorsqu'un retour de soleil du soir se prend
dans la pluie qui cesse, - nuage rouge au-dessus des routes.
Evidence de la lumiere comme en soi-meme sa cause et en soi
seule sa fin. (MR, pp. 72-73)
The 'theologies negatives' mentioned here are also mentioned in
'h'Acte et le lieu de la poesie', where Bonnefoy says, 'cette poesie
qui ne peut saisir la presence, dessaisie de tout autre bien sera
du grand acte clos la proximite angoissee, la theologie negative'
(i , p. 125; Bonnefoy's emphasis). As I have mentioned above
(p. 22 ), the notion of 'theologie negative' - that the essence of
God is unknowable and can only be referred to through God's negative
attributes - is widespread in early Christian thinking, and is also
relevant especially to Plotinus. Such a notion indeed provides an
apt metaphor for Bonnefoy's view of the possibility of poetic
articulacy and the context in which that possibility may exist, in
what we may call the more rigorous phases of the development of his
thought. 'When the poet's struggle to make sense of the world results
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in such an anguished dialectic of existence and essence as is
described in 'L'Acte et le lieu de la poesie', stability is indeed
unknowable and words can e>xp the periphery of an area of
poetic articulacy which itself can hardly be hinted at, far less
referred to or described. Words, as possible expressions of
'tout ce que 1'univers propose d'indefini', can koJcTc^fya para-
—/
doxically inarticulate promise of something beyond themselves:
'lis apparaissent aux confins de la negativite du langage comme
des anges parlant d'un dieu encore inconnu' (i , pp. 125-6). Poetry,
Bonnefoy implies here, must be either something totally magical and
inexplicable, like Goethe's true symbol in which 'the particular
represents the universal, not as a dream or shadow, but as the living1
(5)
and instantaneous revelation of the unfathomable', or else it must
fail completely to 'arracher ce qui est au sommeil de ses formes
* 2
stables, qui est le triomphe du neant' (i , p. 125).
This, however, is of course an "unnecessarily rigorous line of argument,
which could indeed lead to the kind of extremity of aesthetic purism
by which Bonnefoy elsewhere sees Mallarme as having been tempted. Just
as Bonnefoy's evocations of 'l'Un' and 'l'TJnite' lay greater emphasis
on participation in the plenitude of existence than a strict application
of the relevant Plotinian notions would warrant, even at the end of
'L'Acte et le lieu de la poesie' he suggests that the attainment of
poetic articulacy may be simpler than his earlier line of argument had
suggested: 'Etait-ce done si difficile? Ne suffisait-il pas d'apercevoir,
au flanc de quelque montagne, une vitre au soleil du soir?' (i , p. 131).
In his later work, indeed, Bonnefoy has achieved a much calmer apprehension
(5) from Kunst und Altertum V:3 (1826), translated and quoted by Erich
Heller, The Disinherited Mind (London, 1961) p. 90.
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of a mystery which he is content to evoke as such, without seeking
to give it a theoretical explanation: it is significant that the
reference he makes in evoking that mystery in 'Baudelaire contre
Rubens' is not to any theory, or even to myth, but to the painting
by Mondrian which gives its title to the whole volume - and, what
is more, to that painting seen in relation to an imagined, or per¬
haps remembered, incident from a context of simple reality -
'lorsqu'un retour de soleil du soir se prend dans la pluie qui
cesse' (MR, p. 73) • This might indeed be the same incident alluded
to at the end of 'L'Acte et le lieu de la poesie'.
It is therefore as a communication of simple reality that Bonnefoy
now wishes to consider poetic language: no longer, perhaps, as the
^ 2
'realisme initiatique' (i , p. 130) of 'L'Acte et le lieu de la
poesie', because that, after all, like the same essay's 'theologie
negative', relates to a process of conceptual reasoning and yearning
for an intellectual absolute, but rather a kind of realism where
the world is simply itself, without any burden of stated or implied
ontological significance, but with a numinous quality which comes
from the poet's calm vision of the whole of reality, and the par¬
ticular object which is a part of it - seen, however, not as an
object by an observing subject, but as an ephemere, participating
in the observer's existence, - as impregnated with poetic truth (a
vision, of course, which may have to come out of, and transcend,
some previous more intellectual quest): 'M'ai-je pas le droit
d'esperer . . . qu'il est un emploi simple des signes; et que le
Signe majeur, s'il ne vient pas a nous la ou nous l'avons attendu,
sur les chemins du miracle^ naitra, naitra simplement, chair et
souffle, comme un enfant - et anonyme des lors, comme chaque homme
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doit l'etre - , dans la parole commune?' (MR, p. 73).
The possible echo here of the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation
is another example of Bonnefoy's fondness for alluding to systems
of thought or belief to which he does not explicitly subscribe but
with which he may wish in particular contexts to express his sympathy
indirectly. His main emphasis, however, is not here on established
religious doctrine. He had earlier written, towards the end of
•L'Acte et le lieu de la poesie', 'Deja, pour celui qui cherche,
et meme s'il sait bien qu'aucun chemin ne le guide, le monde autour
de lui sera une demeure de signes. Le moindre objet, 1'etre le plus
fugitif, par le bien qu'ils feront, reveilleront l'espoir d'un bien
absolu' (i , p. 128). His later theory, though well aware of this
hope, might be content to say, 'pour celui qui cherche . . . le
monde autour de lui sera'♦ For 'signe' in the context of 'Baudelaire
contre Rubens' and Bonnefoy's other more recent work is not a mere
pointer, and should not be confused with Saussure's linguistic sign;
and if it comes from 'la parole commune', it is nevertheless not
observed from the outside, as by the analytical consciousness, but
seen, as it were, from the inside, through the poet's participation
in the communication which is its raison d'etre. This sign, in other
words, is the artistic experience which is called in L'Arriere-nays
'£, la fois signe et substance' (AP, p. 10) and expressed in Bans le
leurre du seuil in these terms:
... la lumiere joue avec la lumiere
Et le signe est la vie
Bans l'arbre de la transparence de ce qui est.
Je crie, Regarde,
Le signe est devenu le lieu. (P, pp. 277-8)
It is interesting that this last expression of something which, in
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terms of Bonnefoy's prose writings, represents a relatively recent
development, is to be found (though perhaps in a rather imperfect
context) in a poem published in Cahiers du Sud as early as 1962 which
only found its place in a published volume, Bans le leurre du seuil.
in 1975:
Lieu
. . . Tu es cachee
Et pourtant tu emplis la grande salle.
Tu es absente
Et pourtant la musique dans nos voix.
Le signe est devenu le lieu, les marches sombres
Se sont enfin elargies et brisees.
Sur la terrasse de pierre
Nous voici maintenant pour tout un jour.
Peut-etre sommes-nous comme la flamme
Quand elle se detache du flambeau,
La phrase de fumee un instant lisible
(6)
Avant de s'effacer dans l'air souverain.
The play of permanence and impermanence, of absence and presence, in
this poem marks it as an imperfectly realised formulation of a kind
of imagery of physical substance which will only find full expression
on the much larger canvas of Bans le leurre du seuil. The quotation
from that volume which I have just given (p. 195) continues:
Sous le porche de foudre
Eendu
Nous sommes et ne sommes pas.
Entre avec moi, obscure,
Accepte par la breche au cri de faim.
Et soyons I'un pour 1'autre comme la flamme
Quand elle se detache du flambeau,
La phrase de fumee un instant lisible
Avant de s'effacer dans 1'air souverain. (P, p. 278)
(6) in 'Poemes ebauches', Cahiers du Sud 365 (19^2), pp. 7-12
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It is interesting also that the later version involves the poet,
explicitly, in creating the moment of privileged experience he ex¬
presses ('Je crie, regarde . . . soyons 1'un pour 1'autre') - though
this of course remains a moment, instantaneous and ephemeral - and
this may be seen as representing a gain in poetic self-confidence
on Bonnefoy's part in parallel with the gain in self-confidence in
his critical and theoretical attitudes which I have pointed out,
even though the poetic image itself dates from much earlier.
XIX The languages of Bonnefoy's poetry
It is perhaps appropriate that in attempting to summarise the develop¬
ment of Bonnefoy's poetic theory - starting from his differing per¬
ceptions of the distinction between what might be called the analytic
and non-analytic ways of approaching reality, and going on to his
realisation of the value of human involvement in reality as a kind of
mediating force, in which can also be involved the contact between
artist and audience through the audience's experience of the work of
art - we have reached a point where we have to take some account of
the ways in which Bonnefoy's poetry reflects the development of the
theory which I have sketched. To look at Bonnefoy's poetry in this
perspective is perhaps to go the wrong way round, in that Bonnefoy
would certainly consider his poetry as the primary element in his
creative output, with his criticism and other prose writings playing
a secondary role.^ While acknowledging that, it may nevertheless
be useful to look briefly at the ways in which Bonnefoy's poetic
development may throw some light on his theory as set out in his
essays: a study primarily directed at his poetic practice could no
doubt, from a different perspective, similarly benefit from insights
taken from his critical work.
(l) He has in fact said as much (in conversation, Nice, 14 May 1975)*
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Bonnefoy has claimed, in a note appended to the KRP/Poesie edition of
his early poetry, that his poetic project had always been conceived
of as a whole: 'Ces poemes sont les premiers moments de ce qui fut -
depuis Anti-Platon, 1'origine - toujours conpu et attendu, mais par
mirage peut-etre, comme le devenir d'un seul livre en au moins quatre
parties* (KRP, p. 222). This statement - on which Bonnefoy has not,
to my knowledge, significantly expanded elsewhere, though a remark in
his note on the reprinting of 'L'Ordalie* seems to indicate that the
overall shape of his work did not turn out quite as expected ('Mais
voici la recherche plus avancee - quatre etapes, deja, sur le chemin,
j'avais cru que ce serait suffisant, - et je vois surtout maintenant
que les couranis de 1'ecriture ne se partagent pas aussi simplement
que je le pensais.' (0, p. 44)) - could of course mean anything, or
nothing. The typical qualifying phrase 'mais par mirage peut-etre'
leaves it unclear whether Bonnefoy is claiming that a project for
his entire poetic output was mapped out in detail at a very early
stage of his career, or whether he simply grasped in principle at an
early stage the basis of his poetic endeavour, whose details would
depend to a considerable extent on the course taken by his life and
his artistic preoccupations generally. Whatever Bonnefoy may have
had in mind in making the statement, however, it is indeed possible
to see his work as a progression exploring in different ways and with
a growing depth of penetration the relationship between human conscious¬
ness and its experience of the world, which includes the phenomena of
physical substance and of death. His critical work may equally be
seen, to some extent at least, as pursuing a parallel course: and
while the major part of this study has been concerned with exploring
the consistent elements in his critical work, I have indicated in the
previous section how his attitudes have changed and developed over time.
- 199 -
Similarly, the developing approaches of Bonnefoy's poetry to the
relationship "between consciousness and reality, whether or not they
are to he seen as four parts of 'un seul livre', could he categorised
in a number of ways, depending on the critical approach adopted:
John E Jackson, for instance, summarises his investigation of Bonnefoy's
poetic progress through his four main volumes under the headings 'Le
pays ou mourir . . . le temps recommence ... la presence et le rSve
(2)
. . . monde detruit et monde redime*. It is heyond my purpose here
to undertake a further analysis in these or similar terms of Bonnefoy's
poetic output. Analysis either of the content or the linguistic
structure of his poetry could no douht identify the characteristic
themes and the linguistic features which give his work its overall
homogeneity of tone and content, and contribute to the distinctive quality
of his poetic 'voice'. Bonnefoy's prosody, for instance, has been in¬
vestigated by Richard "Vernier in relation to Du mouvement et de
1'immobilite de Douve^ ^ and by Frederic Deloffre in relation to Pierre
ecrite^^
More immediately rerevant to my main purpose here of setting out the
ways in which Bonnefoy sees artistic creativity as operating in poetry
is some treatment of the extent to which each of his volumes of verse,
although possibly contributing to the single 'livre en au moins quatre
parties' referred to above, represents in some sense a fresh approach
to reality through the development of a distinctive style of poetic
(2) John E Jackson, La Question du moi (NeuchHtel, 1978), pp. 243-324.
(3) Richard Vernier, 'Prosodie et silence dans un recueil d'Yves
Bonnefoy', Studia Meoqhilologica 43 (1973)» PP« 288-97.
(4) Frederic Deloffre, 'Versification traditionnelle et versification
liberee d'apres un recueil d'Yves Bonnefoy', in Le Vers franpais
au vingtieme siecle. Actes du collogue de Strasbourg, ed. Parent
(Paris, 1967), PP. 43-53, with discussion, pp. 56-64.
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language. In 'Baudelaire contre Rubens' Bonnefoy clearly states the
importance of the specifically verbal element within each volume.
Talking of the 'nouvelle evidence' (ME, p. 70) of the relationship
between life and art which he has experienced, as against the tempt¬
ations of routine or rhetoric, he concludes:
Je voudrais rappeler, en bref, ce qui a lieu aux premiers
instants de la creation poetique. J'ai dit, on ne 1'a
entendu que trop, j'ai repete, je redis encore, hantise qui
est bien sHr une tentation, un appel, que le livre de poesie
s'organise comme une langue, se ferme ainsi a toute autre
langue, fragmente done 1'unite, compromet ou ruine la presence.
(ME, p. 75)
We may pause here to note that this is a restatement of the extreme
position that written language, even in poetry, must fail as a medium
of communication precisely because it represents a 'langue', in the
idiosyncratic approach that Bonnefoy takes to Saussure's distinction,
rather than the living impulse towards verbal communication represented
by 'parole'. It is therefore fixed and static, rather than dynamically
active, 'comme une monnaie qu'on a retiree de l'echange' (ME, p. 64).
This view in itself, however, is not one with which the poet can be
satisfied, however much it may represent 'une tentation, un appel',
because the simple acceptance that poetry can only exist in such
static terms is in fact a denial of the poetic impulse and ultimately
of the possibility of communication through language in poetry at all.
Bonnefoy goes on to describe the status of the poetic impulse itself:
Mais le mot avec lequel on va commencer d'ecrire, le mot qui
a monte dans ma voix tendue vers cette phrase future, qui doit
etre pour tous, qui tient aussi du serment, ce mot, s!il se
propose a moi, e'est avant le travail des surdeterminations
inconscientes qu'il le fait, e'est avant meme celui des
conceptualisations de la prose 'de reportage' ordinaire: et
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en ceci il reste contemporain de mon espoir de presence, il ne
1'a pas abolie dans ce premier pas, ne de mon emotion a
precisement des rencontres, des sympathies, des attachements,
il en porte inentamee 1'exigence. (KR, p. 75)
The problem, however, remains: how can the poetic impulse, even embodied
in the kind of primal articulacy here described, find some form of more
permanent existence which will nevertheless avoid the dead stasis of
ordinary written language? Bonnefoy goes on to hint at a solution and,
typically, turns away from it almost immediately:
Bans cet instant d'origine encore, l'absolu, c'est-a-dire
1*incarnation, laisse a briller en lui un reflet au moins de
son brasier, notre verbe. Les voBtements d'un sacre - le
pain et le vin, disait Hdlderlin -, ce mot de 1'instauration
ebauchee reste assez robuste pour en supporter le grand poids
et s'articuler de leur lumiere. Et c'est done de ce fait un
carrefour. (HR, p. 75)
The suggestions here are complex. In the first place, the poetic im¬
pulse may be imbued with symbolic significance through the poet's use
of 'les mots profonds'. As we have seen earlier, however, Bonnefoy's
attitude to these is ambiguous: he sometimes suggests that they may
name universally valid essences, while elsewhere he considers that
they may call up notions of particular psychological significance to
individual poets, as when he states that they 'varient certes avec
chacun d'entre nous' (i , p. 252). Here, however, he is suggesting
something further - that the poetic word may, at least potentially,
make contact with the central enactive religious symbol of the Heal
Presence, as a reminder of the word having literally been made flesh.
But this suggestion is of course not one to which Bonnefoy, as an
atheist, could give other than temporary and oblique assent. It is
therefore tempered, characteristically, by the implication that even
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this poetic revelation may depend not on any kind of intrinsic validity
"but on the force it may be given in the work of a great poet - and
the indirectness of this is compounded ironically by the example he
alludes to of Hdlder]in' s Brod und Wein, an elegy which in fact laments
the separation between common reality and any kind of divinity.
In any case, therefore, any suggestion - or at least any explicit
suggestion - of a form of validity for the poetic word can only lead
to a kind of crossroads at which, as in L'Arriere-pays, the poet runs
the risk of concluding only that the possibility of true poetic
articulacy lies along the road he has not taken, while the actual
expression he has chosen remains subject to ' cet emiettement,
1 'apparence' (iffi, p. 75) • -And Bonnefoy finally suggests - though this
formulation may well, and in the dialectic spiral of his thought
indeed must, turn out yet again to be provisional - that the poet must
turn his back on his writing considered in any way as an absolute,
while maintaining a commitment to its validity as a kind of ephemeral
commentary on a human endeavour which itself, ironically, is authentic
only insofar as it seeks to explore the possibility of the poetic
word as an absolute expression of presence;
qui m'empeche de refuser non le fait de cette ecriture - elle
est la, c'est mon choix d'aujourd'hui, que je ne puis desavouer
- mais tout son poids de symboles particuliers, de hantises,
tout ce fatum qu'elle a substitue, desir ferme sur son r§ve,
a cette ouverture d'hier et de demain? . . . Ecrire, certes,
- qui a jamais pu ne pas le faire? Mais desecrire, aussi bien,
par une experience complementaire au poeme, par la maturation
que lui seul permet, les fantasmes et les cbimeres dont notre
passe, autrement, obscurcirait notre vue. Et au total, non
plus desormais quelque livre aveuglement confirme deux ans
apres par un autre, mais une vie ou, l'ecrit n'etant plus dans
sa profondeur meme de polysemies et d'images qului brouillon
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qui s'effacerait a mesure, ce qui se ferait peu a peu, et
parlerait comme tel, c'est une presence a soi, un destin:
la finitude qui se fait claire et veille ainsi sur le sens.
(ME, pp. 75-76)
This fairly dense statement of the ways in which the poet's conscious¬
ness may relate to his work as that work develops is some distance
from, hut is nevertheless relevant to, the consideration of the
developing work as a reflection of the poet's artistic development
generally - a perspective which must he of some importance to the
reader who for his part is anxious to establish through the all-too-
fallible 'text' the dimension of communication which he must hope to
participate in with the poet if his experience of the poetry is to he
of any value at all. Bonnefoy gives us a glimpse of the poetic process
seen in this light in his essay 'Sur la fonction du poeme', when he
talks of the 'rupture' from which the writing of a volume of poetry
starts:
Bans cet esprit, je ne cherche pas, au debut, a dire, ayant
au contraire une langue (celle du livre anterieur) a ouhlier,
sacrifier. Et vient un moment ou les mots surgissent, ebauchant
le reseau dont il me faudra emplir les espaces, comprendre le
vouloir, elaguer le sens. Un jour la langue nouvelle est la,
avec sa logique. (ME, p. 274)
This partly echoes the mention in 'Baudelaire contre Rubens' of 'le mot
avec lequel on va commencer d'ecrire' (MR, p. 75) > "but the notion of
a separate 'language' being almost deliberately created for each book
of poetry takes a stage further the idea in 'Baudelaire contre Rubens'
of each volume having its own language, even if that language, from
the point of view of the outside observer, can only be considered
and commented on as 'langue' rather than 'parole'. Later in 'Sur la
fonction du poeme', Bonnefoy goes on to warn off the potential critic -
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particularly the 'formalist' critic - who might be tempted to
'/confondre/ le texte d'un livre - qui est bien une langue, un
univers, avec ses lois, son dire plus nombreux que le contenu
explicite, son moi mythique en lieu et place de la presence - et
l'ecriture -possible d'une personne, groupe de transformations
combien plus vaste a son tour que les partis definis et occasionnels
par auoi se decident les livres' (HE, p. 276). It would be beyond
the scope of this study to consider in any detail what specific
peculiarities may be discerned in the languages of each of Bonnefoy's
books of poetry, and what connections (if any) may be demonstrated
between them and the poetic impulse which produced them. Such an
analysis would have to consider, on the level of syntax as well as
on that of imagery, to what extent each of Bonnefoy's four main books
of poetry represents a closed system, and in order to do this thoroughly
a full methodology of stylistic analysis would have to be set up to take
into account not only the features which are peculiar to each volume of
poetry, but also the features (such,as Graham Martin has suggested, as
the idiosyncratic use of articles^^) which may be found throughout
Bonnefoy's poetic language, but which are exceptional in relation to
standard French usage. This, while of great interest in relation to
Bonnefoy's poetic achievement generally, would be too ambitious a pro¬
ject for inclusion in this study which is basically concerned with
Bonnefoy's poetic theory as set out in his essays.
While, therefore, it would not be appropriate here to sketch in even
the outline of an exhaustive analysis of the development of Bonnefoy's
poetic language as a whole, it may be worth indicating the possible
scope of such an investigation and giving one or two pointers - in the
(5) Graham Dunstan Martin, 'Evoking the "objet profond": the poetry of
Yves Bonnefoy' in Michael Bishop, ed. The Language of Poetry: Crisis
and Solution (Amsterdam, 1980), p. 82. See also my discussion on the
definite article in 'Movement and Immobility in a Poem by Yves Bonnefoy',
Modern Language Review 72, 3 (July 1977)» p. 568.
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form of remarks on the more immediately obvious characteristics of
the differing uses of language and imagery in each of Bonnefoy's
volumes - towards the lines along which the investigation might be
pursued.
The bulk of such a study would have to be concerned with seeking to
tease out the ways in which idiosyncratic usages in the field of
syntax characterise Bonnefoy's language, and the particular language
of each of his books. It is impossible, without undertaking a full
analytical exercise, to give any real indication of what this investi¬
gation would reveal. It is clear, however, that it would have to take
into account, for instance, such obvious peculiarities of language
as the formula whereby, in Bu mouvement et de l'immobilite de Douve,
a close relationship between the poet's persona and the figure of
Douve is marked by such phrases as 'Je te voyais courir' (P, p. 25).
Further examples of the same syntactic fingerprint, which in Bonnefoy's
work is well-nigh confined to his first volume, are:
Je t'ai vue ensablee au terme de ta lutte (P, p. 29)
Je te decouvre etendue, (P, p. 51)
Mais je vois tes yeux se corrompre (P, p. 35)
je te vois luire, Douve immobile, (P, p. 38)
Je te nommerai guerre (P, p. 5l)
je tiens Douve morte (p, p. 55)
Toute une nuit je t'ai revee ligneuse, Douve, (P, p. 75)
Similarly, in Hier regnant desert the repeated and distinctive use of
the phrases 'II y a que . . .' or 'II y avait que . . .' give the
language of the volume a specific imprint and appear, in contrast to
the integrating phrase 'Je te ^/vois/ . . .' in Du mouvement et de
l'-jmmobilite de Douve, to reduce the poet's involvement in the poems
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and distance his persona from them. Examples of this are:
II y a que la transparence de la flamme / Amerement nie le
jour (P, p. 109)
II y a que la lampe brfilait has, (P, p. 110)
II y avait / Qu'une voix demandait d'etre crue, . . . (P, p. 115)
II y avait qu'il fallait detruire et detruire et detruire, (P, p. 117)
II y a que les doigts s'etaient crispes, (P, p. 127)
II y a qu'une epee etait engagee / Pans la masse de pierre. (P, p. 139)
In the language of Pierre ecrite.and particularly in that of Pans le leurre
du seuil. there are fewer examples of conspicuous verbal formulae. This
may reflect the achievement in Bonnefoy's later work of a poetic language
which is closer to ordinary syntactical usage than that of his first two
volumes - a feature which in its turn may demonstrate his developing
mastery of an idiom whose characteristics, in parallel with Bonnefoy's
theoretical preoccupations, are to describe a poetic world which has
clear links with the real world and which does not largely depend on
tightly-ordered and idiosyncratic forms of language, as such, to enact
its existence. This is not to imply, however, that a full investigation
of the language of the later volumes would not reveal equally character¬
istic, though less conspicuous, examples of syntactic organisation.
In Pierre ecrite, for instance, we may note a procedure whereby an
image is repeated in order to mark, in one of several possible ways,
a change in poetic intensity connected with the achievement, or with
a hint of the achievement, of presence. This procedure depends for
its effect on simple, bold repetition, with the same word taking on,
usually within a single line, two different levels of intensity, thus
bringing forcibly to the reader's attention the changing ontological
status of the image. Examples of this are:
Et le feuillage aussi brille sous le feuillage, (P, p. 163)
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L'arbre vieillit dans 1'arbre, c'est l'ete. / L'oiseau franchit
le chant de l'oiseau et s'evade. (P, p. 201)
Le jour au fond du jour sauvera-t-il / Le peu de mots que nous
fftmes ensemble? (P, p. 212)
... On a dit au coeur / D'etre le coeur. (P, p. 227)
These few indications may suffice to suggest that there are certainly
elements discernible at a syntactic level in each of Bonnefoy's books
of poetry which may show the individual characteristics of each, and
confirm the existence in each case of a separate 'langue nouvelle . . .
avec sa logique' (KB, p. 274)> even if a much more rigorous analysis
would be required to demonstrate in detail the ways in which the
particular 'mot qui a monte dans ma voix tendue vers cette phrase
future' (MR, p. 75) niay be seen to have manifested itself at each
stage of his poetic development and to reflect the development of his
theoretical preoccupations.
It may however be possible to demonstrate a little more clearly, even
on a very cursory examination of Bonnefoy's poetry, how, in his choice
of predominant areas of imagery in each book, his poetry may be seen
to move in parallel with his critical work. In particular, we may
note the changing status of mythology in his poetry, which seems to
reflect the movement of his theory towards a greater preoccupation
with simple reality and ordinary human concerns.
In the first place, Du mouvement et de l'immobilite de Douve places
much greater emphasis than the succeeding volumes on mythological
references. This may be seen on the one hand in the use of established
mythology, as in the mentions of the Maenad and the Osirian legends of
renewal in 'Le seul temoin' (P, pp. 45-50) and elsewhere, of the Phoenix
in a number of poems and of Cassandra in 'Hie est locus patriae' (P, p. 72)
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and 'Cassandre, dira-t-il . . .' (P, p. 79)- (These latter references
however represent a complex network of associations for Bonnefoy,
relating also to the character Cassandre in the early recit L'Ordalie,
whose Imagery 'prenait forme, irresistiblement, de poemes'.^) On
the other hand, the imagery of Du mouvement et de 1 'immobilite de Douve
depends also on more generalised references to figures which have a
mythological dimension but which are not treated as mythological
characters capable of being evoked directly by means of proper names,
as in the reference to Charon as '1'informs nautonier' in 'Aux Arbres'
(P, P. 43) or the various references to the salamander in 'La Salamandre'
(P, p. 74-77) and 'Lieu de la salamandre' (P, p. 89). Most important
of all in this volume are the references to the figure of Louve herself
- the only instance in which Bonnefoy has undertaken the creation of
an entirely new Mythological' figure, without any basis in given mytho¬
logical reference, and thus the establishment of an autonomous poetic
system which depends relatively little on any appeal or reference to
the mythological element in ordinary human experience.
In this respect the imagery of Hier regnant desert represents a movement
away from explicit reference to, and more particularly from the creation
of, any kind of mythology, and the beginnings of a greater emphasis on
the importance in poetic terms of phenomenal reality. Although the
book's tone is often negative, in that it concentrates in general on
the destruction and abandonment of any kind of fixed certainty such
as that which may be represented by 'given' mythology (in such poems
as 'La Beaute' (P, p. 114) or 'L'Imperfection est la cime' (P, p. 117))>
there are also indications of a positive acceptance of the value of
physical reality, as for instance in 'Rive d'une autre mort' (P, p. 101)
(6) L'Ephemere 1 (1966), p. 52.
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where 'L'oiseau qui s'est depris d'etre Phenix / Bemeure seul dans
1'arhre pour mourir./ ... II fait un lent retour a la matiere d'arbre'.
While, therefore, Eier regnant desert may he seen to some extent as
the volume in which Bonnefoy plunges almost in despair into mauvaise
presence, it also contains suggestions of a movement beyond that
negative state into the revelation of presence, no longer primarily
through contact with any form of mythology but through the exploration
of mauvaise presence itself, in the same way as Baudelaire is seen in
Bonnefoy's essay as having explored and identified himself with death
2
in order to make it articulate (i , p. 32); and this exploration leads
to the suggestion that meditation on simple reality may constitute a
way forward for the poet. A particular example of this movement to¬
wards the acceptance of, and involvement in, reality is the poem 'A
la voix de Kathleen Perrier' (P, p. 137) which in addressing itself
to an actual modern singer goes beyond anything else in Hier regnant
desert and to some extent prefigures the appearance of individual
human beings in Bans le leurre du seuil.
The imagery of Pierre ecrite avoids any overt rejection of mythological
references such as may be found in 'La Beaute' or 'L'Imperfection est
la cime', and this may in itself indicate a further stage in the devel¬
opment of Bonnefoy's concern to make contact with the real, rather
than with any sort of readily-available mythological system, since
given mythology has simply been overtaken rather than having to be
explicitly rejected. In Pierre ecrite Bonnefoy moves towards the
expression of physical substance in two main ways - through the icon-like
naming of individual poems *Une pierre', on which I have remarked in
passing earlier (see p. 69 above), and through a strikingly direct and
powerful form of evocation of the plenitude of nature.
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We may contrast the first of these poetic procedures - the device
whereby poems are named 'Une Pierre' - with Bonnefoy's attempt in
his first volume to create a mythological figure, Douve, to be integrated
into a system depending also to some extent on given mythological
references. The naming of poems 'Une Pierre', and their integration
into the overall scheme of the volume Pierre ecrite, again aims at
associating the imagery of the volume with something beyond the poems
themselves, and something beyond the simple reference-system of ordinary
language: but the difference is that whereas Du mouvement et de
l'immobilite de Douve tries to set up something approaching a mytho¬
logical system, which in the last analysis can be appreciated, in the
modern age, only on the level of intellectual abstraction, Pierre ecrite
associates its imagery with the physical substance of stone, a common
element of all human experience as well as, in terms of Bonnefoy's
theory of the enactive power of poetic language, an 'objet prcfond'
(H, p. 244)- The plenitude of nature in Pierre ecrite may equally be
mediated at times (as, in the sequence 'L'ete de nuit (P, pp. l63-17l)>
by indirect reference to the myth of the Garden of Eden), but it is
nevertheless more forcefully and freely expressed than in previous
volumes. Where mythological figures appear explicitly in Pierre ecrite
(as in the case of Phenix in 'Le lieu des morts' (P, p. I83), Aglaure
in 'Une pierre' (P, p. 190) or Core in 'Le Dialogue d'angoisse et de
desir' (P, p. 220)) they are not mentioned simply for the sake of the
strength of the validating mythological reference which they might
bring into the poems from outside, but take their place naturally as
one of a number of elements of imagery, along with images of the
natural world, of the world as seen by art, and to some extent of
ordinary life (particularly in 'Jean et Jeanne' (P, p. I89), where
the human figures, though not without archetypal significance, are
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basically seen as individuals).
This tendency towards the concentration of a number of ranges of
imagery on simple human experiences is continued in bans le leurre
du seuil. Here, the system of poetic reference within which Bonnefoy
operates is less than ever dependent on given mythology or on any
attempt (as with the figure of Douve) to create a direct equivalent
of myth, but relies to a very large extent on the building-up of
images taken from reality, which in some cases are clearly identifiable
as coming from Bonnefoy5s own experience: these autobiographical elements
do not however jar on the reader but take their place naturally in the
image-system which the poem as a whole sets up. It is even less
appropriate to treat Bans le leurre du seuil as simply a collection
of shorter pieces than is the case with the earlier volumes. Thus,
the mention of a deathbed experience of Boris de Schloezer (P, p. 234)
serves to illustrate the gap with which Bonnefoy is concerned at this
point in the poem between the simple plenitude of physical existence
and man's yearning to make of that plenitude something beyond physical
existence; but the mention of this particular incident in itself anchors
the poem in the reality of the poet's human experience and thus serves
to avoid any suggestion of a discussion of abstract ideas, which would
otherwise be a considerable risk here. Similarly, later in the poem
the mention of an inscription in the 'grand grenier' by 'Jean Aubry,
d'Orgon / Et ses fils Claude et Jean' (P, p. 320) puts a seal of
lived experience on the poet's assent to the concrete reality of a
particular phenomenon - both because of the validating force of the
existence of the inscription itself and because its simple mention
in this context brings into the poem an element of the poet's own
experience, without this being merely anecdotal on the one hand or
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on the other an attempt to import any kind of given mythological
reference which itself could tend towards conceptual abstraction.
On a different level, the poetic system of Dans le leurre du seuil
develops and makes more explicit a theme which had appeared, in very
allusive form, in Pierre ecrite: that of the poet's experience of
the visual arts, as exemplified by the paintings of Poussin and in
particular by the two paintings of 'Moise sauve des eaux' referred
to by Bonnefoy in L'Arriere-nays (AP, pp. 88-9 and 155)* In "the
earlier book, the references to a common motif in Poussin's painting
had simply been to 'la robe rouge' and 'le rouge de la robe'(in 'La Chambre'
(P, p. 199) and 'L'Arbre, la lampe' (P, p. 201)). In Dans le leurre
du seuil, however, the references are more directly to the human context
in which the characteristic artistic device of a splash of colour appears:
the poem evokes 'La fille de Pharaon / Et ses servantes, // Celles dont
1'eau, encore / Avant le jour, / Reflete renversee / L'etoffe rouge'
(P, p. 244) and 'le rouge des lourdes / Etoffes peintes / Que lavait
l'Egyptienne, 1'irreveillee, / Le nuit, dans 1'eau du fleuve (P, p. 259)•
We can therefore see, through a very brief consideration of the imagery
of Bonnefoy's successive volumes and in particular of the way in
which given or constructed mythological references are displaced in
favour of more personal, but at the same time more universal, types
of imagery, how Bonnefoy's poetry may be said to reflect his developing
theoretical concerns. While it may be worth emphasising again that
this is very far from being a rigorous demonstration, it may have
served to indicate, in however sketchy a way, certain parallels in
the development from Bonnefoy's more rigid earlier habits of mind,
in both poetry and theory, to his later more relaxed, wide-ranging
and genuinely human preoccupations.
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XX Poetic theory and the theory of art
Having considered the ways in which Bonnefoy's poetic theory has de¬
veloped through his essays, and looked briefly at the ways in which
his main volumes of poetry may be taken to show a broadly analogous
development, we may complete this study with some remarks on the re¬
lationship between his art criticism and his literary and aesthetic
criticism.
Bonnefoy is, of course, an art critic by profession, and this may
explain to some degree the very considerable bulk of his art criticism
in comparison with that of those of his writings which deal specifically
with poetry or with literature generally (16 of the 29 items in the
1980 edition of L'Improbable are wholly or mainly concerned with the
visual arts, as are 8 of the 19 items in Le Huage rouge). At the
same time, many of the essays dealing with art deal also in specific
terms with wider questions of aesthetic theory; as I have already
noted (p. 178 above), the subtitle of Le Nuage rouge is 'essais sur
la poetique'. A full treatment of Bonnefoy's views on all the visual
artists to whose work he has turned his attention \rould be outside the
scope of this study. It is clear, however, that the same general frame¬
work can be postulated for Bonnefoy's treatment both of poetry and of
the visual arts: it may also be worth looking at one or two points
where the detailed treatment of a question relating to art may be
particularly applicable, by analogy, to poetic theory. From there
we may go on to consider briefly how far Bonnefoy's views on parts of
the history of art may refer to, even if they do not actually constitute,
some form of historical overview of the ways in which human artistic
creativity operates.
We may start by considering again Bonnefoy's most concise, and at the
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same time most puzzling, expression of the way in which he would wish
that an artistic medium should operate, and in which, in his more
positive and reckless moments, he simply asserts that it does operate.
Contrasting the work of Gaston-Louis Roux with what he sees as less
valid approaches to artistic creativity, Bonnefoy writes: 'Le
romantisme tragique de la separation d'avec la nature ou la societe,
l'angelisme de la poesie fin de siecle, le souci obsedant de l'ecriture
ont fait ou font ou feront la preuve de leur faiblesse: on representait
au lieu d'etre, alors qu'il faut, disons, etre la pierre par le mot
p
pierre, le gris instaurateur par la couleur grise' (I , p. 291).
This is one of the points in his essays where Bonnefoy deliberately
turns away from any coherent line of intellectual discourse - because
the essence of what he wants to say cannot be conveyed in terms of
discursive argument - and instead simply asserts the direct power of
art to express reality through the artistic medium's capability of
actually constituting reality. A similar example is his statement in
•La Poesie franpaise et le principe d'identite' that '/la langue/ semble
nous inviter a porter dans sa profondeur la parole qui fera etre ce
qu'elle nomine' (i , p. 250). One's sympathy for such assertions must
inevitably be intuitive rather than analytical, but if is important
to recognise that in terms of Bonnefoy's theory as a whole they con¬
stitute a necessary counterweight to the kind of closely-argued line
of reasoning which can only lead to the conclusion that such direct
expression of reality is simply impossible. At some points Bonnefoy
appears to assent to that conclusion, but the assertion of the contrary
at other points is equally necessary to a theory which strives to
present art as being, in some rather oblique sense, directly enactive
rather than representative. What John E Jackson, in describing
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Bonnefoy's concern for the paradoxical immediacy of the artistic
medium, says about 'le mot' could also apply to Bonnefoy's view of
the visual media:
Pour Yves Bonnefoy, en effet, le mot - le mot de poesie en
tout cas - tend a etre, autant et meme plus qu'un element
de signification, une image. Comprenons: une figuration du
reel. Comme 1'image, le mot, chez lui, se veut rapport a
l'etre. Plastique, au sens ou il se donne comme re-presentation
de la chose qu'il designe, il'est aussi bien ce rapport au
dehors, et par la l'espace de ce pari, au sens pascalien, ou
les hypotheses formelles definissent en verite un lien & la
fois ethique et ontologique au reel.
This is a concise summary of the position which is expressed by
Bonnefoy in his essays through an oscillation between assertion and
denial of the more extreme proposition that art can actually re-present
the objects of its concern without any mechanism of symbolic reference
(which implies abstraction) at all: and while Jackson is right to
describe this attitude, as far as language is concerned, as an 'ambition,
(2)
somme toute, pre-saussurienne', this need not imply that Bonnefoy's
attitude to language is any less valid for his own purposes than
Saussure's was for his. As I have mentioned in Part XVTII above, the
two lines of approach are separate and do not meet.
In any case, Bonnefoy's assertions of the hope that art may in some
immediate way be capable of actually expressing reality are normally
accompanied by one of his characteristic indications of possible doubt,
as when in 'La Poesie franpaise et le principe d'identite' he talks
of language which 'semble nous inviter a porter dans sa profondeur la
parole qui fera etre ce qu'elle nomme' (i , p. 250), or when in the
(1) John E Jackson, Yves Bonnefoy (Paris, 1976), 64.
(2) ibid, p. 65.
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essay on Gaston-Louis Roux he adds a faintly ironical 'disons' to the
assertion that 'il faut . . . etre la pierre par le mot pierre, le
gris instaurateur par la couleur grise' (i , p. 29l), thus implying
that the hope of immediacy can itself only be voiced in an imperfect
medium, language, which may account for the fact that the expression
of the hope must appear unsatisfactory.
We may now return, however, to the interesting juxtaposition here on
equal terms of statements about the nature of poetry and the nature
of painting, seen as creative media. This suggests that the painter's
aim of achieving through the colour on his palette the 'gris instaurateur'
which may express presence in a painting is subject to the same con¬
straints and difficulties as is the poet's aim of truly expressing
presence through words which are inevitably distanced from reality by
their normal function as references for concepts. Poetry, in other
words, is not at a unique disadvantage in comparison with the other
arts because its medium is itself involved with conceptual thought.
The medium of expression of the visual arts is equally compromised,
though the fact that colour, outside the context of a painting, is
simply substance rather than a pointer to something beyond itself cannot
be a disadvantage to the visual artist. The main point to be made,
however, is firstly that each medium may in certain undefined circum¬
stances achieve the expression of presence, even if this achievement
can only be described through the distorting medium of discursive
language; but secondly that each medium in itself has no automatic
contact with presence, which depends for its manifestation on some
mysterious quality of immanence which may infuse the intrinsically
inert words, or colour, in the context of a successful work of art.
The equivalence of language and colour as artistic media is again
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referred to in Bonnefoy's later essay on Claude Garache, 'Peinture,
poesie: vertige, paix', though here the possibility of artistic
expression is considered from a negative standpoint rather than
being in any sense asserted positively. Typically, Bonnefoy starts
with an assertion of the failure of language as an artistic medium:
Jamais d'immediat pour l'ecrivain, ... II sait, d*intuition,
la qualite de verite autre que propose une branche en fleurs,
ou une pierre qui roule, de rebords en rebords, dans un
ravin. Mais vouloir en recreer dans les mots la densite
infinie, ou le vide pur, ce n'est qu'un voeu d'emblee
insense, que la poesie, qui en vit, doit abandonner page
aprks page. (MR, p. 319)
The 'qualite de verite autre' to which Bonnefoy refers here is in
part the existential specificity of an individual phenomenon, seen,
however, as in some way different from its mere physical existence
and therefore in a sense transcendent as well as immanent. It is
indeed perhaps a measure of the failure of language to express
the plenitude of existential reality that the only way in which
language can directly refer, even in general terms, to that plenitude
is through a word implying transcendence rather than the immanence
which is basic to the experience of plenitude itself. In any case,
Bonnefoy's denial here, in conceptual terms, of the pretention of
poetry to express the intrinsic nature of things, and the statement
that poetry 'doit abandonner /le voeu insens£7 page apres page',
leaving the words on the page as the dead husks of what might have
been the elements of the expression of reality, are to be taken as
categorical only in their own limited terms. Hovering behind the
reference to poetry 'qui en vit' is an ■unexpressed and conceptually
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inexpressible assertion that poetry can, in fact, work the miracle.
Bonnefoy goes on, in 'Peinture, poesie: vertige, paix', to consider
the ways in which, on the face of it, painting might he seen as an
artistic endeavour more directly in touch with reality than writing.
He concludes, however, that the analogs'- between painting and poetry
is complete. In neither case can the medium be seen as an intrinsic¬
ally satisfactory means of expression of reality; in either case,
however, the artist may achieve a sudden and inexplicable contact
with presence;
II n'y a pas d'immediatete aux commencements du peintre, et
il n'y en a pas davantage la ou sa recherche aboutit. Les
dechiffrements conventionnels, il les a refuses, bien stir,
et remplaces, mais il les maintient aussi du seul fait qu'il
cherche a les vaincre, et il ne fait pour finir qu'ajouter
aux intrications du travail du signe sur 1'etre, doublant la
langue commune de celle de son genie. Et, reciproquement,
tel fragment chez des poetes - ainsi: 'J'ai vu le soleil
bas . . ,',dans Le Bateau ivre - -peut etre aussi brutalement
'rouge', malgre les mots, que le tableau de Van Gogh le plus
ardent h vouloir 1'outre-regard.
II n'y a pas d'immediatete, il n'y a que ce desir d'immediat,
que tant eprouvent. (NR, p. 323)
Here, of course, we reach the point where discursive criticism inev¬
itably ends and subjective impressionism takes over, for the assertion
that a phrase of Rimbaud's is 'rouge' is possibly even less strictly
verifiable than Mallarme's conviction that the word nuit has a
'sonorite qui est claire', whose subjectivity Bonnefoy recognises in
his comment 'Mallarme en tout cas n'en a pas doute' (hR, p. 186).
Such assertions are of doubtful value if considered as analysis of
the nature of the poetic language in question, but may be valid as
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insights into the poetic effect of the words on a particular reader.
What is more relevant here is the fact that Bonnefoy places his
assertion of the 'redness' of Rimbaud's phrase - which is presumably
an indication that in his view the poet has here achieved some form
of immediate expression of presence - in the context of an explicit
assertion that painters, like poets, cannot achieve such direct
expression of the intrinsic nature of reality. This is therefore
another example of the deliberate ambiguity with which Bonnefoy often
surrounds his comments on the possibility, or impossibility, of art
achieving contact of this kind.
The expression here of the visual artist's final achievement as one
of only contributing 'aux intrications du travail du signe sur l'etre,
doublant la langue commune de celle de son genie' is again reminiscent
of Bonnefoy's ideas on poetic language and particularly of his argument
that the poet may in some way create a separate language for each of
his volumes of poetry, which I have discussed above (pp. 202-203). A
further parallel between painting and poetry as artistic media may be
seen, once again, in Bonnefoy's short essay on Gaston-Louis Roux.
Speaking of '1'accord juste de deux couleurs', he says:
Voici que deux donnees de la perception, en elles-memes
insignifiantes, font a deux comme un bruissement, comme un
ange; cependant que la chose qui a prete ses aspects, offert
ce jaune et ce rouge, est effacee comme objet mais se reforme
en tant qu'ame, connue de 1'interieur desormais par ce projet
d'harmonie qui etait en elle, et n'y etait que pour nous.
(I2, pp. 289-90)
This is a less obscure formulation of the possibility of art expressing
presence than the later mention in the same essay of 'etre . . . le
gris instaurateur par la couleur grise' (I , p. 291). Its emphasis
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on the artistic effect of the juxtaposition of colours echoes Mallarme's
idea, on which Bonnefoy comments in •La Poetique de Mallarme', that
even if the word nuit is in some mysterious way light in itself, it
may nevertheless, through its juxtaposition with other words in a
line of poetry, lose something of its intrinsic quality and indirectly
enact the true meaning of what it names:
reunis a d'autres ^mots/ de son espece - subtil, par exemple,
et triomphe, ou meme ancien, au debut du Faune - le son nuit
va permettre S, plusieurs notions de s'allumer chacune d'un
reflet venu de chaque autre: et toutes s'approfondiront, se
rectifieront. dans ce rapprochement opere sous le signe clair, -
dans la lucidite d'un son pur . . . (HR, pp. 189-90)
In the same way as we must remember, in cases where Bonnefoy is ex¬
plicitly denying the power of the poetic word, or of the elements of
visual art, that the denial is implicitly the reverse side of a forceful
but irrational assertion of the contrary, we should be careful to
remember in contexts like this comment on Mallarme that Bonnefoy is
only giving a temporary and provisional assent to the positive assertions
with which he is dealing. His own overall attitude - which can only be
gauged if we take into account simultaneously both the positive and
negative assertions that he makes - is that of a precarious equilibrium
between belief in the direct power of art to represent reality, and the
denial of that belief, or at any rate the denial that that belief can
be articulated in any way which does not betray its essence.
From the examples I have given above, therefore, it will be clear that
although Bonnefoy does not formulate a coherent theory of the expression
of reality through the visual arts - as indeed he formulates no coherently
set-out theory of the expression of reality through literature - he
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nevertheless sees the possibilities and limitations of the two media
as being analogous, if not identical. It may now be worthwhile to
look at two of the essays in Le Efuage rouge which expand somewhat on
the nature of the representation of reality in art - those dealing
with Elsheimer and Mondrian - to consider how Bonnefoy sees the
artistic symbol as operating in practice in similar ways to the
symbol in poetry.
It is interesting that in these two essays Bonnefoy comes closer than
anywhere else in his writings to undertaking the exercise of
explication de texte, though the texts in question are not works of
literature but paintings. As would be expected, however, he does not
undertake a technical analysis but instead considers the paintings -
Elsheimer's Derision de Ceres and Mondrian's Le Nuage rouge - within
the artists1 work as a whole as examples of how a particular artistic
statement relates to the reality (whether phenomenal or mythological)
of its subject, and what implications can be drawn from this about
the nature of the artistic symbol generally in the historical context
of the paintings in question.
Bonnefoy sees Elsheimer, first of all, as a highly individual artist
standing at a particular point in art history at which the assumptions
of the Italian Benaissance were beginning to be questioned:
Et ainsi lisons-nous dans les tableaux d'Elsheimer a la fois
les singularites sans recours d'un §tre de solitude et la mise
en question tres lucide, tres resolue de cette poetique de
l'approche de l'etre par la forme que la Renaissance italienne
avait tenue pour un vrai savoir, mais en se vouant de ce fait
a une autre et bien pire solitude. (HR, p. 96)
We will return to the question of how Bonnefoy's critical work may be
taken to reflect and comment on the history of art and the history of
culture of which it is a part. It may now however be worth exploring
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how Elsheimer is seen, in his painting of the Derision de Ceres in
particular, as carrying out a 'mise en question . . . de /la7 poetique
de l'approche de l'etre par la forme*. The painting (which shows an
episode .from Ovid's Metamorphoses in which Ceres, while searching for
Proserpine, stops at a house to ask for a drink of water and, annoyed
"by a boy who has mocked her, throws some of the water over him,
turning him into a lizard) is seen as an exemplar of the artistic
process. Bonnefoy comments first of all on the mythological background:
Ceres est l'etre, que 1'esprit de possession vient eteindre dans
chaque vie qu'eclairait le sens. Proserpine est la vie qui
pourrait etre presence, participation a un sens, al'etre done,
et que voici alienee de soi: comme il en va aussi en peinture,
quand un intelligible y reduit ce qui est a d'abord la forme
spatiale, quitte a le voir prendre figure insolite et s'obscureir
et se taire des que lui-meme devient un dogme. (MR, p. 99)
This is a reiteration, in terms adapted to the particular work of art
on which Bonnefoy is commenting, of his oft-repeated explicit view of
the impossibility of the expression of the true existence of reality
through art, of the inevitable involvement of the artistic process in
abstraction, and of the loss of contact between art and reality.
Bonnefoy asserts the nature of the artistic symbol as a mediating
force between reality and the substantive existence of the raw material
of art (whether that be words or colour), but states that this mediation
can only operate through a process of association which is itself
subject to the fluctuation of the ontological validity of the artistic
impulse which informs it. The power of the symbol is therefore by no
means self-evident - though even when it is subject to the kinds of
failure described here, it may still show considerable artistic strength
when, taking the form of a myth like this episode of the story of Ceres
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and Proserpine, it enacts those kinds of failure themselves. The
image of Ceres'5 desolate quest for her daughter thus attains a certain,
albeit negative, artistic validity through being underlined by the
metamorphosis of boy into lizard: 'Pes pattes prendront les places
des membres, le corps s'amenuisera, la divinite a voulu que l*offenseur
devienne un lezard, j 'aimerais dire une salamandre• (MR, p. 100).
(The last phrase is in part ironical, since the mythological overtones
of the salamander would be inappropriate in this context, but neverthe¬
less shows obliquely the importance which Bonnefoy attaches to the
participation of the observing commentator in the experience of a work
of art.)
In order for the individual artistic statement to achieve some form
of positive validity, however, in an age such as the immediate pre-
Baroaue period in which Elsheimer was working, and which Bonnefoy
sees as to some degree analogous to the modern age, the artist must
himself provide an element of redemptory transformation of the
•condition malheureuse' (MR, p. 101) of the myth which he uses as raw
material. Bonnefoy sees such a transformation as having been achieved
through an incidental detail of the foliage of trees in the painting
which acts as a kind of catalytic ephemere:
voici ce peu de feuillage dont j'ai parle, ces branches ou la
lumiere des torches, qui y a porte des crevasses, eveille
maintenant les vibrations infinies de ce qu'un siecle plus tard
on nommera la nature. . . Va-t-on penser que je donne trop a
ces quelques branches encore noires? Mais ne faut-il pas
comprendre plutot que dans l'ecriture de poesie l'essentiel se
joue sur une nuance? Un mythe a ete revecu dans sa profondeur
signifiante par le travail inexplicite mais lucide de I'ecriture
du peintre. (MR, p. 101)
The basic parallelism of the media of literature and painting is here
strikingly expressed. Bonnefoy goes on to describe what Elsheimer
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achieves in the painting as the expression of 'une intermittence
saisonniere, "une precarite a jamais: ce qui est, un et multiple
maries par des ramures vivantes - un absolu et un infini qui valent
aussi et d'abord pour le regard de 1'artiste* (HR, pp. 101-2).
Bonnefoy therefore sees in Elsheimer's painting a kind of contact
with reality which has been achieved through the painter's attachment
to an incidental detail which, while itself remaining incidental
rather than occupying the centre of the artist's (literal or meta¬
phorical) field of vision, nevertheless allows the work of art as
a whole to reflect the plenitude of existence. This is of course
closely related to what, in the context of poetic theory, I have
called 1'enhemere: something like the 'vitre au soleil du soir'
(i , p. 13l) which appears at the end of (though only indirectly as
a result of) the intellectual convolutions of 'L'Acte et le lieu de
la poesie', or the 'simple' to which poetry must come 'comme les
betes lointaines a l'eau le soir', as Bonnefoy puts it in L'Ordalie,
despite the necessity of the poet also in some sense taking account
of 'les mille excarnations que l'on a ete' (0, p. 45)- The necessary
intellectual preliminaries to the expression of reality through
l&phemere are represented, in Elsheimer's picture, by the use made
of the background of given mythology, which is thus itself transformed
in what Bonnefoy calls 'cette redecouverte du mythe' (NR, p. 102),
This however can only come about in this particular way in the specific
historical context within which Elsheimer was working, which itself
reflects the degree of acceptance by society of the validity of symbols
whose significance is basically religious:
Car 1'avenir va le confinner: du moment que nous ne disposons
plus d'un sacre, avec ses references, dieux par example,
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explicitement denommees, on peut encore, on doit meme interroger
les mythes, irremplapables, dans les recits que nous en trouvons,
ici ou la, mais il faut d'abord les mettre a 1'epreuve de notre
condition comme elle est, les reentendre a travers ses voix a
elles, brouillees, les reformer de notre substance, sinon ils
ne sont vite que de trop belles images, qui disent notre nostalgie
mais nullement notre verite, et restent d'ailleurs en depa de la
maturation, de 1'illumination, souhaitables. (KR, p. 102)
The phrase 'du moment que nous ne disposons plus d'un sacre' defines
Bonnefoy's view of the historical context within which the modern artist
- the post-Renaissance artist, that is - must work, just as he sees the
^ 2
modern poet as coming 'apres les dieux' (i , p. 107). He expands on
the idea, which I will consider in more detail later, that the first
moment of the truly modern artistic consciousness was the early Baroque
period, that of 'Elsheimer et Poelenburgh et Breenbergh, des protestants,
les premiers qui furent prives de la Presence reelle, d'ou leur hantise
de Rome' (MR, pp. 104-5)» in Rome 1650. We may note here, however, the
clear association established between the historical circumstances in
which an artist finds himself and his attitude to the key question which,
according to Bonnefoy, lies at the centre of the artist's endeavour -
the investigation of the 'means for the metaphysical approach to the
sacred' which he mentions in relation to Mallarme. It is interesting
also that Bonnefoy is able, as here in the context of Elsheimer, to
discuss much more explicitly in relation to painting than in relation
to poetry the question of the ways in which a modern artist may use
given mythological references in his work: presumably the discussion
of this in abstract terms in relation to poetry would impinge too closely
for comfort on his own continuing concerns as a practising poet.
(5) Bonnefoy: article on 'Symbolism' (trans. Spender) in The Concise
Encyclopaedia of English and American Poets and Poetry, ed. Spender
and Hall (London, 1963), p. 325« ~~~~~
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However, "before considering the question of Bonnefoy's attitude to art
history generally, and to the function of the artistic symbol at different
historical moments, it may be useful to look briefly at an essay in
which he takes a painting from a different historical period as the
subject of what is almost an explication de texte - 'Quelques notes
sur Mondrian', whose subject gives the volume Le Huage rouge its title.
Here, as often when Bonnefoy meditates on a particular artist or a
particular work of art, the relationship between the painting and what
it may be taken to represent is explored from a number of different
angles rather than being described by a process of logical argument
leading to a single, supposedly definitive, interpretation. Bonnefoy
first of all sketches in a view of the relationship between the painting
and the given mythological references (in a broad sense) which may be
seen as relevant to it:
Meme les couleurs du Huage rouge, bleu du manteau de la Yierge,
emeraude de l'alchimie, rouge dont Delacroix ensanglantait
1'Ideal, sonnent la une fois de plus dans l'histoire les trois
notes fondamentales de notre condition qui veut forcer ses
limites.
II reste que ce grand signe qui domine la terre nue, cette nuee
qui eclaire tout comme un autre buisson ardent, n'offre pas, au
second regard, la nettete des epiphanies qu'aimaient evoquer
les anciens peintres. (MR, p. 117)
The implication here is that while a modern painting like Le Nuage
rouge may contain a number of resonances from given mythology (within
which I include, in this context, religious references), such references
themselves cannot constitute the work of art's central communicative
element. We are not concerned here, as was the case with Elsheimer's
Derision de Ceres, with some kind of 'redecouverte du mythe' (NR, p. 102),
even if such a rediscovery in order to be truly valid must be further
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transformed "by the artist's own contact with reality through
1'ephemere. The possibility of true contact with reality through
myth may be referred to in a modern work of art, but must neverthe¬
less be considered as illusory in the modern age which, Bonnefoy
again repeats, has no contact with religious certainty:
II y a eu une ombre d'epiphanie, un peintre a cru percevoir la
forme qui se detache du rien du monde, la flamme qui transfigure:
mais Mondrian est assez de notre epoque sans dieux pour percer
a jour ce mirage et lui faire avouer du fond meme de sa figure
furtive qu'il n'est qu'un reflet deform! de son desir qui se
cherche. (HR, p. 118)
The harshness of this dismissal of the validity of any reference to
given mythology is not, of course, to be taken as a statement of
Bonnefoy's final position on this point, but as a moment in his consid¬
eration of given mythology seen through the question of the ontological
validity of a particular implied reference in a particular painting.
The true artistic effect of the painting comes from a different source
- the way in which the cloud may be seen, once again, as a kind of
ephemere:
En somme, c'est la un autre 'nuage rouge'. Non plus une chose
de notre monde qui se fait le signe d'un absolu, mais notre
univers comme tel qui, de 1'interieur, se revele I- la fois la
diversite des etres et 1'unite que les lie, - a la fois le
rien et la plenitude, a la fois la tenebre et une lumiere.
Et ne faut-il done pas se tourner vers ce ciel qui est au fond
du hasard et - ecrivant meme, peignant - se simplifier pour
en faciliter la rencontre: renonpant aux pratiques qui jugent
la finitude, qui croient avoir raison contre elle, cherchant
l'universel au contraire sur les voies qu'elle nous indique?
(ME, p. 122)
And again, the particular quality of Mondrian's artistic project may
be seen as analogous to that of the literary artist, even if the
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effect of his work car only "be described through a relatively
technical comment on the way his use of colour suggests an ephemeral
presence:
c'est de toujours /que Mondrian/ a perpu, comme Racine ou
Mallarme qui furent souvent ses proches, la verite d'existence
sous la verite d'ecriture, le trouble dans le cristal. . .
^Dans Le Euage rouge7 aux confins du vert et du bleu, dans
1'etroitesse d'un peu de blanc et de noir mais qui vibrent a
1'infini, c'est la profondeur comme telle qui du coup se
signifie a 1'encontre, s'indique non abolie. Dimension autre,
cet horizon. (ER, pp. 122-3)
In this picture, therefore, Mondrian may be seen as seeking the ex¬
pression of, on the one hand, simple reality, and on the other, the
necessarily undefined 'vibration a 1'infini' to which true contact
with simple reality may give rise.
We see again here an example of how Bonnefoy's consideration of a
visual artist's approach to reality through painting comes to similar
conclusions to those he might draw about the approach of a poet to
reality through words. The comparisons he draws - or rather, the
juxtapositions he makes - between the artistic possibilities of the
literary and visual media show that he sees these possibilities,
whether or not they can be explicitly affirmed, as being broadly
similar. A further characteristic of his approach to both literature
and the visual arts is his apparent tendency to see artists as being
subject to the artistic possibilities peculiar to the historical
period in which they worked. This can be seen frequently in his
essays, as for example in the essay on Elsheimer, in which modem
artists are said to be working in a period where 'nous ne disposons
plus d'un sacre' (ER, p. 102), and more specifically in which Elsheimer,
Poelenburgh and Breenbergh are described as 'des protestants, les
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premiers qui furent prives de la Presence reelle' (HR, pp. 104-5).
A more striking and wide-ranging example of the kind of generalisation
Bonnefoy sometimes makes about a particular historical period is to
be found at the end of 'L'Architecture baroque et la pensee du destin',
where human artistic creativity is said to turn away from architecture
after the baroque period because of the impossibility of that art
expressing any kind of valid collective truth, and to turn instead
towards the possibilities of music, 'seul lieu maintenant possible
pour 1'emergence de l'Un', and in particular towards the possibilities
of the type of music which best represents the spirit of individuality
which is the only valid mode of artistic enterprise in the new histor¬
ical circumstances: 'C'est vers 1670, au declin de la grande architecture
romaine, qu'apparait le concerto, ou la voix solitaire d'un instrument
se detache de la communaute musicale' (i , p. 252).
This kind of idea could not, by its very nature, be written up into a
comprehensive history of culture: there would be too many obvious
exceptions to refute any facile assertion of what human artistic
creativity consists of, and of how it has been realised in different
art-forms and at different historical periods. Equally, any expression
of such a comprehensive theory would be foreign to Bonnefoy's habits
of thought, which tend to meditation on individual works of art and
the distinctive sensibilities of individual artists rather than to
the construction of all-embracing theories - and these would in any
case carry all the dangers of the philosophical system which Bonnefoy
points out in 'Les Tombeaux de Eavenne' and elsewhere. It may never¬
theless be worth investigating in a little more detail Bonnefoy's
views on painting and the other visual arts, as I have investigated
his views on poetry in parts XH-XV above, in the perspective of the
relationship between the individual artist's sensibility and the con¬
text in which he works - a relationship which, in Bonnefoy's view, is
at least partly historically influenced through the loss, at some
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point in the sixteenth or seventeenth century, of the medieval con¬
fidence in the unity of creation guaranteed by the central religious
symbol of the Heal Presence of Christ. (We may note in passing that
in theological terms it is wrong to see this, as Bonnefoy apparently
does in the passage on Elsheimer, Poelenburgh and Breenburgh quoted
above, as a specifically Protestant doctrine: while Zwingli abandoned
the doctrine of the Real Presence, Luther defended it at their debate
in Marburg in 1529.) Be that as it may, however, the principle re¬
mains, and the ways in which the history of art is affected by this
loss of the link between the religious or artistic symbol and the
reality whose spiritual dimension it may express are summed up by
Erich Heller, in relation to the seventeenth century:
Robbed of its real significance, what did the symbol signify?
Robbed of its symbolic meaning, what did reality mean? What
was the State on earth? A Leviathan. What was God? More and
more a deus absconditus, an infinitely remote and impenetrably
veiled God. This was not only the century of Newton, the
century of cosmic tidiness and calculable pulls and pushes.
This it was indeed in the sphere of 'reality1., that obedient
patient under the fingers of man's mind. But in the sphere of
the soul, disobedient sufferer of God's anger and grace, it was
the century of Pascal and Hobbes, of the desperate and once
more triumphant convolutions of the baroque, and of the meta¬
physical poets. Commerce between the separated spheres, felt
to be urgent again, moved uneasily, intensely and anxiously
along disrupted lines of communication. Strategical points
had to be gained by cunning, break-throughs to be dared with
the passion of spiritual violence. The baroque was the archi-
(4)
tectural style of such manoeuvres of the soul.
And this essential separation of art from any vision of a spiritually-
validated form of reality continued, according to Heller, after the
seventeenth century, bringing about a change in the orientation of
art itself:
(4) Erich Heller, The Disinherited Mind (London, 1961), pp. 231-2.
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Architecture, the most 'real' of all the arts, steadily-
declined. After the seventeenth century Europe no longer
dwelt or worshipped or ruled in buildings created in the
image of authentic spiritual vision. For all that was real
was an encumbrance to the spirit who, in his turn, only
occasionally called on the real, and even then with the
embarrassment of an uninvited guest. He was most at home
where there was least 'reality' - in music. The music of
modern Europe is the one and only art in which it surpassed
the achievement of former ages. This is no accident of
history: it is the speechless triumph of the spirit
world of words without deeds and deeds without words.
Once again, it must be stressed that such views, which bear a close
resemblance to Bonnefoy's references to music at the end of
'L'Architecture baroque et la pensee du destin', are not susceptible
of empirical verification as historical theory. I am not however
concerned with their strict historical accuracy, nor with the extent
to which the implication that the art of an earlier age had a more
genuine contact with reality can be proven scientifically, but rather
with their aptness as a reflection of the position of the modern
artist as Bonnefoy sees it, and of the aesthetic concerns to which
that position gives rise, both in relation to Bonnefoy's views of
artists and poets of former ages and to his views of the possibilities
of artistic creation generally in an age where the artist is seen as
necessarily possessing - to use Erich Heller's phrase - 'the
(6)
religiously disinherited religious mind'.
Bonnefoy's most comprehensive account of the attitudes of artists to
the possibility, against this background, of artistic creation is
(5) Heller, p. 232.
(6) ibid, p. 14L.
contained in his survey of the ways in which 'le principe d'identite'
operates in French poetry. He states that the principle 'a dCL varier
dans son apprehension des essences, et changer de metaphysique, depuis
les debuts du franqais' (i , p. 260). This is a small change from
the rather more mechanistic phrasing of the earlier version of the
essay in TJn Reve fait a Mantoue, where he talks of the variable 'indice
metaphysique1 of the principle (EFM, p. 112). The notion of some such
'indice metaphysique' may also be useful in considering Bonnefoy's
approach to painting, though in relation to painting he never enunciates
such a clear general formula as that of the 'principe d'identite'.
Nor does he make any systematic comparative assessment of the ways in
which the approaches of the painters of any particular school relate
to reality, as he does where French poets are concerned in 'La poesie
franjaise et le principe d'identite'. The absence of such a clearly-
stated - though perhaps rather simplistic - doctrine in relation to
painting need not however prevent us from noting the similarities
between his treatment of French poetry by reference to the 'principe
d'identite' and the general views on the modes of apprehension of
visual artists which appear to underlie his consideration of their
work.
The first similarity to be noted between 'le principe d'identite' and
Bonnefoy's critical approach to the visual arts is that in both cases
the approach is only to a limited extent historical. Boxmefoy considers
that the order represented by 'le principe d'identite' in the Middle
+ * 2
Ages was 'eprouve comme realite religieuse' (I , p. 260), whether it
is to be attributed, as Bonnefoy asserts here, to the fact that the
language of the liturgy was Latin and not French, or, as he argues
elsewhere, to the loss of belief in the bread and wine of the Mass
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as enactive symbols of the Real Presence, marked a historical
turning-point (whose exact placing in time is, however, never made
entirely clear) after which the 'principe d'identite' becomes a
notion allowing the categorisation of poets according to their
attitudes towards language rather than a principle which may be
said to develop historically. While Bonnefoy states that 'notre
poesie a aussi, comme dimension de son histoire et de sa diversite,
ces egarements et ces retours' (I , p. 270), the 'principe d'identite'
does not provide the basis for a theory of consistent historical
development, since the examples cited of 'retours' are Baudelaire
and Rimbaud, and those of 'egarements' Racine, Mallarme and (more by
implication than by direct statement) a number of more recent poets,
and in particular Valery. In the same way, Bonnefoy sees painters
of different periods as facing essentially similar problems in their
relationship to reality, but does not see their creativity as being
primarily conditioned (at least since the Renaissance) by the phase
of the historical development of art in which they worked. Although
his criticism may take historical factors into account, the main
historical circumstance which he sees as having a determining effect
on the work of visual artists is, again, the specifically modern loss
of a settled religious consciousness which may be postulated to have
taken place at some point in the Renaissance or baroque periods.
The second feature of 'le principe d'identite' which may be taken to
be relevant, by analogy, to Bonnefoy's art criticism is the diversity
of possibly valid ways in which the artist may approach reality.
While Bonnefoy makes clear in relation to poetry that what I have
called the 'existentialist' approach, characterised by Baudelaire
and Rimbaud, allows a more valid grasping of the ephemeral kernel of
reality than the 'essentialist' approach characterised by Racine,
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Mallarme and Valery, the poetic achievement of these latter poets
is by no means to be dismissed, and in Mallarme's case at least bears
witness to a striving after a kind of (albeit unattainable) poetic
perfection which is in its way no less heroic than Baudelaire's
achievement of 'vrai discours' (i , p. 34) through his poetic
identification with death. Similarly, while Bonnefoy may place
particular visual artists at different points in the spectrum of
possible approaches to the expression through art of ever-elusive
reality, he is if anything rather less prescriptive that he is in
relation to poets in 'La Poesie franqaise et le principe d'identite'
as to what may be considered the most correct or artistically desirable
approach. Rather is he concerned to recognise, and to delineate with
finely-tuned discrimination, the particular quality in each artist
which constitutes his originality and which shows the intensity and
seriousness of the artistic enterprise he has undertaken. Thus,
before comparing Raoul TJbac to 'ce "paysan" qu'Une saison en enfer
finit par opposer a tous les mirages de 1'imagination angelique'
(i , p. 295)» Bonnefoy seeks to describe in more detailed, though
not in more analytical, terms the precise characteristics of TTbac's
approach:
II y a dans son oeuvre ces bleus, ces gris, mais ce n'est
pas le bleu, pas le gris, c'est une ame grise de la couleur
qui penetre aussi bien les ocres, les bruns, les rouges: et
voila qui n'est pas une description des donnees sensibles et
moins encore une decision esthetique, une stylisation de l'objet
mais, directement exprimee par la plus simple des metaphores,
1'immanence de l'etre dans la precarite de la vie. . . TJbac
semble poser d'emblee, par cette couleur qui domine, la
categorie de presence, et n'y inscrire qu'ensuite la variete
des choses terrestres. (i , pp. 294-5)
In this kind of assessment the artist's work is seen in terms of his
own resolution of the problems posed by the need to express through
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a medium common to all artists a unique view of the reality which
cannot "be directly interpreted through painting any more than it can
be expressed through words. The description of this resolution in
any particular case cannot be rigorously exact and must to some
extent be impressionistic. The critical approach also implies an
overall view of the background against which the artist is working
which Bonnefoy does not spell out in terms as explicit as those
which he uses in relation to poetry in formulating the idea of 'le
principe d'identite'. He nevertheless suggests, in the first version
of his essay on 'Baudelaire contre Rubens', such a general view of
the artist's position:
Et il faut sentir qu'a travers l'histoire de la peinture, par
exemple, s'affirme une dialectique qui est moins celle des
langues qu'elle a adoptees tour a tour, que celle des temoins
de 1'invisible - ou decouvreurs - et des colonisateurs du
perpu, grands ou petits maltres de l'apparence. La dialectique,
disons, du 'dessin' profond et des parlers perissables. C'est
elle qui assure que l'art, la poesie, peuvent ne pas etre
(7)
lettre morte.
In his critical work as a whole Bonnefoy sees this 'dialectic' less as
a historical development - and certainly less as a historical development
which can be rigorously charted through the course of the development
of art - than as a kind of combat within the creative process itself,
in the context of which each artist must define his position, the
significance of the creative act being the depth of commitment which
each artist brings to the effort of definition. The idea of the artist's
endeavour being a combat within the creative process finds an echo, in
relation to poetry, in Bonnefoy's statement in 'L'Acte et le lieu de
(7) L'Ephemere 9 (19&9)> P* HO: the passage is dropped from the later
version of the essay published in Le Huage rouge .
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la poesie' that 'Je voudrais que la poesie soit d'abord une incessante
bataille, un thettre ou l'etre et 1'essence, la forme et le non-formel
p
se combattront durement' (I , p. 124).
It is outside the scope of this study to trace Bonnefoy's views on how
all the visual artists of whom he writes resolve the problems they
face. It may however be worth saying something further about the period
in which Bonnefoy most clearly sees specific historical factors as
having a significant influence on how artists have defined their stance
- the baroque period.
Bonnefoy sets baroque art in a very specific historical context in the
development of human thought and belief in 'La seconde simplicite':
Le baroque est un realisme passionnel. Le desir emporte,
deraisonnable, aveugle, que 1'existence terrestre accede aux
droits du divin, et ce n'est pas un hasard, stlrement, si cet
art a grandi quand on a commence a douter de la presence reelle,
quand on n'a plus compris ce pain et ce vin qui sacralisaient
toutes choses, et d'abord le lieu ou nous sommes et notre
instant, (i , p. 185)
The particular manner in which Bonnefoy sees the baroque as seeking
to reconcile the multiplicity of earthly experience with the unity
represented by the spiritual validation of that experience - at a time
when, through the loss of belief in the Real Presence, no automatically
valid identification of the spiritual world and the world of physical
existence could any longer be counted upon - is expressed again in
his comments on Bernini in Rome 1650. Describing Bernini's art as
'le mouvement recommence de la foi', he continues:
Bernin a retrouve les clefs de l'hic et nunc - de 1'experience
de cette redemption reservee ici, maintenant, a la personne,
absolue, unique - ce que le monde grec n'avait pas et qu'avait
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meconnu la Renaissance italienne. Mais il est temps d'en venir
a des problemes de mots; et, caracterisant le Bernin comme le
temoin sur le plan de l'art de cette foi qui focalise l'espace
par la presence, et deploie la duree humaine, mais en meme
temps la recourbe, comme en spirale, dans 1'unite du divin -
je dirai, -par definition, que c'est cela le baroque, avec les
corollaires, bien sib?, qu'il sera aise d'en deduire. (R, pp. 18-37)
It may be as well at this point to compare Bonnefoy's view of what
constitutes baroque art, expressed as it is in personal and rather
idiosyncratic terms, with the principles underlying one of the most
influential standard statements of the place of the baroque in art
history - that of Heinrich Wtilfflin. In his Principles of Art History
he describes his approach as aiming at 'an art history which conceives
style primarily as expression, expression of the temper of an age
(8)
and a nation as well as expression of the individual temperament'^
This sounds very like the kind of approach which could be argued to
lie behind much of Bonnefoy's consideration of art, and particularly
of the baroque. Wdlfflin goes on to recognise the difficulties with
which he is faced: 'it remains no mean problem to discover the
conditions which, as material element - call it temperament,
Zeitgeist, or racial character - determine the style of individuals,
(9)
periods and peoples. '
WBlfflin's analysis, stemming from these principles, is however more
systematic and technical than anything Bonnefoy attempts, or would
wish to attempt. Furthermore, WiJlfflin specifically eschews value-
judgements on different periods. Comparing the classic art of the
(8) Heinrich Wfllfflin, Principles of Art History, trans. M.D.Hottinger
(London, 1932), p. 10.
(9) ibid, p. 11.
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sixteenth century with the baroque art of the seventeenth, he says:
'We can turn our sympathy to one or to the other, but we must realise
that that is an arbitrary judgement, just as it is an arbitrary
judgement to say that the rose-bush lives its supreme moment in the
formation of the flower, the apple-tree in that of the fruit'.
This is of course an echo of the passage from Hegel's Ph&nomenologie
des Geistes which I have quoted towards the beginning of this study
( p. 26 ) as an example of the kind of philosophical procedure
which, though claiming to transcend fixed systems, constitutes in
fact the most gargantuan system of all: and the comparison with
Waifflin's approach shows by implication the extent to which Bonnefoy's
attitude differs from that of the system-builders, and why, though
one may discern some shadow of an overall view of art history behind
his criticism of individual artists, it would be wrong to argue that
such an overall view constitutes the substance of his criticism. Of
the various forms taken by a plant at different stages of its develop¬
ment Hegel says, 'leur nature fluide en fait des moments de 1'unite
organique dans laquelle elles ne se repoussent pas seulement, mais
dans laquelle l'une est aussi necessaire que 1'autre, et cette egale
necessite constitue seule la vie de tout'. The 'egale necessite'
here, however, means that the critic, in observing similar principles
at work in the history of art, is precluded from expressing a full
imaginative interpretation of the work of any individual artist, which
it is Bonnefoy's implicit ambition to express; and while this ambition
does not lead to the necessary condemnation of approaches different
from that with which the critic is dealing at any particular moment,
(10) Wdlfflin, Principles of Art History, p. 14.
(11) Hegel, La Phenomenologie de 1'esprit, vol.1, p. 6.
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it does imply a greater identification of the critic with the artist's
aims than can be achieved by, in WBlfflin's words, 'turning our
sympathy' to a particular artist or period.
Even bearing in mind, however, these necessary caveats, it is interesting
to go on to consider the precise terms in which ¥{Jlfflin deals with
the baroque period, in comparison with the Renaissance:
The central idea of the Italian Renaissance is that of perfect
proportion. In the human figure as in the edifice, this epoch
strove to achieve the image of perfection at rest within itself.
Every form developed to self-existent being, the whole freely
co-ordinated: nothing but independently living parts. The
column, the panel, the volume of a single element of a space
as of a whole space - nothing here but forms in which the
human being may find an existence satisfied in itself, extending
beyond human measure, but always accessible to the imagination.
With infinite content, the mind apprehends this art as the
image of a higher, free existence in which it may participate.
The baroque uses the same system of forms, but in place of the
perfect, the completed, gives the restless, the becoming, in
place of the limited, the conceivable, gives the limitless,
the colossal. The ideal of beautiful proportion vanishes,
interest concentrates not on being, but on happening. The
masses, heavy and thickset, come into movement. Architecture
ceases to be what it was in the Renaissance, an art of arti¬
culation, and the composition of the building, which once
raised the impression of freedom to its highest pitch, yields
(12)
to a conglomeration of parts without true independence. '
The central point being made here - that there is a radical change in
emphasis between the Renaissance and the baroque periods in the way in
which artists conceive the relationship of the parts of a work of art
to the whole - coincides, to some degree, with Bonnefoy's approach.
(12) WfJlfflin, Principles of Art History, pp. 9-10*
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This partial sympathy between the two viewpoints is made clearer in
WBlfflin's summary, later in his book, of the basic aim underlying
baroque art: 'On principle, the baroque no longer reckons with a
multiplicity of co-ordinate units, harmoniously interdependent, but
with an absolute unity in which the individual part has lost its
individual rights. But thereby the main motive is stressed with a
fl3)
hitherto unprecedented force'. '
The emphasis here on the subordination of detail in baroque art to
the work's overall artistic aim is not however quite in line with
Bonnefoy's approach - for while Bonnefoy may on occasion summarise
the intention of baroque art as 'cette volonte de tout unifier sous
^ 2
le signe de la Presence' (i , p. 212) (without, incidentally, making
it quite clear whether this view is entirely his or at least partly
that of Pierre Charpentrat, whose book he is reviewing), his considered
view of the relationship of parts to whole in the baroque is more
complex. And indeed the impression given by baroque art - whether
architecture or painting - is that of a 'conglomeration of parts'
which, though lacking 'true independence', nevertheless have definite
significance for the effect of the work as a whole.
Bonnefoy's views on this point might best be approached rather indirectly.
We may note first of all that even in Rome 1650. the book in which he
takes most care to place artists in their historical context, he does
not present even the baroque as an exclusively historical category -
rather the contrary. After his 'definition' of the baroque which I
have quoted above (pp. 236-7 ), he goes on to make it clear that that
category cannot be seen as simply covering a historical period: 'on ne
pourra plus appliquer ce mot a tous les travaux d'une epoque, ni meme
(13) Wdlfflin, Principles of Art History, p. 157-
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a des esprits qu'on a rapproches du Bernin - ainsi certains poetes de
Prance - si ces derniers ne font que ressentir le neant, comme beaucoup
disent: le "change", sans accomplir sa mutation en presence.'(R, p. 37) •
A little later, he underlines the point that what characterises the
baroque, in his view, is not an accident of history or even a point
of view peculiar to specific artists, but a kind of attitude which
artists may be led to adopt, though not necessarily throughout their
work:
Et parce que j'identifie ainsi le baroque a un mouvement de
conscience, que l'on peut accomplir ou non-c'est notre liberie
qui decide, - il va de soi qu'il n'y a pas de raison pour que
le mot, s'il prend son sens de Bernin, s'applique meme a toutes
ses oeuvres. ... Le baroque prend dans un moment de la
sensibilite, comme la cristallisation peut le faire dans un
liauide: comme 1'amour, dirait done Stendal. Et ainsi il a
pu arriver que cette synthese attendue, esperee, voulue, se
derobe indefiniment dans la destinee d'un artiste. (R, p. 37)
It therefore seems that Bonnefoy hardly uses the term 'baroque' to
apply to an art-historical category at all, but rather to a moment of
the human artistic consciousness - rather loosely defined in historical
terms - at which an individual artist is facing certain central questions
about the ontological status of the artistic symbol.
We may now go back and consider further the differences of emphasis -
which seem, indeed, to amount to fundamental differences of substance
- between Bonnefoy's approach to art and that of a more rigorously
systematic historian like WBlfflin, exemplified by the question of how
the baroque deals with the balance between parts and whole. Using
the criteria he has already defined, Bonnefoy makes the surprising
claim that the work of Pietro da Cortona is not baroque. He says of
Cortona's Allegory of Divine Providence (or Glorification of the
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Pontificate of Urban VIII) in the Palazzo Barberini:
ce que Bernin a dresse, au bout de la nef de Saint-Pierre,
c'est la presence de Dieu, qui est celle d'une conscience,
au aela de toute nature - tandis au'au centre de ce plafond,
de cette gloire dite divine, il y a le bourdonnement diffus
de trois immenses abeilles, 1'unite chaleureuse et indifferente
de la nature physique. Une unite, mais celle de la sensation,
qui exclut de soi notre conscience particuliere, qui ne veut
rien savoir de notre destin, qui n'est done pas 1'unite. Et
j'en conclurai done que Pierre de Cortone n'est pas baroque,
il ne sait rien de 1'instant ou se ressaisit le Longin, ou
s'eprouve infinie la Sainte Therese, il respire suavement
comme 1'animal ou la plante dans la torpeur de l'intemporel,
a tout le moins dans le reve d'un clge d'or hors du temps.
(R, p. 79)
Prom this negative statement - in which, incidentally, we may see the
distance between Bonnefoy and standard academic criticism in the fact
that he does not mention that the 'trois immenses abeilles', while
they may signify '1'unite chaleureuse et indifferente de la nature
physique', are also the emblem of the Barberini family of which Pope
Urban Till was a member - we may deduce Bonnefoy's positive assessment
of the importance of detail in baroque art, and link this to his view
of the historical circumstances which gave rise to that art. For if
Pietro da Cortona is to be excluded from the ranks of baroque artists
because the unity he depicts is merely that of nature and takes no
account of the integration within true unity of the individual human
consciousness, the baroque cannot simply be concerned with, in
WOlfflin's words, 'an absolute unity in which the individual part
has lost its individual rights',but must involve a kind of unity
which allows the individual part to enjoy its individual rights while
(14) Wtflfflin, Principles of Art History, p. 157.
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nevertheless participating to the full in the overall unity which is
the final objective of the work of art. In Bonnefoy's own terms, as
we have seen, baroque art participates in 'cette foi qui focalise
l'espace par la presence, et deploie la duree humaine, mais en meme
temps la recourbe, comme en spirale, dans 1'unite du divin' (R, p. 18).
We may mention here in passing a further perspective according to which
Bonnefoy considers what might be called the baroque consciousness. This
lies in the development of physical science and in the radical change
in man's view of the nature of the unlverse which took place at about
the same time, and helped to overturn the classical and Renaissance
view of the symmetry of the world. At a time when Galileo and Kepler
were themselves unable fully to accept the implications of their
astronomical observations for the symmetrical model of the universe
which they had until then taken to be objectively true, a reorientation
of human consciousness itself was necessary:
N 0 0 *
C'est a la fin du XVT siecle que se repand 1'idee que la
matiere - notre matiere d'ici - est universelle; que les astres
les plus lointains et 'divins' sont comme la terre sur ce point.
Et l'on peut deja pressentir les consequences sans nombre de
cette nouvelle intuition: si les spheres celestes sont corruptibles
comme la nature terrestre, voici ferme a jamais le plus superbe
chemin par lequel 1'exercice des sens ait jamais approche des
dieux - et le divin doit etre cherche desormais comme transcendance
pure, dans une experience interieure. (R,p. 12)
We may therefore summarise how Bonnefoy sees baroque art as mirroring
the religious consciousness of the artists, and in a less direct way
of the age which produced it. While classical and Renaissance art was
able to see the world as a well-balanced arrangement of elements, each
having a fixed place in the divine scheme of things, baroque art had
lost this calm confidence and had to reach out to grasp a transcendent
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reality which had become separated from the ordinary reality of the
world. Ironically, however, while this yearning for unity led to a
diminution in the importance of the elements of a work of art, these
elements gained in another sense in importance as the only possible
mediators in the quest for ■unity: and here we may see another echo
of Bonnefoy's notion of the elusive ephemere.
The idea of a kind of ephemere. in relation specifically to baroque
art, is developed further at a number of points in Bonnefoy's writing.
In the first place, he sees the contrast between the architectural
styles of Bernini and Borromini as a kind of variation within the
baroque itself. Bernini is seen as exemplifying the main baroque
tendency towards unity:
l'objet, du point de vue de la representation, pourra etre
laisse a son apparence ordinaire, a ses mille aspects non
reduits aux besoins specieux de l'Idee, - parce qu'il importe
d'abord d'exprimer la tension qui fait 1'unite du monde, la
grande forme spirale qui et rassemble et transcende les mille
^ 2
formes ouvertes qui sont tournees vers la mort. (i , pp. 220-21)
If the emphasis here, so to speak, is on the all-embracing character
of the spiral, and on its primary upward thrust, Borromini tends, in
Bonnefoy's view, rather to express the importance of the circular
motion at particular points of its progress upwards:
ce qui est la devant nous . . . affirme, avec une energie
saturnienne, les caracteres propres d'une existence a jamais
particuliere, les signes paradoxalement restes exterieurs
d'une irreductible interiorite. . . le premier motif, bien
que reclos sur soi-meme, s'est raccorde a bien d'autres par
tout un systeme de rythmes, lesquels, sans l'arracher a son
'en-soi' plein de reves, ont pourtant deploy! une part de
son apparence, ont suspendu 'un instant' ce qu'il avait d'insense,
d'incompatible avec la nature, - mais pour y consentir & nouveau
dans une musique instable et fuyante, qui ne fait qu'agrandir
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aux proportions de toute l'eglise ce detail du debut, toujours
* * r 2
interieur et separe. (i , p. 222)
In this contrast, indeed, between Bernini and Borromini within a single
artistic tendency (the baroque), we come close to the central pre¬
occupation of Bonnefoy's aesthetic theory. It is significant that he
expresses that contrast in religious terms by asking 'Est-ce,
Borromini, le christianisme et Bernin, malgre tout, le "paganisme
^ 2
eternel"?' (i , p. 225). The sense in which he sees Borromini's
concentration on detail as a means to achieving the expression of
unity (as against Bernini's expression of unity in which detail,
though important, is secondary) as Christian may be clarified by his
remark in 'L'Acte et le lieu de la poesie' that 'La difficulte de
la poesie moderne, c'est qu'elle a a se definir, dans un meme instant,
par le christianisme et contre lui. Car . . . 1'invention baudelairienne
de tel etre ou de telle chose est bien chretienne pour autant que
Jesus a souffert sous Ponce Pilate, dormant une dignite a un lieu
+ + 2
et a une heure, une realite a chaque §tre' (i , pp.119-20). It is true
that, at least at the time when he was writing 'L'Acte et le lieu de
la poesie', Bonnefoy saw this Christian sanctification of the here and
now - or of l'ephemere - as an unsatisfactory basis for artistic en¬
deavour, since 'le christianisme n'affirme qu'un court instant
1'existence singuliere. Chose creee, il la reconduit a Lieu dans les
voies de la Providence et voici ce qui est prive une fois encore de
sa valeur absolue' (i , p. 120). In other words, a conventional
religious guarantee of existence, and its expression in art, fails
through the intrinsic failure of any philosophical system to avoid
abstraction and grasp the true existence of the particular. In
Christian terms this may, of course, be a misinterpretation of the
sacrifice of Christ. But in replying to his own question about the
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Christianity and paganism of Borromini and Bernini, Bonnefoy gives a
further formulation which shows how Borromini, in his view, takes
something from Christianity, in the same way as 'la poesie moderne
. . . a a se definir . . . par le christianisme', and how Bernini,
comparably, takes something from paganism, while both nevertheless
represent facets of a single impulse, which is central to Western
artistic creativity:
Mais plus rien alors, dans le premier cas /Ke Borrominl7, de
la religion de Saint Pranpois, comme plus rien chez Bernin
de l'horreur platonicienne de la matiere. PlutSt les deux grandes
forces, d'incarnation et d'excarnation, de rapport immanent au
monde et d1interiorite transcendante, qui se retrouvent en oeuvre,
des hypotheses contradictoires du Parmenide au catholicisme
r , " ,
jesuite, dans 1'elaboration ambigue de la sensibilite d'Occident.
(I2, P. 225)
And, more directly in the context of seventeenth-century painting,
Bonnefoy expresses again the central importance, and at the same time
the complementarity, of the art of Bernini and of Borromini in a
striking image: 'Le Je transfigure par la grace, le Je paralyse par
le peche: c'est, face au moi impersonnel, intemporel de Cortone, ou
a l'individu que le rationalisme recherche a travers ses chateaux de
sable, - disons face a cette ame vegetative et a ce cerveau - la
diastole et systole d'un m§me coeur.' (R, p. 84).
We may now attempt to summarise briefly how Bonnefoy's art criticism,
and in particular his view of the baroque, shed light on his poetic
theory. He is concerned with defining - or rather with describing,
through patient and sensitive investigation of the individual approach
of each of the artists to whom he turns his attention - how an artist,
be he painter or poet, can express at the same time the particular
existence of the reality with which he is dealing and the need, for
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the Western consciousness as Bonnefoy interprets it, to grasp at some
form of transcendent reality beyond that particular existence. Pinal
and definitive expression of any such simultaneous vision is by
definition impossible, if only because the division itself is a
product of the split made by the Western intellectual consciousness
between reality and what reality may be taken to signify: but it is
clear that Bonnefoy sees the attempt to achieve such expression as
basic to any genuine attempt at artistic creativity. His consideration
of particular poets or painters therefore is basically a description
of the particular terms in which they make such an attempt, and of
the extent of their necessarily incomplete success. He sees each
artist as an individual engaged in an individual, and unique, struggle:
and even within the baroque itself (a period, or moment of the Western
consciousness, in which the problems of artistic creativity are seen
as having presented themselves in a particularly critical form) the
varieties of struggle which are undertaken extend not only to those
I have described of Bernini and Borromini, but also, for instance, to
the apparently distant art of the group of painters known as the
bamboccianti (from the nickname of its most prominent member, Peter
van Laer). These are painters of genre pictures which, though
apparently quite inconsequential, may nevertheless sometimes make
contact with the reality which is also the concern of more 'metaphysical'
artists: 'Ce qui me touche, c'est qu'en ces images qui se sont voulues
fugitives affleure l'epiphanie qu'il nous faut, de la terre sans
nymphes desormais ni amadryades mais d'autant plus a nouveau la Mere,
qu'on peut aimer' (MR, p. 104). Once again, therefore, some form of
contact with what I have called 1'ephemere is seen as a major artistic
goal.
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The conclusion to this study cannot, by the nature of its subject-matter,
be a neat formula summarising the content of Bonnefoy's poetic theory -
since that theory is not an abstraction from the objects which it
considers but an attempt to convey the intrinsic quality of each,
against a background whose theoretical content can only be implied
rather than directly stated. It may be preferable therefore to turn
aside from poetic theory altogether and emphasise again that in
Bonnefoy's view specifically artistic activity, while of great signi¬
ficance, cannot be of supreme importance in human endeavour, precisely
because the artist can never achieve the complete simultaneous expression
of the ideal and the real for which he must nevertheless strive. At
the end of Rome 1650< Bonnefoy mentions 'cette variete d'experiences
qui s'est deployee devant nous, depuis les hautes ambitions metaphysiques
de Bernin, Borromini ou Poussin jusqu'au realisme "entrave" des
Bamboccianti' (R, p. 166), but decides to close his book with an
appreciation of the human qualities (albeit in relation to his art)
of another artist, Valentin:
Mais Valentin, c'est bien mieux qu'un peintre, c'est un homme . . .
Valentin est un homme de la province franpaise, et nous savons
qu'il ne fut jamais oublieux de sa Brie natale. Cela signifie
que sa relation profonde avec le reel avait ete determinee
par tout un reseau d'actes simples et substantiels, boire,
manger, dormir, veiller soigneusement sur les quelques biens
que la terre evidente donne. (R, p. 166)
Bonnefoy's criticism seeks to chart the ways in which artists and poets
have expressed their personal relationship with reality, and with the
spiritual dimension of reality which in his view represents for the
Western consciousness both an inescapable challenge if reality is
itself to be fully grasped, and a dangerous temptation insofar as it
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may lead away from reality itself and into some form of philosophical
or religious abstraction. Art is not therefore seen as something which
can he said to operate, or can he commented on, in isolation from the
reality which it strives to express or the wider contexts in which
artists relate to that reality. Bonnefoy's consideration of particular
painters and poets has to take into account the contexts in which they
worked, whether these are the background of ideas prevalent at the time,
the conditions determined by that background for the possibility of
artistic expression of an individual temperament, or the overriding
characteristics of that temperament itself. These contexts, however,
are equally never Bonnefoy's primary concern on their own account,
and while he may sometimes hint at some form of philosophical or
art-historical superstructure for his consideration of individual
artists, it would be a radical misunderstanding of his method and aims
to attempt to distil any kind of abstract theory, or even any generalised
view of the nature of artistic creativity, from his work. He is concerned
rather with refusing any such abstract definition, and through this
refusal with exploring the particular qualities discernible in individual
artists and works of art. This study has therefore attempted to review
the ways in which, in his criticism and to some extent in his poetry,
Bonnefoy declares the necessity for artistic endeavour to address
itself to the particular which contains within itself resonances of
wider significance, and to seek to enact that particular, however
fruitless the attempt at enactment may be in the last analysis.
Precisely, indeed, and consistently, Bonnefoy is concerned to deny
the adequacy of the kind of analysis which nevertheless, as a thinker
in the Western tradition, he sees as one of his basic conceptual tools.
Finally, then, we may quote once again Bonnefoy's remarks on the
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symbolic nature of the bread and wine in the Mass, encapsulating
physical reality and metaphysical significance - a symbol whose
reality, ironically, Bonnefoy feels unable to accept:
Qp.e le pain soit le corps du Christ, cela n'est communicable
que pour autant que le pain soit deja le pain, c'est-a-dire
une realite bien identifiee et stable, et non quelque
apparition obscure et changeante, indefiniment susceptible
de prendre forme nouvelle. II reste que ce pain, s'il a ainsi
son image claire et distincte, est done vecu en Dieu et sous
le signe de I'Un. (i2, p. 260)
The central assertion of Bonnefoy!s theory is that any such final
identification of reality and symbolic significance is impossible
(which may explain his unequivocal, but obviously reluctant, atheism):
but that the modern artist must pursue with all his strength the
search for such an identification, while rigorously avoiding the
dead formulae of any kind of conventional doctrine. Only then may
the artist possibly achieve, apparently obliquely and almost by




This is a working bibliography in the sense that it lists all the
material on which this thesis is based, rather than attempting to
catalogue fully everything which Bonnefoy has published and everything
which has been published about Bonnefoy. A complete bibliography of
Bonnefoy's publications, of translations of his work, and of critical
work on his writing up to the end of 1978, is to be found in Annie
Prothin, 'Yves Bonnefoy: A Bibliography', Bulletin of Bibliography
36, 3 (Autumn 1979)» PP« 128-43*
The main references to Bonnefoy's critical work in this thesis are
taken from L'Improbable et autres essais (Paris, 1980) to which I refer
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as I , and which republished with verbal modifications the essays
previously collected in L'Improbable (Paris, 1959 - referred to as I)
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- 252 -
NRF Du mouvement et de l'immobilite de Douve. suivi de Hi pi-
regnant desert (nouvelle version) et accompagne d'Anti-Platon
et de deux essais (Paris, 1970: KRF/Poesie edition)
AP L'Arri^re-pays (Geneva, 1972)
0 1'Ordalie (Paris, 1975)
The first part of this bibliography lists works by Bonnefoy under a
number of headings. The second part lists critical works about him,
and the third part gives a selective list of other books which I have
consulted while writing the thesis. Items in the first part are
arranged in chronological order of publication under each heading,
while those in the second and third parts are arranged under each
heading in alphabetical order of the authors. The reprinting of
Bonne foy's essays in book form is only noted in relation to the
latest collected editions: Le Kuage rouge (Paris, 1977) and L[Improbable
et autres essais (Paris, 1980). There are often considerable textual
differences between these and the original printings in periodicals or
in the earlier collected editions.
1 WORKS BY B0KKEP0Y
A Collections of poetry and essays
1. Traite du pianiste (Paris, 194-6)
2. Da mouvement et de I'immobilite de Douve (Paris, 1953)
5. Peintures murales de la France gothique (Paris, 1954)
4. Hier regnant desert (Paris, 1958)
5. Pierre ecrite Ardoises taillees par Raoul Ubac (limited edition)
(Paris, 1958)
6. hIImprobable (Paris, 1959)
7. Rimbaud par lui-meme (Paris, 1961)
8. La seconde simplicite (Paris, 1961). Reprinted for the most part
in I*, pp. 173-97
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9. Anti-Platon, avec Le coeur-espace (limited edition) (Paris, 1962)
10. Miro (Milan, 1964: Paris, 1965)
11. Pierre ecrite (Paris, 1965)
12. La Poesie franpaise et le principe d'identite avec deux eaux-fortes
de Raoul TJbac (limited edition) (Paris, 1967)• Reprinted in
12, pp. 243-70
13. TJn Reve fait a Mantoue (Paris, 1967 )
14- Rome 1630; 1'horizon du premier baroque (Paris, 1970)
15. Bu mouvement et de 1 'immobilite de Bouve suivi de Hier regnant desert
et accompagne d'Anti-Platon et de deux essais (Paris, 1970)
16. L'Arriere-pays (Geneva, 1972)
17. TJne peinture metaphysique /on Benise Estaban/ (limited edition)
(Paris, 1973)
18. L'Ordalie avec des eaux-fortes de Claude Garache (Paris, 1975)
19. Dans le leurre du seuil (Paris, 1975)
20. Le Kuage rouge (Paris, 1977)
21. Rue Traversiere(Paris, 1977)
22. Poernes (Paris, 1978)
23. L'Improbable et autres essais (Paris, 1980)
B Articles and other contributions (except poetry) to -periodicals
and "books
24. 'Bonner a vivre', Le Surrealisme en 1947 ^catalogue de 1'exposition
internationale du surrealisme, presentee par Andre Breton et
Marcel Duchamp) (Paris, 1947)> PP« 66-8
25. 'L'Eclairage objectif', Les deux soeurs 3 (1947)» pp. 42-53
26. 'Sur le concept de lierre', Troisieme convoi 5 (1951)> PP« 26-8
27. 'Les Tombeaux de Ravenne', Les Lettres nouvelles (May 1953).
Reprinted in l2, pp. 11-28
28. 'Aspects nouveaux de Michel-Ange', Les Lettres nouvelles
(Becember 1953). Reprinted in 12, pp. 151-7
29. 'En Miroir' /on Jouve7, Les Lettres nouvelles 17 (July 1954)»
PP. 93-7
30. 'Les Eleurs du mal', Mercure de Prance (September 1954)» PP« 41-7*
Reprinted in I , pp. 29-38
31. 'La Banse des morts de la chaise—Bieu', Mercure de Prance
(October 1954)> PP« 193-9
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32. 'Raoul Ubac', Derriere le miroir 74-76 (1955)• Reprinted in
I , PP. 57-9
33. 'Degas', Critique 102 (November 1955). Reprinted in I , pp. 165-9
34. 'L'Oeuvre de Fra Angelico', Critique 105 (February 1956). Reprinted
in I , pp. 139-150
35« 'De moyen age fantastique', Mercure de France (May 1956), pp. 172-5
36. 'L'Invention de B^lthus', Mercure de France (March 1957)> pp. 402-417-
Reprinted in I , pp. 39-56
37. 'Melodrame' /on Jouve/, Mercure de France (November 1957) pp. 510-12
38. 'G. Lely ou le realisme poetique', Critique 132 (1958), pp. 387-95-
Reprinted as postface to G. Lely, Vie du Marquis de Sade, in Sade,
Oeuvres completes, vol.1 (Paris, 1966) and, under the title
'La cent vingt et unieme journee', in I2, pp. 85-95
39- 'Valery I'apostat', Les Lettres nouvelles 6, 2 (1958), pp. 234-9.
Reprinted under the title 'Paul Valery' in I^, pp. 97-103
40. 'La Critique anglo-saxonne et la critique franpaise', Preuves 95
(January 1959)> PP« 68-73
41. 'Le Temps et 1'intemporel dans la peinture du Quattrocento', Mercure
de France (February 1959). Reprinted in I2, pp. 61-84
42. 'L'Acte et le lieu de la poesie', Les Lettres nouvelles (4 March 1959)
pp. 21-27 and (ll March 1959)> PP- 57-47- Reprinted in l2} pp. 105-31
43« 'Shakespeare et le poete franpais', Preuves 100 (June 1959)> PP- 42-8
44. 'Spanzotti redecouvert', Mercure de France (June 1959)» PP- 355-57
45- 'Deux livres sur Caravage', Les Lettres nouvelles 33 (December 1959).
Reprinted in I2, pp. 159-64
46. 'La Decision de Rimbaud', Preuves 107 (January i960), pp. 3-16
47. 'La Poesie objective' /on Rimbaud7, Two Cities 4 (15 May i960),
pp. 6-15
48. 'De la Rome troublee k la conscience elisabethaine', Cahiers Renaud-
-Barrault 30 (i960), pp. 3-16. Reprinted in Cahiers Renaud-Barrault
57 (1966), pp. 49-62
49- 'Dhe Saison en enfer', Mercure de France 341 (March 1961) pp. 385-412
50. 'Transposer ou traduire Fa.mlet', Preuves 134 (April 1962), pp. 31-4
51. 'La Poesie de du Bouchet', Critique 18 (April 1962), pp. 291-8
52. 'La Religion de Chagall', Derriere le miroir 132 (1962)
53. 'Le Voyage de Grece', Mercure de France 349 (1963). Reprinted under
the title 'Un Reve fait a Mantoue' in 12, pp. 199-205
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54- 'Symbolism', trans. S. Spender, in The Concise Encyclopaedia
of English and American Poets and Poetry, ed. Spender and
Hall (London, 1963), pp. 325-6
55. 'Comment traduire Shakespeare*, Etudes anglaises 17, 4 (1964),
pp. 341-51
56. 'The Feeling of Transcendency' /on Surrealism^, Yale French
Studies 31 (May 1964), pp. 135-7
57. 'A la mort de Jacques Villon', Art de France 4 (19&4).
Reprinted in 12, pp. 285-7
58. 'Une Vigne qui bouge dans ses ombres', Mercure de France (May 1964).
Reprinted in l2, pp. 289-91
59- 'Des fruits montant de l'abime', Derriere le miroir 142 (1964).
Reprinted in Raoul Ubac (Paris, 1970) and in 12, pp. 293-303
60. 'La Poesie franpaise et le principe d'identite', Revue d'esthetiaue
18 (1965), pp. 335-54. Reprinted in I2, pp. 243-70. See also 12.
61. 'L'Illumination etl'eloge', Honneur a Saint-John Perse (Paris, 1965),
pp. 327-37. Reprinted in NR, pp 221-33
62. 'Pierre Charpentrat et 1'architecture baroque', Critique 223
(December 1965), pp. 999-1015. Reprinted under the title
'L'Architecture baroque et la pensee du destin' in I2,
pp. 211-33
63. 'Proximite du visage' /on Raoul UbacJ, Derriere le miroir 161
(October 1966). Reprinted in I2, pp. 505-14
64. 'L'Ordalie', L'Ephemere 1 (1966), pp. 52-64. Reprinted as 18
65. 'L'Etranger de Gi^cometti', L'Ephemere 1 (1966), pp. 79-91.
Reprinted in I , pp. 315-28
66. 'Rome I63O: definition du baroque', Preuves 189 (November 1966),
pp. 3-14
67. 'Sept Feux', L'Ephemere 2 (1967), pp. 69-77. Reprinted in 1^,
pp. 329-40
68. 'Hercule Seghers', L'Ephemere 2 (1967), pp. 89-96. Reprinted under
the title 'Notes sur Hercule Seghers' in I2, pp. 207-10
69. 'Jacqueline Lamba', L'Ephemere 3 (1967), pp. 83-90
70. 'Sur la Chanson de Roland', L'Ephemere 4 (1967), PP« 55—65•
Reprinted under the title 'Les mots et la parole dans le Roland'
as a postface to La Chanson de Roland (Paris, 1968), and under
the title 'Les mots et la parole dans la Chanson de Roland'
in NR, pp. 171-81
71. 'A l'horizon de Morandi', L'Ephemere 5 (1968), pp. 117-24.





















'Elsheimer et les siens*, L'Ephemere 7 (1968), pp. 79-104.
Reprinted in MR, pp. 95-105
'L'Art et le sacre, Baudelaire parlant a Mallarme', in L'Art
dans la societe d'aujourd'hui, Revue neuchateloise 42 (1968),
pp. 75-94, with discussion, pp. 191-215
'La Traduction de Shakespeare', Revue d'esthetique 21 (1968),
pp. 94-6
'Rimbaud devant la critique', Rimbaud (Paris, 1968), pp. 269-87
'Baudelaire contre Rubens', L'Ephemere 9 (1969), pp. 72-112.
Reprinted, in a much altered and expanded version, in MR,
pp. 9-80
'Pierre Jean Jouve', Cahiers de 1'Herne 19 (1972), pp. 60-75«
Reprinted in MR, pp. 255-65
♦La fleur double, la sente etroite' /on Basho/, Mouvements
premiers; etudes critiques offertes a Georges Poulet
(Paris, 1972), pp. 307-16.Reprinted,in an expanded version
under the title 'La fleur double, la sente etroite: la nuee',
in MR, pp. 327-45
'Fonction du poeme', Bulletin de l'Academie royale de langue et
de litterature franpaises 50, 3-4 (1972), pp. 161-175. "
Reprinted under the title 'Sur la fonction du poeme' in
MR, pp. 267-283
'Paul Celan', Revue de belles-lettres 96, 2-3 (1972), pp. 91-7.
Reprinted in MR, pp. 303-9
'Hommage a Jaccottet', Revue de belles-lettres 97, 3-4 (1973),
pp. 107-9
'George Henein', La Part du sable (July 1974). Reprinted in
Argile 5 (1974-75), PP- 22-39,and in BR, pp. 287-302
'La Poetique de Mallarme', Critique 51^ (1975), PP« 1053-74.
Reprinted as introduction to Mallarme, Igitur, Divagations,
TJn Coup de des (Paris, 1976), and in MR, pp. 183-211
'Rome, les fleches', Les Cahiers du chemin 24 (1975), PP« 57-66
'Raymond Mason', Arfuyen 1 (1975), PP« 61-3
'Peinture, poesie: vertige,paix' /on Claude Garache/', Berriere
le miroir 213 (1975), pp. 1-10. Reprinted in MR, pp. 319-26
'L'Egypte, et quelques poemes', Argile 7 (1975), PP« 5-17.
PqIit? rtni no non+. ho HOTnri y dps mots
'Le Grillon' Premiere livraison 1-6 (1975-76)
'Seconde rue Traversiere', Argile 9-10 (1976), pp. 232-35
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91. 'Terre seconde', preface to an exhibition at the Chateau de
Ratilly (1976). Reprinted in NR, pp. 547-65
92. 'Deux souvenirs de Georges Duthuit', Georges Duthuit (1976).
Reprinted in MR, pp. 159-67
93* 'Rimbaud encore', Archives des lettres modernes 160 (1976).
Reprinted in MR, pp. 215-19
94« 'De Dada au dadai'sme. Une encyclopedie sur Dada, c'est une
somme explosive', Pes Mouvelles litteraires (25 December 1976),
p. 4
95* 'Chants de la Balandrane' /on Char/, Pes Mouvelles litteraires
(22 December 1977), p. 21
96. 'Rimbaud: "Pes reparties de Nina"', Pe Pieu et la formule: hommage
a Marc Eigeldinger (Neuchatel, 1978), pp. 88-110
97. 'Madame Rimbaud', Etudes sur les "Poesies" de Rimbaud, ed. Eigeldinger
(Neuchitel, 1979), pp. 9-43
98. 'Deux soirees au theatre' (with translations by Susanna Pang),
World Piterature Today 53, 3 (1979), PP« 370-3
99. 'P'Analogie supreme', Stiftung F.V.S. zu Hamburg. Verleihung
des Montaigne-Preises 1978 (1979), PP. 43-8
100. 'Rembrandt vu par Genet', Pes Nouvelles litteraires (2 August
1979), P- 4
101. 'Gilbert Pely', Gilbert Pely; etudes critiques inedites (Paris,
1979)
C Selected periodical and anthology -publications of poems and translations
102. 'Anti-Platon', Pa Revolution la rrnit 2 (1947), pp. 14-15
103. 'Theatre de Douve', Pa Part du sable (1949)
104. 'P'Orangerie' (7 poems),. Mercure de France 1054 (June 1951),
pp. 215-15
105. 'Yrai Pieu' (11 poems), Mercure de France 1077 (May 1953), PP- 16-20
106. 11 poems in 'Poesie d'aujourd'hui', Pe Point (June 1954)
107. 'Veneranda' (3 poems), Mercure de France (January 1956), pp. 87-8
108. 20 poems in J. Paris, Anthologie de la poesie nouvelle (Monaco,
1956), pp. 59-69
109. 'Pes Pampes' (6 poems), Pes Pettres nouvelles (July-August 1956),
pp. 5-4
110. 'Scenes de Jules Cesar de Shakespeare', Mercure de France
(February 1957)
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111. 'lie Bruit des voix' (9 poems), Les lettres nouvelles 58
(March 1958), pp. 321-5
112. 'A une terre d'aube' (10 poems), Mercure de France (May 1958),
PP. 37-41
113- 'Pierre ecrite' (7 poems), Two Cities 2 (15 July 1959), pp. 23-4
114. 8 poems in Les Poemes de l'annee (Paris, 1959)
115. 3 poems in Cahiers Renaud-Barrault 30 (October i960)
116. 'Une Ombre respirante' (7 poems), Mercure de France (June 19&3)
117. 'Bans le leurre du seuil' (fragments), L'Ephemere 11 (1969),
PP- 344-357
118. 'Bans le leurre du seuil' (fragments), Les Poemes de l'annee (1970)
119. 'Bans le leurre du seuil, 2' (fragments), L'Ephemere 19-20
(1972-3), PP. 293-307
120. 'Par experience' (4 poems), Arfuyen 1 (1975), pp. 3-6
B Editions and introductions
121. 'Bans la lumiere d'octobre', preface to Georges Seferis, Poemes
(Paris, 1963). Reprinted in I2, pp. 235-42
122. 'Leonor Fini ou la profondeur delivree', preface to the catalogue
for the Fini exhibition at the Galerie Lolas, Paris (1965)
123. 'Les Romans arthuriens et la legende du Graal', introduction to
Albert Beguin and Yves Bonnefoy, La Quete du Graal (translation
of the 13th century Queste del Saint Graal) (ParisT 19&5)
124. 'L'Obstination de Chestov', preface to Leon Chestov, Athenes et
Jerusalem (Paris, 1967). Reprinted in I2, pp. 271-83
125. 'Un Ennemi des images', preface to Georges Duthuit, Representation
et presence (Paris, 1974). Reprinted in HR, pp. 125-57
126. 'Giovanni Bellini', introduction to T. Pignatti, Tout 1'oeuvre
peint de Giovanni Bellini (Paris, 1975). Reprinted in MR,
pp. 83-94
127. 'Andrea Mantegna', introduction to Tout 1'oeuvre peint de Ifentegna
(Paris, 1978)
128. 'Readiness, ripeness: Hamlet, Lear', preface to William Shakespeare,
HairGet/Le Roi Lear, trans. Bonnefoy (Paris, 1978)
E Translations by Bonnefoy
129* Carrington,Leonora: Une Chemise de nuit de flanelie (Paris, 1951)
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150. Shakespeare, William: Henri IV, lere partie (Paris, 1957)
151. Shakespeare, William: Jules Cesar (Paris, 1958, reprinted i960)
152. Shakespeare, William: Ham]et (Paris, 1958). Reprinted, with
additional material, under the title Hamlet sufvi d'une
Idee de la traduction (Paris, 1962), and in 128
135« Shakespeare, William: Le Conte d'hiver (Paris, 1959)
134« Shakespeare, William: Venus et Adonis (Paris, i960)
135. Shakespeare, William: Le Viol de Lucrece (Paris, i960)
136. Frost, Robert and Yeats, W.B.: 'Poemes', Cahiers Renaud-Barrault
30 (I960), pp. 96-8
137. Shakespeare, William: Le Roi Lear (Paris, 1965). Reprinted in 128
138. Shakespeare, William: Romeo et Juliette (Paris, 1968)
139• S4feris, Georges: 'Sur un soleil d'hiver*, in Trois poemes secrets
(Paris, 1970)
140. Yeats, W.B,,: 'Sailing to Byzantium, traduction et notes' in
Le Romantisme anglo-americain: melanges offerts a Louis Bonnerot
(Paris, 1971)» pp. 307-16 ~~~
141. Gelb, I.J.: Pour une theorie de l'ecriture (Paris, 1973)
142. Yeats, W.B.: 'Bouze poemes', Argile 1 (1973~74)» PP« 64-93
143• Bonnefoy, Yves: 'In the threshold's lure' (extracts), French Poetry
Now, Pros-pice 3 (1975)> ed. Edwards, pp. 20-28
144- Frost, Robert and Bonne, John: 'Deux poemes', Port-des-singes 3
(1976)
F Interviews
145. Piroue, Georges, 'Bonnefoy ou l'acte de degager la presence dans
1'absence', Mercure de France 355 (Jirae 1958), pp. 365-8
146. interview in L'Express (17 Becember 1959)
147- Falciola, Bernard, 'Yves Bonnefoy et le pouvoir poetique',
Gazette litteraire (11-12 November 1972)
148. interview with John E Jackson, L'Arc 66 (1976), pp. 85-92
149. Lemoine, Yves, 'Les Etats du langage. Un entretien avec Bonnefoy',
Les Nouvelles litteraires 2573 (24 February 1977)» V- 7
G Selected translations of works by Bonnefoy
150. 5 poems, translated by Wallace Fowlie, in 'Postwar French Poets',
Poetry (Chicago) (September 1952), pp. 365-71
- 260 -
151. 'Critics, English and French, and the distance between them'
/translation of 40J, Encounter (July 1958), pp. 59-45
152. 'Akt und Ort der Dichtung' /translation of 42 by Max HfJlzer/,
Die Neue Rundschau 71, 4 (I960), pp. 625-44
155. Poems, with translations by Galway Kinnell, The Hudson Review
15.4 (1960-61), pp. 528-49
154. 'Shakespeare and the French Poet' /translation of 45
Encounter (June 1962), pp. 58-45
155. Poems, with translations by Galway Kinnell and Jackson Matthews,
Poetry (Chicago) (July 1962)
156. Poems, translated by Edward Lucie-Smith, The Critical Quarterly
4,5 (1962), pp. 245-6
157. 'New Poetry in France', poems translated by J.R. Lawler, Mean,jin
22.5 (September 1965), pp. 292-506
158. Poems, translated by Galway Kinnell, Chicago Review 17, 1 (1964),
pp. 116-17
159. 'Transpose or Translate' /translation of 50J, Yale French Studies
55 (1964), PP. 120-26
160. 'Transponer o traducir Hamlet' /translation of 50_/, Sur 289-90
(1964), pp. 61-7
161. Poems, translated by John Lushington, Modern Poetry in Translation
2 (1966)
162. Miro /translation of 10 by Judith Landr/7,(London, 1967)
I65. Selected Poems with translations by Anthony Rudolf (London, 1968)
164. On the Motion and Immobility of Houve /translation of 2 by
Galway Kinnell/, (Athens, Ohio, 1968)
165. Poems, with an interview and translations by Serge Gavronsky,
in Serge Gavronsky, Poems and Texts (New York, 1969), pp. 125-41
166. Poems, translated by Anthony Rudolf, 'Poetry International 1970',
Modern Poetry in Translation 7 (1970), p. 50
167. 'On Translating Yeats' and two poems, translated by Anthony Rudolf,
Modern Poetry in Translation 16 (1975), PP« 11-12
168. Rimbaud /translation of 7 by Paul Schmid//(New York,1975^
169. 6 poems, translated by Anthony Rudolf, Prospice 1 (1975), PP« 58-60
170. 6 poems, presented and translated by Enrique Moreno Castillo,
Campa de l'Arpa 7 (1975), PP« 4-6
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171. 'French Poetry and the Principle of Identity' /translation of 60
by John Coombes/, French Poetry Now. Prospice 3 (1975)»
ed. Edwards, pp. 29-48
172. 'Nell'inganno della soglia' /translation in part of 19 by Piero
Bigongiari/, L'Approdo letterario 70 (1975), PP» 24-45
173. 'Tbe Poetics of Mallarme' /translation of 8^7, Yale French
Studies 54 (1977), pp. 9-21
174. 'On the Translation of Form in Poetry', World Literature Today
53, 5 (1979), PP. 374-9
175. Rue Traversiere /translation of 21~j with a postface by Friedhelm
Kemp (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1980)
II CRITICAL WORKS ON B0NNEF0Y
A Books, theses and special numbers of periodicals
176. L'Arc 66 (October 1978), presented by Alain Paire. Articles by
Starobinski, Vernier, Munier, Jaccottet, Vigee, Kemp, Picon,
Agosti, Madeleine-Perdrillat, Roudaut, Poulet, Jourdan, Abe
and Jackson: individual articles listed in part B below under
authors' names
177. Arndt, Beatrice: La Qpete poetique d'lves /sic/ Bonnefoy (Zurich, 1970).
Zurich University thesis
178. Jackson, John E: Yves Bonnefoy (Paris, 1978)
179. Jackson, John E: La Question du moi: un aspect de la modernite poetique
europeenne. T.S. Eliot, Paul Celan, Yves Bonnefoy (Neuchatel, 1978)
180. Price, J.D.: 'Le Chemin du seuil. Une analyse thematique de la
poesie de Valery, Jouve, Frenaud, Bonnefoy et Perse.'
(Southampton University thesis, 1974)
181. Regniero, Helen: 'Issue and return. The poetic imagination in
Wordsworth, Baudelaire, Yeats, Stevens and Bonnefoy.' (Brown
University thesis, 1970)
182. World Literature Today 53, 3 (summer 1979). Articles by Bonnefoy,
Vernier, Starobinski, Frank, Lawler, Lawall, Lang, Stamelman,
Gordon, Kanes, Greene, Caws, Jackson, Breunig and Martin:
individual articles listed in part B below under authors' names
B Articles and selected reviews, including chapters in books
183. Abe, Yoshio: 'La tentation de 1'intelligible', L'Arc 66 (1978),
pp. 71-81
184. Agosti, Stefano: 'Yves Bonnefoy e la grammatica dell'ineffabile',
Sigma 14 (1987), pp. 75-93- Reprinted in part in I metodi
attuali della critica in Italia, ed. Corti and Segre (Turin,
1970), pp. 358-62
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185. Agosti, Stefano: 'Violence de l'oubli', L'Arc 66 (1976), pp. 42-7
186. Albert, Walter: 'Bonnefoy and the Architecture of Poetry',
Modem Language Notes 82 (l967),pp. 590-605
187• Attal, J.-P.: 'La Quote de Bonnefoy', Critique 21 (1965),
PP. 535-40. Reprinted in L'image 'metaphysique' et autres essais
(Paris, 1969), pp. 211-16
188. Berger, Yves: 'Deux poetes devant la trahison du language' /on
Bonnefoy and Emmanuel/, Preuves 104 (October 1959), pp. 75-8
189. Bigongiari, Piero: 'La Metamorfosi di Bonnefoy', L'Approdo
letterario 37 (1985). Reprinted in Poesia francese del
novecento (Plorence, 1968), pp. 235-52
190. Bigongiari, Piero: 'La poesia imperfetta di Bonnefoy tra Bier
regnant desert e Pierre ecrite', La Poesia come funzione
simbolica del linguaggio (Milan, 1972), pp. 283-323
191. Bigongiari, Piero: '"Hell'inganno della soglia" owero l'altro
nello specchio di Harciso', L'Approdo letterario 71-72 (1975)
pp. 122-42
192. Blanchot, Maurice: 'Le grand refus', Houvelle revue franpaise
14 (1959), PP. 678-89
193* Blanchot, Maurice: 'Comment decouvrir l'obscur?', Houvelle revue
francaise 14 (1959)> PP« 867-79
194. Blanchot, Maurice: 'Rimbaud et l'oeuvre finale', Houvelle revue
francaise 18 (1961), pp. 293-303
195. Blot, Jean: 'Le Progres d'Yves Bonnefoy', Houvelle revue francaise
282 (June 1976), pp. 71-4
196. Boase, Alan: 'Critiques franpais, critiques anglais, ce qui les
divise. Reponse a Yves Bonnefoy', Cahiers de 1'Association
internationale des etudes franpaises 16 (March 1964), PP. 157-65,
with discussion, pp. 290-92
197. Boisdeffre, Pierre de:'Un siecle de poesie franpaise: de Baudelaire
a Yves Bonnefoy', Arts-Loisirs 66 (1966), pp. 28-9
198. Borel, J.: 'D'une experience de 1'impuissance', Cahiers du Sad
380 (1964), PP. 270-87
199. Bosquet, Alain: 'Bonnefoy ou la fuite devant le signifiant',
Verbe et vertige (Paris, I96I), pp. 165-73
200. Bosquet, Alain: 'Yves Bonnefoy contre le signifiant immobile',
Nouvelle revue francaise 294 (June 1977), pp. 91-2
201. Bowie, Malcolm: 'The immanent Idea', Times Literary Supplement
(6 May 1977), P. 553
202. Brindeau, S.: 'La possession de 1'etre: Yves Bonnefoy', La Poesie
contemporaine de lang-ue francaise depuis 1945 (Paris, 1973)
pp. 197-202
203. Breunig j Le^oy C: 'Bonnefoy's Hamlet', World Literature Today
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53, 5 (1979), PP. 461-5
204. Bruch, J.-L.: 'Approches de la poesie', Chantiers 24, 4
(February i960), pp. 11-13
205. Casanova, Jean-Yves: 'A propos de Bonnefoy*, Bud 10,31 (1980),
pp. 52-6
206. Caws, Mary Ann: 'Bonnefoy: not the Peacock but the Stone',
The Inner Theater of Recent French Poetry (Princeton, 1972),
pp. 141-70
207. Caws, Mary Ann (with Sarah Lawall): 'A style of Silence: two
reading's of Bonnefoy's poetry', Contemporary Literature 16,2
(1975), PP. 195-217
208. Caws, Mary Ann*: 'Reading, the cast shadows:
a reflection', World Literature Today 55, 5 (1979), pp. 450-55
209. Chambaz, Bernard: 'L'Improbable', Nouvelle revue franpaise 352
(September 1980), pp. 88-90
210. Chappuis,Pierre: 'TJn Reve fait AMantoue', Nouvelle revue francaise
30"(1967), PP. 697-9
211. Chappuis, Pierre: 'Le Livre infaisable', Courrier du centre
international d'etudes poetiques 121-2 (1977), pp. 11-19
212. Charpentrat, Pierre: 'TJn instant privilegie de l'art de 1'Occident',
Critique 27 (March 1971), pp. 264-6
J
213. Charpentreau, J.: 'Poesie du temps', Signes du temps 1 (January i960),
pp". 29-32
214. Clancier, Georges-Emmanuel: 'Hier regnant desert*, Mercure de
France 354 (1958), PP« 295-8. Reprinted in La Poesie et
ses environs (Paris, 1975), PP* 247-52
215. Cornulier, Benoit de: 'Metrique de 1'alexandrin de Bonnefoy.
Essai d'analyse methodique', Langue francaise 49 (February 1981),
pp. 50-48
216. Deloffre, Frederic: 'Versification traditionnelle et versification
liberee d'apres un recueil d'Yves Bonnefoy', Le Vers franoais
au vingtieme siecle, ed. Parent (Paris, 1967), pp. 45-55, with
discussion, pp. 56-64
217. Beloffre, Frederic:'Yves Bonnefoy: "Nous vieillissions, lui le
feuillage et moi la source'", Stylistique et poetique franpaises
(Paris, 1970), pp. 199-211
218. Dickson, Andrew: 'Movement and Immobility in a Poem by Yves
Bonnefoy', Modern Language Review 72, 5 (July 1977), pp. 565-74
219. Dieguez, Manuel de: 'Bonnefoy et la critique du style', Esprit
28 (December i960), pp. 2120-28
220. Duits, Charles: 'L'enigme poetique d'Yves Bonnefoy', Critique 14
(1958), pp. 832-7
- 264 -
221. Dumontet, B.: 'Situer la poesie', Le Pont de l'enee 8 (1959),
pp. 62-5
222. Estaban, Claude: 'L'Echo d'une demeure', Nouvelle revue frangaise
225 (September 1971)* pp. 19-54
225. Estaban, Claude: 'L'immediat et 1'accessible', Critique 35 (19T7)»
pp. 913-48
224. Frank, Joseph: 'Yves Bonnefoy: Notes of an Admirer', World
Literature Today 53, 3 (1979)> pp. 399-405
225. Gateau, Jean-Charles: 'Bans le leurre du seuil', Nouvelle revue
franpaise 270 (June 1975)> PP- 71-3
226. Glissant, Edouard: 'Notes sur Bonnefoy et le chemin de la verite',
Les Lettres nouvelles 6,2 (1958), pp. 583-7
227. Glissant, Edouard: 'Offrande', L'Intention •poetique (Paris, 1969),
pp. 230-35
228. Gordon, Alex L.: "Things dying, things new born: the poetry of
Yves Bonnefoy', Mosaic 6, 2 (1972-73)» PP« 55-70
229. Gordon, Alex L.: 'Bonnefoy and "La conscience dans les pierres"',
Balhousie French Studies 1 (1979)» PP- 75-94
230. Gordon, Alex L.: 'From Anti-Platon to Pierre ecrite: Bonnefoy's
"indispensable" death', World Literature Today 53» 3 (1979),
pp. 430-40
231. Greene, Robert W.: 'Bonnefoy and art criticism: a preliminary
study', World Literature Today 53> 3 (1979), pp. 447-50
252. Gros, Leon-Gabriel: 'Pactes avec la mort', Cahiers du Sud 522
(March 1954), PP* 471-6
233. Gros, Leon-Gabriel: 'Stylisation et invention', Cahiers du Sud
47 (1958), pp. 264-70
254. Grosjean, Jean: 'Du mouvement et de l'immobilite de Douve',
Nouvelle revue francaise (September 1954)» P« 510
255- Henriot, E.: 'Essai d'explication d'un poete: Yves Bonnefoy',
Le Monde (2 July 1958), pp. 8-9
258. Hofstadter, Marc: 'The Search for Transcendence in Bonnefoy's
"Un Feu va devant nous"', Romance Notes 19, 1 (1978), pp. 4-9
237. Hofstadter, Marc: 'From alienation to incarnation. Bonnefoy's
Hier regnant desert' The Romanic Review 72 (1981), pp. 333_48
238. Eolkeboer, R.: 'Some Trends in Recent French Poetry', Studies in
the Twentieth Century 9 (1972), pp. 1-13
239. Hubert, Renee Rddse: 'Pierre ecrite'. The French Review 40 (1966-67),
pp. 174-5
240. Hubert, Renee Riese: 'L'Arriere-pays', The French Review 47 (1973-74),
pp. 216-17
- 265 -
241. Jaccottet, Philippe: 'Yves Bonnefoy', Nouvelle revue franpaise
12 (1958), pp. 296-500
242. Jaccottet, Philippe: 'Vers le "vrai lieu'", L'Eritretien des muses
(Paris, 1968), pp. 251-7
243. Jaccottet, Philippe: 'Une lumiere plus m&re', L'Arc 66 (1976),
pp. 24-6 ———
244« Jackson, John E.: 'En personne', L'Arc 66 (1976), pp. 82-4
245* Jackson, John E.: 'Rilke, Eliot and Bonnefoy as Readers of
Baudelaire', World Literature Today55. 3 (1979), pp. 458-61
246. Jamme, Pranck Andre: 'Rue Traversiere', Nouvelle revue franpaise
313 (February 1979), pp. 94-6
247. Jourdain, L.: 'Rimbaud par un autre', Tel Quel 6 (1961), pp. 47-52
248. Jourdan, Pierre-Albert: 'L'Ecriture comme nuee', L'Arc 66 (1976)
pp. 67-70
249. Kalb, Henry E.: 'Bonnefoy and Bouve. "Le Froid secret'", Modern
Language Review 73 (1978), pp. 525-31
250. Kanes, Martin: 'Bonnefoy, Architect', World Literature Today
53, 3 (1979), PP. 440-46
251. Karaulac, M.: 'Le Jardin essentiel. Notes sur Bonnefoy',
Bulletin des .jeunes romanistes 1 (June i960), pp. 20-21
252. el Kayem, Henri: 'Rencontres avec trois poetes: Schehade, Jouve,
Bonnefoy', La Revue du Caire 178 (March 1955), pp. 87-110
253. Kemp, Friedhelm: 'Bans le leurre du seuil', L'Arc 66 (1976),
PP. 37-40
254. Lang, Susanna: 'The Word and the Place Between', World Literature
Today 53, 3 (1979), pp. 417-20
255. Lawall, Sarah: 'Yves Bonnefoy and Benis Roche: Art and the Art
of Poetry', About French Poetry from Bada to Tel Q,uel (Betroit,
1974), PP. 69=111
256. Lawall, Sarah, and Mazy Ann Caws: 'A Style of Silence: two readings
of Yves Bonnefoy's poetry', Contemporary Literature 16,2 (1975),
pp. 193-217
257. Lawall, Sarah: 'Poetry, Taking Place', World
Literature Today 53, 3 (1979), pp. 411-17
258. Lawler, James R.: 'Celebrating the Obscure', World Literature
Today 53,3 (1979), pp. 405-10
259. Leclair, Yves: 'Bonnefoy dans le leurre du seuil', Recherches
sur l'imaginaire dans la litterature contemporaine de 1850 a
nos .jours (Angers, 1980), pp. 152-6
260. Madeleine-Perdrillat, Alain: 'L'Arriere-pays et la patrie inconnue
de Vinteuil', L'Arc 66 (1976), pp. 4R-55
- 266 -
261. Magny, 0. de: 'Bonnefoy', Ecrivains d'au,jourd[hui. ed.Pingaud
(Paris, I960), pp. 127-36
262. Martin, Graham Dunstan: 'Yves Bonnefoy and the Temptation of
Plato', Forum for Modern Language Studies 10,2 (1974)> PP- 95-108
263. Martin, Graham Dunstan: 'Bonnefoy's Shakespeare Translations',
World Literature Today 53j 3 (1979)» PP- 465-70
264. Martin, Graham Dunstan: 'Evoking the "objet profond": the poetry
of Yves Bonnefoy', The Language of Poetry: crisis and solution,
studies in modern poetry of French expression, 1985 to the
present, ed. Bishop (Amsterdam, 1980), pp. 69-92
265. Maurin, Mario: 'On Bonnefoy's Poetry', Yale French Studies 21
(1958), pp. 16-22
266. Munier, Soger: 'Le Pays', Critique 30 (1974)» pp. 515-28
267. Munier, Roger: 'Le Cri', L'Arc 66 (1976) pp. 16-23
268. Mus, David: 'Stances on Love' /on Dans le leurre du seuil7.
Poetry (Chicago) 128, 3 (June 1976), pp. 163-77
269. Paris, J.: 'Introduction', Anthologie de la poesie nouvelle
(Monaco, 1958), pp. 30-35
270. Picon, Gaetan: 'Les formes de l'esprit: 1'experience d'ecrire',
Le Monde (26 March 1968), p. 11
271. Picon, Gaetan; 'La parole survivante', Le Monde (7'May 1975)> P- H
272. Picon,Gaetan: *S'il est aujourd'hui une poesie . . .', L'Arc 66
(1976), p. 41
273• Piroue, Georges: 'Bonnefoy, Shakespeare et la tragedie',
Mercure de France 340 (i960), pp. 732-6
274* Piroue, Georges: 'Rimbaud -par lui-meme', Mercure de France 342
(1961), pp. 700-703
275- Pons, Christian: 'Les traductions de Ham"!et par des ecrivains
franpais', Shakesueare en France, Etudes anglaises (i960),
pp. 116-129
276. Pons, Christian: 'Transposition et traduction: a propos du Hamlet
d'Yves Bonnefoy', Etudes anglaises 17 (19&4)» PP* 538-48
277- Poulet, Georges: 'Un idealisme renverse', L'Arc 66 (1978), pp. 58-86
Wves. ... /
278. Price, John D.: ^Bonnefoy. The Sense of Things', Sensibility 1*<-S (
and Creation, Studies in twentieth-century French poetry,
ed. Cardinal (London, 1977)j PP- 204-19
279. Prothin, Annie P.: 'The Substantive Language of Bonnefoy',
Sub-Stance 20 (1978), pp. 45-58
- 267 -
280. Reda, Jacques: 'Bonnefoy, Yves: Pierre ecrite', Cahiers du Sua
383-4 (1965),PP. 172-3
281. Renard, Marie-Prance: '"Yrai nom" de Bonnefoy', Cabiers d'analyse
textuelle 18 (1976), pp. 66-76. Reprinted in L'Analyse textuelle.
Theorie et pratique, ed. Delbouille and Legros (Liege, 1978),
pp. 132-42
282. Richard, Jean-Pierre: 'Bonnefoy, entre le nombre et la nuit',
Critique 17 (May 1961), pp. 387-411• Reprinted in Onze etudes
sur la poesie moaerne (Paris, 1964), pp. 207-32
283. Roudaut, Jean: 'Le lit de la poesie', Critique 24 (1968), pp. 635-47
284. Roudaut, Jean: TYves Bonnefoy: Rome 1630', Les Cahiers du chemin
13 (October 1971), pp. 138-47
285. Roudaut, Jean: 'Les Arriere-livres', L'Arc 66 (1976), pp. 56-7
286. Saillet, M.: 'Du mouvement et de l'immobilite de Douve', Les
Lettres nouvelles 9 (November 1953), pp. 1166-72. Reprinted
in Sur la route de Narcisse (Paris, 1958), pp. 189-97
287. Saint-Aubyn, P.C.: 'Yves Bonnefoy: first existentialist poet',
Chicago Review 17, 1 (1964), PP« 118-29
288. Simon, Pierre-Henri: 'L'Arriere-pays d'Yves Bonnefoy', Le Monde
(3 June 1972). Reprinted in Parier pour 1'homme (Paris, 1973),
pp. 329-33
289. Stamelman, Richard: 'The Allegory of Loss and Exile in the Poetry
of Yves Bonnefoy', World Literature Today 53, 3 (1979), pp. 421-9
290. Stamelman, Richard: 'The Syntax of the Ephemeral' /on Giacometti,
Bonnefoy, Dupin and du Bouchet/ Dalhousie French Studies 2
(1980), pp. 101-17
291. Stamelman, Richard: 'Landscape and Loss in Bonnefoy and Jacccftet',
French Forum 5 (1980), pp. 30-47
292. Starobinski, Jean: 'La prose du voyage', L'Arc 66 (1976), pp. 3-8
293. Starobinski, Jean: 'Bonnefoy, la poesie entre deux mondes',
Critique 35 (1979), PP« 505-22. Reprinted in an English
translation by Mary Ann Caws, World Literature Today 53, 3
(1979), PP. 391-9
294* Starobinski, Jean: 'Eloge de M. Bonnefoy', Stiftung F.Y.S. zu
Hamburg. Yerleihung des Montaigne-Preises"1978 (1979), PP. 27-40
295. Sullivan, Adele, and Cagnon, Maurice: '"Devenir" (et "avenir").
Themes-cles dans 1'evolution poetique de Bonnefoy', Ethique
et esthetique dans la litterature francaise du vingtieme siecle,
ed. Cagnon (Saratoga, Cal., 1978), pp. 41-58
296. Tak, Marjan: 'Bonnefoy et Rimbaud', Rapports 49 (1979), PP« 59-61
- 268 -
297* Trottier, P.: 'Bonnefoy ou la poesie n'est pas tin art', Liberte 2
(i960), pp. 118-24
298. Vernier, Richard: 'TTn Recit d'Yves Bonnefoy', The Romanic Review
63, 1 (1972), pp. 34-41
299- Vernier, Richard: 'Prosodie et silence dans an recueil d'Yves
Bonnefoy', Studia Ifeophilologica 45 (1973), pp. 288-97
300. Vernier, Richard: 'Bans le leurre du senil'. The French Review
49 (1975-76), pp. 459-40
301. Vernier,Richard: 'Locus Patriae', 1'Are 66 (1976), pp. 9-15
302. Vernier, Richard: 'Bans la certitude du seuil. Bonnefoy, aujourd'hui',
Stanford French Review 2, 1 (1978), pp. 139-47
303. Vernier, Richard: 'Bonnefoy and the Conscience of Poetry', Sub-stance
23-24 (1979), PP. 149-56
304. Vernier, Richard: 'Words like the Sky: the Accomplishment of Yves
Bonnefoy', World Literature Today 53> 3 (1979)> pp. 384-91
305. Vigee, Claude: 'L'Enfant qui porte le monde', L'Arc 66 (1976),
pp. 27-36. Reprinted in L'Art et le demonique (Paris, 1978),
13-27
306. Wevill, Bavid: 'Beath's Bream Kingdom', Belos 4 (1970), pp. 235-41
307. York, R. A.: 'Bonnefoy. Aspects of Poetic Structure', Forum for
Modern Language Studies 15 (1979)» PP« 380-91
308. York, R.A.: 'Bonnefoy and Mallarme: Aspects of Intertextuality',
Romanic Review 71> 3 (May 1980), pp. 307-18
III OTHER WORKS CONSULTEB
A Philosophy
309. Brehier, Emile: La Philosophie de Plotin (Paris, 1928)
310.X Shestov, Lev: Chekhov and other essays (Bublin, 1916). Reprinted,
with introduction by S. Monas, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1966
311. Shestov, Lev: All things are possible, trans. S.S. Koteliansky
(London, 1920*)
312. Shestov, Lev: In Job's Balances, trans. Coventry and Macartney
(London, 1932)
313. Chestov, Leon: Athenes et Jerusalem, trans. Boris de Schloezer
(Paris, 1967)
3£ All works by Leon Chestov (Lev Shestov) are grouped together by date
of publication, irrespective of transliteration.
- 269 -
314• Chestov, Leon: Le Pouvoir des clefs, trans. Boris de Schloezer
(Paris, 1967)
315. Shestov, Lev: A Shestoy Anthology, ed. Bernard Martin (Athens,
Ohio, 1970)
316. Cornford, P.M.: Plato and Parmenides. Parmenides' Way of Truth
and Plato's Parmenides translated, with an introduction and
a running commentary (London, 1939)
317* Dodds, E.R.: 'The Parmenides of Plato and the origin of the
Heoplatonic "One"', Classical Quarterly 22 (1928), pp. 129-42
318. Hegel, G.W.P.: La Phenomenologie de 1'esprit, trans. J. Hyppolite
(Paris, 2 vols, 1939-41)
319• Henry, P., S.J.: 'The Place of Plotinus in the History of Thought',
preface to Plotinus, The Enneads, trans. MacKenna (London, 1962),
pp. xxxv-lxx
320. Kierkegaard, £>6ren: Journals, ed. and trans. Hong (Bloomington,
2 vols, 1970)
the
321. Otto, Rudolf: The Idea ofAHoly, trans. Harvey (Oxford, 1925)
322. Plotinus: The Enneads,trans. MacKenna (London, 3rd edition, 1962:
4th edition, 19&9)
323. Plato: The Symposium, trans. W. Hamilton (London, 1951)
324. Plato: The Republic, trans. H.D.P. Lee (London, 1955)
325. Plato: The Last Bays of Socrates, trans. H. Tredennick
(London, 1969)
326. Plato: Timaeus and Critias, trans. H.D.P. Lee (London, 1971)
327. Ross, Sir David: Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford, 1951)
328. Schloezer, Boris de: 'Un penseur russe, Leon Chestov', Mercure
de Prance 159 (October 1922), pp. 82-115
329. Soil, Ivan: An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics (Chicago, 1969)
330. Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans.
Pears and McGuiness (London, 1961)
B Theory of Literature and Art
331. Abrams, M.H.: The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the
Critical Tradition (Hew York, 1953;
332. Beguin, Albert: L'Ame romantique et le reve (Paris, 1946)
333« Benjamin, Walter: Iliumnations (London, 1968)
- 270 -
334- Brooke-Rose, Christine: A Grammar of Metaphor (London, 1958)
335. Cardinal, Roger: Figures of Reality: a -perspective on the
•poetic imagination (London, 1981)
338. Charpentrat, Pierre: Living Architecture: Baroque, Italy and
Central Europe, trans. Brown (London, 19&7)
337• Charpentrat, Pierre: Le Mirage baroque (Paris, 1987)
338. Coleridge, S.T.: Biographia Literaria (London, 1985)
339- Davie, Donald: Articulate Energy: An Inquiry into the Syntax
of English Poetry (London. 1978)
340. Hamburger, Michael: The Truth of Poetry (New York, 1969)
341. Heller, Erich: The Disinherited Mind. Essays in modern German
literature and thought (London, 1981)
342. Heller, Erich: Kafka (London 1974)
343* Heller, Erich: The Poet's Self and the Poem (London, 1978)
344. Martin, Graham Dunstan: Language. Truth and Poetry (Edinburgh,
1975)
345. Mossop, D.J.: Pure Poetry (Oxford, 1971)
348. Nowottny, Winifred: The Language Poets Use (London, 1982)
347. Raymond, Marcel: De Baudelaire au surrealisme (Paris, 1933)
348. Renard, Jean-Claude: Notes sur la poesie (Paris, 1970)
349. Rousset, Jean: La Litterature de 1'age baroque en France.
Circe et le paon (Paris, 1954)
350. Sartre, Jean-Paul: Qu'est-ce que la litterature? (Paris, 1948)
351. Scarfe, Francis: The Art of Paxil Valery (London, 1954)
352. Wheelwright, Philip: The Burning Fountain (Bloomington, 1954)
353- Wolfflin, Heinrich: Principles of Art History, trans. M. D.
Hottinger (London, 1932) ——
C Other Works
354. Barfield, Owen: Poetic Diction. A Study in Meaning (London, 1928)
355* Baudelaire, Charles: Les Fleurs du Mai, ed. Adam (Paris, 1981)
356. Baudelaire, Charles: Curiosites esthetiques. L'Art romantique
et autres oeuvres critiques, ed. Lemaitre (Paris,
357. Blake, William: Poetry and Prose, ed. Keynes (London, 1987)
- 271 -
358. Dante Alighieri: Le Opere, ed. Moore and Toynbee (Oxford, 1924)
359- Holded.in, Friedrich: Poems and Fragments, ed. and trans.
Hamburger (Cambridge, 1980)
360. MacCaig, Horman: A Round of Applause (London, 1982)
361. Mallarme, Stephane: Oeuvres completes, ed. Mondor and Jean-Aubry
(Paris, 1945)
362. Mondor, Henri: Vie de Mallarme (Paris, 1948)
363. Mounin, Georges: Les Problemes theoriques de la traduction
(Paris, 1983)
364. Muir, Edwin: Collected Poems (London, 1983)
365. Ogden, C.K., and I.A. Richards: The Meaning of Meaning (London,
1949)
386. Perse, Saint-John, Oeuvres completes (Paris, 1972)
387. Polanyi, Michael, and Harry Prosch: Meaning (Chicago, 1975)
388. Ponge, Francis: Le Parti pris des choses (Paris, 1987)
389. Ponge, Francis: Pieces (Paris, 1971)
370. Ponge, Francis: Comment une figue de -paroles et pourquoi (Paris, 1977)
371. Racine, Jean: Theatre complet, ed. Rat (Paris, 1980)
372. Rilke, R.M.: Duino Elegies, trans. Leisimian and Spender
(London, 1948)
373• Rimbaud, Arthur: Oeuvres, ed. Bernard (Paris, i960)
374* Robinson, Ian: The Survival of English (Cambridge, 1973)
375• Saussure, Ferdinand de: Cours de linguistique generale (Paris,
1965)
378. Shakespeare, William: Hamlet, ed. Dowden (The Arden Shakespeare,
London, 1899)
377- Shakespeare, William: Antony and Cleopatra, ed. Ridley (The
Arden Shakespeare, London, 1954)
378. Valery, Paul: Oeuvres, ed. Hytier (2 vols, Paris, 1957)
379- Verlaine, Paul: Oeuvres noetiques, ed. Robichez (Paris, 1989).
380. Whorf, Benjamin Lee: Language, Thought and Reality (Cambridge,
Mass., 1958)
381. Wordsworth, William: Poetical Works, ed. Hutchison and de
Selincourt (London, 1950)
